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INTRODUCTION 
From the seventeenth century on philosophers have been fascinated 
by Descartes' sceptical doubts with respect to the possibility of 
knowledge. Despite Descartes' own attempt to nip these doubts in the 
bud, they were highly contagious and they spread rapidly through the 
philosophical community. A large part of post-Cartesian philosophy can 
be characterized as the quest for an indubitable philosophical 
foundation of knowledge: The philosopher's aim was to find an 
effective anti-sceptical remedy in order to banish such doubt forever. 
However, centuries of unsuccessful philosophical research have convinced 
an increasing number of philosophers that there exists no curative 
remedy and that the best we can do is to look for palliative measures. 
There is no answer to the sceptical (Cartesian, Humean) challenge. 
Quine's diagnosis of the Humean predicament as the human predicament' 
is meant to be ultimate: we cannot be cured from being human. 
Quine's advice was to stop the search for a foundation of knowledge 
or a 'first philosophy'. Instead of justifying knowledge, philosophers 
should from now on try to explain knowledge by means of the best 
knowledge available from the empirical sciences. 
This proposal heralded the revival of the naturalistic approach in 
epistemology. Empirical sciences, such as psychology, biology and the 
computer-sciences, have been invoked to help explain the human capacity 
for knowledge. Research in these areas has been and still is highly 
successful, though it has not provided a satisfactory answer to the 
critics who object that scientists and philosophers cannot really penist 
in ignoring the sceptical challenge and that they cannot really manage 
without any a priori foundation of knowledge. At present, however, there 
seems to be a growing consensus that, surely, we cannot simply ignore 
the sceptical challenge, but that we can manage without a 'first philo-
sophy'. Some day empirical research will provide us with the appropriate 
'bootstraps' to escape from the notorious epistemologica! circle that 
arises, if one tries to explain the possibility of contingent knowledge by 
means of other, always fallible, contingent knowledge. 
The revival of naturalism was not restricted to epistemology alone. 
The naturalistic principle "that knowledge, mind and meaning are part of 
the same world that they have to do with and that they are to be 
studied in the same empirical spirit that animates natural science"2, 
became also a leading thought in e.g. the philosophy of mind and the 
philosophy of language. 
In this study I will be concerned with the naturalistic approach in 
the philosophy of science. If epistemology in general should be 
naturalized, then it is implied that the philosophy of science should take 
part in this enterprise. If there is no foundation for knowledge in 
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general, then there is no foundation for scientific knowledge either. Few 
philosophers of science are ready to accept this consequence: It seems to 
make any attempt to distinguish e.g. between good and bad science or 
between science and pseudo-science basically senseless. Mainly for this 
reason most philosophers of science reject Quine's proposal as too ex-
treme. At least, they say, there has to be some fundamental principle or 
criterium by which we can judge whether there is progress in science or 
not. Otherwise, there is only one option left, viz. to become relativists. 
In other words, the naturalist is challenged to show how he can 
explain progress in science, as everyone believes there is, without 
assuming some a priori criterium to assess progress with. In this study I 
will take up this challenge. I do not believe that one needs a prior 
foundation of knowledge - as both Quine and his critics seem to believe 
- to be able to justify our knowledge and to demonstrate progress in 
science. I will defend a naturalistic approach in the philosophy of 
science, first by showing that, thus far, the attempts to give a prior 
foundation to scientific knowledge have run into grave difficulties, and 
secondly by arguing that we will have a good opportunity to explain 
progress in science if it can be shown that there has been progress in 
rationality as well. I submit that both progress in science and progress 
in rationality - i.e., in the quality of the reasons used by scientists -
can be explained in terms of each other, viz. in terms of the mutual in-
fluence of scientific discoveries and scientific standards or values. In 
this 'bootstrap'-theory of scientific rationality there is no need for a 
prior foundation of knowledge or science in order to explain progress in 
science. So this conception, if successful, will help us to escape "the in-
viduous choice between the arbitrariness of the (logical) absolutist and 
the defeatism of the (historical) relativist". 
A naturalist conception of science, at least the one I have in view, 
can be successfully defended only by means of extensive and detailed 
historical studies. Such studies will not merely be concerned with the 
history of science but more generally with the history of ideas. To 
support the naturalist conception of science these studies should not 
only show how science has developed under the guidance of (local) 
scientific standards or values, but also how these standards or values 
themselves have changed under the influence of science. The naturalist 
expects that a detailed account of the previous history of our science 
and our ideas about scientific rationality will explain why we can have 
confidence in our present ideas about rationality and that such an ex-
planation will also suffice to justify this confidence. 
So this conception of science hopes to get the best of both worlds: 
both the explanation and the justification of our scientific knowledge 
and of our ideas about what constitutes scientific knowledge. 
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Of course, I dare not pretend to actually give such an explanation 
and justification here, but I hope to show how, in one particular case, it 
can be developed. My own contribution to the historical explanation of 
our knowledge is restricted to a detailed investigation of one episode in 
the history of science, viz. the Mendelism-biometry controversy in 
evolutionary theory. 
This study consists of two parts. In part I I will unfold the naturalist 
conception of science by means of a discussion of three distinct topics 
in recent philosophy of science each of which, as I will show, has 
essentially contributed to the shaping of a naturalist approach to 
science: The growing awareness of the inextricability of the history and 
philosophy of science, the recognition that conceptual problem solving 
constitutes at least as important a part of the scientific enterprise as 
empirical problem solving, and the view of science as a discovery-process 
have given us accumulating reasons to believe that the naturalistic 
approach might be the best approach to explain scientific progress. At 
the end of part I I will give a general outline of this naturalist 
conception of science and I will show how this conception can be put to 
work in the explanation of controversy and consensus formation in 
science, both phenomena that either foundationalist or relativist 
conceptions of science have difficulties to cope with.'* 
In part II I will apply the naturalist conception to one special and 
well-known example of a scientific controversy, viz. the already 
mentioned Mendelism-biometry controversy. I will argue that this 
controversy is best understood if we take full account of the mutually 
incompatible scientific standards governing research in each of the 
competing programs. My main project is to show that these standards, 
which were largely responsible for the vehemence of the controversy, 
gradually changed under the influence of scientific developments within 
each of the programs. As a result of these changes both programs 
converged to each other with respect to their scientific theories as well 
as their scientific standards. In the end, the Mendelian and biometrie 
programs were to be synthesized into one new program - the program of 
population genetics - that comprised the most successful scientific and 
meta-scientific ideas of the old programs. This case-study primarily 
shows how scientists can have reasons to change their ideas about 
scientific rationality because of new scientific developments. The fact 
that scientists did have good reasons to change these ideas already 
indicates that there may be progress in rationality. But to support the 
claim that there actually has been progress further research into the 
vicissitudes of the program of population genetics will be necessary. At 
the end of part II I will discuss some aspects of the program of 
population genetics that give us prima facie reasons to believe that 
there has been such progress indeed. My conclusion will be that this 
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study of the Mendelism-biometry controversy serves as a good example 
of the kind of empirical, historical research that will be necessary to 
explain - and justify - our present scientific knowledge. 
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PARTI 
THE NATURALIST CONCEPTION OF SCIENCE 
INTRODUCTION 
The naturalist conception of science is not a conception that can be 
neatly and systematically exposed like e.g. Popper has done with his fal-
sificationist methodology in the Logic of Scientific Discovery. There are 
two obvious reasons for this: First, the naturalist approach is a meta-
methodological approach. It transcends methodology; it purports to study 
the history of methodology and to answer such questions as to why 
different methodologies have been used and how these methodologies 
have changed over time. Secondly and more importantly, the naturalist 
denies that there is one valid method or one valid meta-method (cf. e.g. 
Lakatos' conception) of science. What validity scientific methods have is 
always historically contingent. So the naturalist does not want to 
prescribe one particular method or meta-method to all science, but he 
wants to investigate which methods that are employed in science, can be 
vindicated by the previous history of science. Or, more precisely, he 
wants to investigate which methods that are employed in a particular 
scientific discipline, can be vindicated by the previous history of that 
discipline. This approach is not doomed to be exclusively descriptive. On 
the contrary, historical studies may well reveal how methods can be 
improved, given the historical and contemporary background of the 
discipline being studied. 
I believe that the best way to convey an outline of the naturalist 
view of science is to show how this view more or less issued from some 
recent developments in the philosophy of science. The strategy in this 
part of the study, therefore, is to discuss these developments and to 
show in each case how and in what aspects they have contributed to the 
naturalist conception of science. 
In chapter I I will start with the most important development, viz. 
the so-called 'historical turn' in the philosophy of science. Since the 
1960*5 the history of science has become relevant for the (Anglo-Saxon) 
philosophy of science in several distinct ways. First it was recognized by 
an increasing number of philosophers that the previous history or the 
career of a theory should be taken into account for its appraisal. From 
this recognition it was only a little step to the view that the philosophy 
of science should not focus on single theories but on larger units of 
appraisal that are stretched over time. Furthermore, it has been 
persuasively argued by Kuhn and Lakatos, among others, that 
epistemologica! and metaphysical issues play an important constructive 
role in the development of theories or science in general. As a 
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consequence these 'extra-scientific' beliefs, which help to determine the 
career of a theory, should be considered as part of the larger units of 
appraisal. The thesis that such extra-scientific beliefs are indispensable 
for the development of science is one of the basic tenets of the 
naturalist conception of science, elaborated in this study. 
But another, more profound connection between the history and 
philosophy of science made its appearance when philosophers began to 
ask themselves seriously how they would justify their particular philo-
sophical models.' Before the 1960's philosophers of science have been 
rather evasive about this question, but since the 'historical turn' most of 
them have come to agree that every philosophy of science should be 
tested against the history of science, i.e. every normative model of 
science should be confirmed by actual scientific cases. However, this -
highly reasonable - requirement was not easily met Most attempts to 
justify particular philosophical models by means of historical case-studies 
have run into some recurrent and virtually insuperable difficulties. I will 
discuss these problems in section 2 of chapter I and I will show that 
these problems are mainly due to the fact that philosophers have con-
tinually aimed at establishing a foundation for all scientific knowledge. 
In section 3 of chapter I I will argue that these problems can be 
avoided if one abandons the quest for one, universally valid model of 
science and if, instead, one accepts that rationality itself is historical in 
character. Rationality in science is historically contingent; it depends on 
the state of knowledge at any particular time. What is judged to be 
rational changes with the content of scientific knowledge. This 
conception does not imply some kind of relativism. On the contrary, I 
will indicate how our intuition that science has progressed is best pre-
served if we can show how science and rationality have both progressed 
through time in mutual interaction. This means that the history of 
science is not only relevant for, but even inextricably intertwined with 
the philosophy of science. 
While chapter I contains a discussion of some prior theoretical con-
siderations that lead one to a naturalist conception of science, chapter 
II deals with the prior empirical support of such a conception. In my 
view, the main contribution of Laudan's Progress and Its Problems* 
consists in its demonstration of the ubiquity of conceptual problem 
solving in science. Laudan cites many examples of the arisal and sub-
sequent resolution of conceptual tensions in science. Such tensions, I 
will argue, are predicted by a naturalist conception of science. Many of 
these conceptual tensions pertained to the detection of some incongruity 
between a scientist's conception of rationality and his actual scientific 
discoveries. The naturalist approach finds primarily support in the fact 
that these tensions were often resolved by means of a readjustment of 
the scientist's preconceived standards or values to his discoveries. The 
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main purpose of the case-study in part II will be to extend this support 
by means of an elaborate study of the influence of science on the 
scientists' ideas about scientific rationality. 
If the results of chapter I and II are put together, then it appears 
that science is best conceived of as a discovery-process. In chapter III I 
will argue that a large part of the scientific enterprise consists of the 
discovery of theories or problem-solutions by means of abductive in-
ference. The take-off of this argument is Kuhn's and Lakatos1 
recognition of the important constructive role that meta-scientific ideas, 
e.g. epistemologica! and metaphysical presuppositions, play in the 
development of science. I will argue that most of the time scientists 
reason from a particular problem and a set of presuppositions, drawn 
from their background-knowledge, to a problem-solution. Part of these 
presuppositions are the scientists' ideas about what is rational in science 
(e.g. is it rational to hypothesize unobservable entities or not?). 
I will further argue that these presuppositions do not only heuris-
tically guide the scientists' research but that they also confer, to a 
certain extent, an epistemic warrant on the solutions finally reached. But 
neither the way in which the scientist is heuristically guided nor the 
way in which his solutions are epistemically warranted can be 
characterized as smooth algorithmic procedures. In fact, the scientist 
usually starts with some vague intimations of the restrictions on his 
research, which are further specified in the course of that research. 
During this process he will often encounter the kind of conceptual pro-
blems that I discuss in chapter II and he may discover that some of his 
presuppositions, including his conception of scientific rationality, will 
have to be readjusted to the scientific knowledge he has already ac-
quired. Thus conceived, science is a discovery-process that continually 
reshapes itself in a naturalistic fashion. 
Finally, in chapter IV I will rehearse the most important results of 
the discussions in the previous chapters and I will answer some of the 
objections that can be made against (my version) of the naturalist con-
ception of sience. Next, in section 2 of that chapter, I will show how 
the naturalist conception can be applied in the explanation of contro-
versy and subsequent consensus formation in science. Because the case-
study in part II concerns the controversy and final consensus formation 
between Mendelians and biometricians, this section can be seen as a 
preliminary to the case-study. For the same reason section 3 can be 
seen as an interlude between parts I and II: In this section I will discuss 
an alternative naturalist approach to the Mendelism-biometry contro-
versy, viz. the approach of the 'strong programme' in the sociology of 
science. The strong program claims that it can give a sufficient 
explanation of the controversy in terms of social causes. I will argue 
that it fails to substantiate this claim and that, instead, an explanation 
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in terms of reasons promises to be more successful. Such an explanation, 
I submit, will be given in part II. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE INEXTRICABILITY OF THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 
OF SCIENCE 
The Kuhnian revolution in the philosophy of science is often con-
ceived of as signifying some sort of 'historical turn' in the 
philosopher's interests; it has also been characterized as a radical 
break from 'logicism' and an embracement of 'historicism' in the 
general philosophical orientation. As it stands, however, this is far 
too rough and unclear a characterization to yield much insight in the 
changes that took place. 
First, the 'historical turn' was relevant only to certain parts of 
the philosophy of science. It concerned such connected topics as 
confirmation, theory-structure, explanation and conceptual change, but 
it did hardly affect discussions of, e.g., measurement, modality or 
causality.1 
Secondly, many problems in the specific branches of the philosophy 
of science, such as the philosophy of quantum mechanics or the philo-
sophy of relativity theory, should still be classified as largely 
formal in character and the solutions to these problems are often cast 
in complex mathematical language. 
Thirdly, it is not at all clear what is meant with the label 
'historicism'. For all its worth as a general label it seems to 
signify a unanimous rejection of the central positivist doctrines and 
a renewed acknowledgement of the relevance of historical investiga-
tions to the philosophical enterprise. But the alleged relevance of 
the history of science has been estimated in fairly different degrees 
and varieties. This diversity renders the label 'historicism' too 
ambiguous, to be clarifying as a general characterization. 
To resolve this ambiguity McMullin^ proposes to distinguish between 
three different theses touching on the temporal dimension of science: 
1) Scientific theories are historical entities and not just atemporal 
sets of propositions. 
2) History of science provides an indispensable warrant for epistemo-
logica! claims about the nature of science. 
3) Scientific rationality is itself historical in character. 
Similar distinctions have been made by, e.g., Burian and Finochiaro. 
Burian also distinguishes between 'minimal', 'weak', and 'strong 
historicism'. Theses (1) to (3) can, roughly, be seen as progressively 
stronger versions of 'historicism'. Each of these theses is relevant 
for this study; I will discuss them separately in the following three 
sections. 
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1. Scientific theories as historical entities 
It is hard to think of any present philosopher of science who would 
deny that the history of a theory should play some role in the 
evaluation of that theory's credentials. One might say that 'minimal 
historicism' is a generally shared doctrine in recent philosophy of 
science. But at least in the 20 years between 1940 and 1960 that 
positivism was dominant this doctrine has been out of fashion. In their 
endeavour to completely formalize theory-assessment the positivists 
hoped to reduce the evaluation of theories to the exploration of the 
logical relations between theory and evidence at a given moment. The 
preceding history of that theory was considered to be irrelevant. 
However, it was soon recognized, even by some positivists themselves, 
that this 'logicist' conception precluded them from distinguishing 
between genuinely testable theories and 'ad hoc'-theories. Nineteenth 
century philosophers had already stressed the importance of this 
distinction. One of them, Whewell , claimed that only those theories 
could be accepted as good, or even true, theories that made 'novel' 
predictions. These theories were distinguished from 'ad hoc'-theories by 
their prediction of new, unexpected data, which were not part of the 
reason for formulating the theory in the first place. This requirement is 
nowadays still considered to be an important criterion in theory-
appraisal. But the criterion also implies that the history of a theory has 
to be taken into account. It is not possible to ascertain whether a 
theory is ad hoc independently of a historical knowledge of its pre-
decessors and of the general background knowledge available at the time 
of its invention. 
In our time Lakatos" has probably been the most important advocate 
for the return to at least this minimal form of historicism. Apart from 
emphasizing the role of 'novel' predictions in theory-assessment he has 
also indicated the relevance of other historical factors such as, e.g., the 
theory's ability to accomodate auxiliary hypotheses and its capacity to 
reshape itself under competitive pressure or in the face of experimental 
difficulties.' One of Lakatos' reasons for introducing the career of a 
theory as relevant for theory-appraisal was his conviction that Popper's 
falsificationism was the right doctrine, but that it failed because of its 
rejection of theoretical dogmatism and inductivism. In Lakatos' opinion 
we are justified to maintain a falsified theory, if it still succeeds in 
making novel predictions and if some of these predictions are confirmed 
once in a while. 
Lakatos' sophisticated falsificationism has been widely received as a 
necessary improvement on Popper's philosophy. Accordingly, it is agreed 
that historical factors should play a part in theory-assessment. But so 
far this does not imply that theories themselves have to be seen as 
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historical entities. The criterion of novelty leads one to impute a 
temporal ordering to the evidence for a theory; it does not compel one 
to the view that theories themselves are historical entities. 
Again, it is Lakatos who has to be credited for being one of the first 
philosophers, who insisted on looking at the career of a theory in 
theory-appraisal. Lakatos substituted 'theory' by a 'series of theories' (or 
series of subsequent versions of one theory) as the basic unit of ap-
praisal. For the assessment of scientific progress one should not look at 
single theories but at the historical development of a 'scientific research 
program'. But, despite the proven fruitfulness of the notion of 'research-
program' - which is illustrated by the appearance of many modifications 
of this notion: e.g., Laudan's 'research tradition' or Shapere's 'scientific 
domain' -, Lakatos has not come up to the expectations that he had 
created with his theory. In particular, Lakatos has failed to indicate 
unambiguously what it is that is being appraised with respect to a re-
search program. And this, of course, is a first requisite if he wants to 
show that, rather than a time-sliced theory, the research program as a 
historical entity should be the basic unit of appraisal. 
Thus, McMullin' urgently questions Lakatos, what precisely is a re-
search program and how is it to be appraised. If Lakatos identifies the 
research program, as he does more than once, with a series of theories, 
how is this series to be appraised? Ought the last one of this succession 
of theories not bear the main weight of appraisal? Certainly not, if 
Lakatos wants to be consistent. As McMullin points out, there should be 
some sort of continuity or a continuous entity that allows one to speak 
of a program's being the 'same' program throughout and that makes it 
possible to appraise it as a trans-temporal unity. Here I will skip the 
problem of identification - I will come back to it later on - and con-
centrate on the question, what it is that is being appraised with respect 
to research programs. 
McMullin claims, that in Lakatos' theory it can not be the hard core. 
Though it is a continuous entity, being irrefutable and hermetically 
sealed off from the rest of the program it cannot be appraised. But what 
about the 'positive heuristic'? Does not Lakatos suggest that it is the 
hard core together with the positive heuristic that is being appraised 
with respect to their success in determining the career of a theory? 
Isn't this the continuous entity McMullin asks for? McMullin seems to 
dismiss this possibility. But, given Lakatos' highly ambiguous 
characterization of the 'positive heuristic', this dismissal is strongly 
dependant on McMullin's own reading of Lakatos' theory. If one should 
believe McMullin10, then Lakatos has not much more to say about the 
'positive heuristic' than that it is independent of the hard core; that it 
only concerns the protective belt; that in the protective belt theories 
are modified and that these modifications typically consist of the 
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"addition of novel auxiliary hypotheses". Nothing is said about the way 
these modifications are made; they seem completely arbitrary. It sounds 
as though hypotheses can just be added and if the addition works, the 
hypothesis will be credited; if it does not work the hypothesis will be 
dropped and no harm is done. Clearly, there is no trace to be found 
here of an appraisal of a continuous entity indicative of the career of a 
theory. McMullin repeatedly adds that Lakatos surely would have wanted 
to say more about the positive heuristic, but that he does not and 
cannot, primarily because of his strict separation of the hard core and 
the positive heuristics. Lakatos' whole point of suggesting a temporal 
unit of appraisal probably was that theory-modifications are dependent 
on the original theory or hypothesis and that the way theories are 
modified - the positive heuristic - is suggested by this original hypo-
thesis. But, as McMullin argues, Lakatos is unable to substantiate these 
points, because it does not fit in with his theory of research programs. 
McMullin concludes that there is nothing much to be gained from 
Lakatos' theory of research programs. Moreover, there are still no insur-
mountable objections against viewing theories instead of programs as the 
temporal units of appraisal.12 Especially not, if one accepts McMullin's 
claim that in theory-assessment one should take account not only of the 
novelty of its predictions, but also of the proven fertility of the theory. 
According to McMullin a good scientific theory is always associated with 
a model or "a postulated explanatory structure whose elements are 
capable of further imaginative development". ^ Such a model "allows the 
imagination to work, and guides it in certain directions. It is not a 
merely vague or indefinite object of thought. It directs the mind, not 
coercívely but tentatively, by analogies and hints". The modifications 
of a theory are not (logically) precontained in this model, "but the 
potentialities to produce them are there, and this is why the 
corroboration of a theory is, in part, a corroboration of the original 
metaphor (model) from which the career of the theory (or this episode 
in the career of the theory) began". ^ 
McMullin hits the mark; he has pointed out some important reasons 
why we should consider theories as historical entities or temporal units 
of appraisal. But I think that McMullin has been too harsh in his 
indictment that Lakatos missed these points and I also think that 
McMullin in his turn missed an important aspect of Lakatos' theory. 
Lakatos' positive heuristics is too easily dismissed by McMullin as 
being of little relevance for the apraisal of research programs as 
temporal units. If Lakatos would have dropped his sharp distinction 
between hard core and positive heuristics - and I see no particular 
reason why he could not have done that; e.g., it is not essential to his 
theory that the hard core should be isolated as irrefutable - then many 
of McMullin's criticisms would cease to have any impact. In fact the 
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'positive heuristic' has much in common with McMullin's notion of a 
'model' or a 'metaphor': The protective belt is not built up in an 
eclective fashion, without any preconceived order. There is an order of 
research and this is set out by the positive heuristic. It sets out a 'pro-
gramme' which, to quote Lakatos, lists "a chain of ever more compli-
cated models simulating reality". The positive heuristics consists of 
partially articulated sets of suggestions and hints on how to change and 
modify the protective belt. Finally, the research program may be 
negatively appraised if the positive heuristic does not work well. One 
way to resolve this problem is to change the positive heuristic by means 
of a 'creative shift'. 
So far, Lakatos' description of the 'positive heuristic' is almost inter-
changeable with McMullin's description of a 'model' or a 'metaphor', 
except for the difference between McMullin's 'theory' and Lakatos' 
'program'. 
However, problems arise when Lakatos tries to spell out the positive 
heuristic in more details. On the one hand it is repeatedly suggested 
throughout his work that the positive heuristic primarily sets out the 
way in which the 'theory' or 'model' is to be elaborated mathematically. 
But this view would imply that all modified versions of the original 
theory are already precontained in that theory and that the career of 
the program would be irrelevant for theory-appraisal. On the other hand 
Lakatos suggests on several occasions that the positive heuristic may be 
formulated as a set of flexible 'metaphysical' principles.17 Although 
Lakatos remains conspicuously vague about it, this suggestion can only 
be interpreted as transcending pure mathematics. Elsewhere1" Lakatos 
stresses the heuristic importance of 'influential metaphysics' and the 
connection of this sort of metaphysics with the problem of continuity in 
science. Though again Lakatos is not quite explicit about it, he seems to 
suggest that this metaphysics asserts its influence via the positive and 
negative heuristics of a program. 
Despite, the ambiguity in Lakatos' explication of the concept of 'posi-
tive heuristic', one can not escape the impression that Lakatos would 
have accepted an interpretation which would strongly resemble 
McMullin's notion of a 'model'. But there would be one important 
difference: the positive heuristic is, at least partly, shaped by extra-
scientific, metaphysical considerations.1' McMullin's insistence that we 
should look at the theory proper as a historical unit in which the model 
is unfolded^ seems to exclude such an influence of extra-scientific 
considerations. I think that McMullin by rejecting 'research programs' as 
a "bad choice of label"21 misses an important aspect of scientific 
reasoning which is partly captured in Watkins' and Popper's notion of 
'influential metaphysics' and which can only become part of scientific 
appraisal if one looks beyond the theory proper. 
14 
In a sense one might say, with McMullin, that the development of a 
new theory starts with a 'model' and all its 'metaphorical1 resources. But 
the elaboration of the model is not only dependent on the indications 
given by the model itself , but usually also on a list of heuristically 
useful restrictions, which may consist of e.g. metaphysical and methodo-
logical constraints. The form of the 'chain of ever more complicated 
models' is co-determined by these extra-theoretical restrictions. 
Of course, such an influence of extra-scientific 'values' was already 
recognized by authors like Kuhn and Feyerabend, but they inferred that, 
as a consequence, theories cannot be genuinely appraised. Lakatos tried 
to restore rationality by incorporating these extra-scientific 
considerations within his programs and letting these complex wholes 
function as units of appraisal. 
It may be true that Lakatos failed in demonstrating, as I agree with 
McMullin, that his programs actually function as units of appraisal, but 
this does not detract from the value of Lakatos' work, in so far as he 
has shown how extra-scientific influences should be taken into account 
in the assessment of scientific development. 
To resume, Lakatos has learnt an important lesson from the 'histori-
cal turn' in the philosophy of science, which is inadequately attended to 
by McMullin. This lesson consisted of Kuhn's prime contribution to this 
historical turn, viz. his demonstration of the role of extra-theoretical 
values in the development of science. ^ Lakatos seems to have acknow-
ledged the role of these values; his theory of scientific research pro-
grams was partly meant to ward off the relativistic implications drawn 
by Kuhn and Feyerabend. 
However, Lakatos' unhappy distinction between the irrefutable hard 
core and the more flexible positive heuristic and the ambiguity in his 
explication of the function of the positive heuristic makes it hard to see 
what it is that is being appraised with respect to research programs. 
What is worse, Lakatos' advice that one should choose the progressive 
program in favour of a degenerating program only belittles again the 
role of the previous history of the program as it comes to appraising 
that program.^4 
In this study I will try to overcome the difficulties and short-comings 
of both Lakatos' and McMullin's proposals by developing a conception of 
'research programs' that is highly germane to Laudan's notion of 're-
search traditions'. * In this conception I will drop the distinction 
between a 'rigid' hard core and a 'flexible' positive heuristic. Instead a 
program is designated as a flexible 'constraint-structure'^ which 
simultaneously captures McMullin's notion of "a postulated explanatory 
structure whose elements are capable of further imaginative development" 
and Lakatos' notion of "a partially articulated set of suggestions and 
hints on how to change and modify theories". The constraint-structure 
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does not only comprise a specific 'model' of a purely scientific domain, 
but it also puts metaphysical and methodological constraints on the 
elaboration of this model. 
In this context I will refrain from giving a full description of con-
straint-structures. Such a description will be given later on. Here it 
should only be noted that these more inclusive 'models' - the constraint-
structures - are the units of appraisal in my conception. It is the 
career of these constraint-structures which is being appraised with 
respect to their capacity to indicate what problems have to be solved 
and how they have to be solved. But they are not only appraised exter-
nally 'with hindsight'. Sometimes scientists themselves will stop their 
'normal' research - in the moments of minor crises that will occur in 
every program - to scrutinize the constraints they are working with and 
even to change one or more of them. This form of internal appraised is 
important for the naturalist conception of scientific development to be 
elaborated in this study. I will return to it in section 3 of this chapter. 
To conclude this section I will briefly discuss the problem of the 
identification of research programs, that I already mentioned earlier in 
this section. In Lakatos' theory there seems to be no such problem, be-
cause programs are identified by their inflexible hard cores. But if we 
allow, as I propose, that every ingredient of a program may - in prin-
ciple - be subject to change, then it seems that we are not able any 
more to assert that a program remains the same through time. In other 
words, if a program has no essential, unchanging characteristics there is 
a problem as to how we distinguish between a change within one pro-
gram and a transition between two successive programs. One possible 
way to solve this problem is suggested by David HulP' who observed an 
interesting analogy between biological species and theories. 
Hull is a fervent advocate of the 'radical solution to the species pro-
blem' that was first proposed by Ghiselin. ° This - highly controversial^' 
- solution consisted of the thesis that species are best interpreted as 
spatio-temporally localized individuals and not as natural kinds or clas-
ses. Hull has detected an analogy between his 'radical' species-concept 
and the conception of theories as historical entities. The analogy will be 
particularly forceful if one conceives of science as an evolutionary 
phenomenon. " Hull argues that if one takes this last conception seriou-
sly and one accepts the analysis of biological species as individuals in-
stead of classes, "then it follows that whatever conceptual entities are 
supposed to be analogous to species must also be historical entities". 1 
I think that any general comparison between scientific development 
and biological evolution is fraught with difficulties.^2 For one thing, the 
mechanism of natural selection is too opportunistic: It will never explain 
the ability of rational beings, i.e. scientists, to 'reculer pour mieux 
sauter', i.e to take temporarilly maladapted (irrational) decisions in order 
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to be more adapted (rational) in the long run.-'-' But the analogy bet-
ween species and theories may be still rewarding, because it suggests a 
solution to the problem of the identification of theories and programs. 
E.g., to answer the question what it is that makes Mendelian genetics of 
this day still the same theory as Mendelian genetics from the beginning 
of the century, one should not search for some shared essential property 
or some abstract similarity, but - in analogy to species-individuation -
one should search for an ancestor-descendant relationship. 
Although it remains unclear yet how such a relationship can be ac-
tually established with respect to theories or programs - e.g. we lack a 
clear substitute for the reproduction-relation that specifies the ances-
tor-descendant relation in species-individuation - this solution to the 
problem of identification has a prima facie attraction: At least, it is well 
in accord with the view, defended in this chapter, that our basic units 
of appraisal should be theories or programs that are stretched over time. 
Moreover, it links up with a general tendency to approach any problem 
of identification in terms of 'causal chains', whether it be, e.g., the pro-
blem of 'personal identity' in the philosophy of mind or the problem of 
'referential identity* in a realist philosophy of science. Such a connec-
tion may prove to be fruitful in the future. 
I am aware that this proposal needs a further elaboration, which I am 
not able to provide. But I believe that if it is necessary to have some 
criterion for the identification of theories or programs (I do not exclude 
that it will turn out to be pseudo-problem), then it should be looked for 
in this analogy with Ghiselin's view of species-individuation. 
2. History of science «s a warrant for the philosophy of science 
So far we have considered some arguments in favour of the relevance 
of the career of a theory (or program) to its appraisal. The 
establishment of this relevance amounts only to a minimal form of his-
toricism. It seems even possible to adapt the 'logicist stance', as Giere™ 
suggests, by including temporal considerations in the evaluation of theo-
ries. Such a modified logicist conception continues to employ universally 
valid evaluative techniques, as they are, e.g., provided by Carnap's con-
firmation theory, which in their application require only modest histor-
ical information.-" Moreover, it is not in principle impossible to develop 
universally valid and, by themselves, time-independent evaluative 
measures, which, e.g., will capture McMullin's notion of the 'proven 
fertility' of a theory, though such measures will probably have to trans-
cend purely logical procedures. 
A unanimous agreement that temporal considerations have to be taken 
into account in theory-appraisal does not necessarily undermine the in-
dependence of specific philosophical models of appraisal from the history 
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of science. However, in this section we shall encounter another theme in 
the post-Kuhnian criticism, which really does undermine the independen­
ce of the philosophy of science from the history of science. The suspici­
on arose that it would be pretty useless to be engaged in a normative 
enterprise of devising models of appraisal that could appear to be too 
remote from actual scientific practice. This suspicion was to be forceful­
ly expressed in the criticism at the address of the logical positivists. 
They were accused of building idealized structures, that were almost 
hermetically sealed off from the scientific activity that these structures 
were supposed to represent. 
Historical studies had shown that science was "a many-sided activity 
which had taken many centuries to develop and the variety of whose 
facets could not possibly be grasped by some formal scheme a ргіогГ™ 
Philosophical analyses ought to bear some resemblance to this complex 
scientific activity. As a consequence philosophers should at least test 
their models by means of examples form the history of science. The 
positivist models, it was generally agreed, would not stand such scrutiny. 
Another reason for the requirement of an α posteriori justification 
of any model of appraisal was the existence of a variety of conflicting 
normative models. How are we to choose between, e.g. a Popperian, 
Carnapian or Bayesian philosophy of science?-'' Provided that each of 
these models does not show any logical infelicities, a most reasonable 
suggestion seems to be, that they should be tested against the history of 
science. The best model will be the model that stands up to this 
empirical test by showing that every episode in the history of science, 
which we intuitively judge to be rational and progressive, is rational and 
progressive indeed according to its methodological standards. 
Historical case-studies should decisively influence our choice for a 
particular model of appraisal. The delicate balance between acceptance 
and validation™ seems to have turned towards the side of acceptance. 
The two extremes of this balance may be characterized as follows: either 
you start with developing an a priori scheme for validation and then you 
go out and look for particular scientific examples to fit into your sche­
me; if you do not succeed, then all science should be deemed irratio­
nal.-'' Or you start to collect examples from science, which scientists 
and philosophers agree to be rational episodes from the history of 
science and then you try to develop a model of appraisal into which all 
these examples can be accomodated. The most extreme position at this 
side of the balance would be to accept all science as rational and to 
reject any attempt to validate science. Feyerabend's position seems to 
draw near to this extreme. " 
Both extreme alternatives, of course, are unacceptable. If allowance is 
made for reaching the conclusion that all science is irrational, as in the 
first alternative, then it is unclear in what sense we are doing the 
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philosophy of science. I do not think that any philosopher of science, 
including the logical positivists, has ever seriously, or let us say deli-
berately, entertained such an extreme position. So it may be inferred 
that each philosopher of science at least has taken some episode from 
scientific history as prototypical of rational scientific reasoning prior to 
validation. If, on the other hand, validation becomes irrelevant and all 
science should just be accepted, whether it be rational or irrational, 
then it becomes unclear in what sense we are doing the philosophy of 
science. Acceptance without validation will lead us to an unattractive 
relativist position. 
But if at least some part of science should be accepted as rational 
prior to the development of any system of validation, then we will have 
to face up to the question which part of science should be accepted and 
whether that part or any other part of science can also be taken as a 
warrant for the system of validation subsequently developed. These 
seemingly innocent questions have generated a host of problems, two of 
them being notoriously difficult to solve. 
The first of these problems is the danger of circularity. If the histo-
ry of science is blind without a philosophy of science, as Lakatos main-
tains, then any example from the history of science that we want to use 
as a warrant for our philosophy of science, will already be preshaped 
into an approximate fit by that same philosophy of science. A corollary 
of this problem is the arbitrariness in the choice of the prototypical 
scientific examples. Lakatos' suggestion that we should appoint a 'scien-
tific elite' for choosing these examples does not satisfy as a solution: it 
would be hard to resist the temptation of appointing just that group of 
scientists as the 'scientific elite' that would subscribe to one's own 
system of validation. 
The second problem concerns the question whether scientists them-
selves from a certain scientific episode have made their decisions for the 
same rational reasons as the system of validation, for which this episode 
serves as a warrant, prescribes. If this is not the case - and 
Feyerabend argues that most of the times there is not even a consensus 
among the scientists involved - then it seems that we are forced to 
invoke a kind of Hegelian 'Cunning of Reason'r* if
 w e persist in 
judging certain scientific episodes as rational episodes, despite the fact 
that the scientists themselves made their 'rational' decisions on 
irrational grounds4^ then apparently it is the divine force of Reason 
that pushes science forward using the irrational passions of the scien-
tists as its vehicle. 
No one has really succeeded in breaking the ensuing deadlock in the 
philosophy of science. If it is generally agreed that each system of vali-
dation should be tested against the history of science and it is subse-
quently shown that such a test is virtually impossible, then any attempt 
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to develop a universally valid system of validation will remain futile. 
This does not only obtain with respect to the rather liberal methodolo-
gies of Lakatos and Laudan, but also, a fortiori, with respect to fal-
sificationism and inductivism. 
One possible way to escape this deadlock would be to ensure that in 
testing his system of validation the philosopher shall use actual, not re-
constructed cases from the history of science. This strategy would avert 
both the danger of circularity and the threat of an Hegelian conception 
of history. So the philosopher of science should reject Lakatos' adage 
that the history of science is blind without a philosophy of science. 
However, apart from the fact that 'actual' history, too, is inevitably a 
construct, this approach seems to have the unpalatable consequence that 
scientific development will appear to be largely an irrational affair with 
respect to whatever system of validation that will be applied. Every 
human activity, not in the least scientific activity, is heavily contamina-
ted by irrational elements - relative to one set of norms -. Part of the 
reason for reconstructing science, was to clear science of these irra-
tional elements. 
So it seems that the history of science can not serve as a warrant 
for the philosophy of science. Either the history of science (as actual 
history) will refute every philosophy of science or the history of science 
(as reconstructed history) will trivially support every philosophy of 
science by means of circularity or the invokation of 'hidden rationality'. 
I think this conclusion leaves the philosopher of science with two 
main options. The first option is, that he continues his quest for a 
univerally valid system of validation, but that he refrains from trying to 
test his inventions against actual scientific practice. This means that he 
falls back to the (extreme) positivists' aprioristic position. He will 
discuss the ideal structure of science in total isolation of real scientific 
development and scientific history ceases to have any function of a war-
rant for the philosophy of science. 
The other option is to drop the search for an a priori epistemic 
foundation. There are several possibilities left, if the philosopher of 
science chooses for this option: 
I. He could still try to steer a middle course. As a true empiricist he 
could try to be as faithful as possible to the actual history of science 
and to extract ex post factum some general criteria for theory-appraisal 
common to all of the scientific examples he has studied. But this 
'Baconian' inductivist strategy, if it succeeds at all, will most probably 
lead to a model of scientific development that will be so general as to 
be unilluminating and useless. 4 
Moreover, one still has to face the intrusion of a weaker form of 
circularity: since it is impossible to study all of scientific history, one 
has to make a selection. And given the aim of the study, at least the 
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larger part of this selection should consist of rational episodes from this 
history. So again the philosopher has to rely on his 'pre-analytic intui-
tions1 about the best available instances of rationality in the history of 
science. 
II. It is not in principle excluded, that the study of the actual history 
of science will reveal that the larger part of scientific development has 
been irrational. One may discover that science has changed under the 
influence of rhetoric tricks, propaganda or power instruments. In that 
case the history of science seems to serve as a warrant for 'overruling 
reason', disregarding 'refuting facts', in short for 'epistemic anarchy'.4^ 
But here again the necessity to select examples from history can lead to 
circularity: One malicious, but probably justified, objection against 
Feyerabend's defense of 'epistemic anarchy' by means of allegedly sup-
porting case-studies from the history of science, is that he might be 
disregarding refuting facts as well. If Feyerabend allows - or even 
recommends - the scientists to overrule reason, why should he not adopt 
the same latitude in choosing and interpreting the historical evidence for 
his theories? With respect to Feyerabend's theory the notion of a 
'warrant' itself becomes rather slippery both on the scientific and the 
metascientific level.4" As a matter of fact, many philosophers and histo-
rians are ready to concede, that Feyerabend has at least been consistent 
in taking his own advice to 'overrule reason' seriously to heart. 
But to be a relativist one does not have to be an extreme relativist. 
The study of the actual history of science may also reveal that, although 
rational and irrational arguments have been part of scientific develop-
ment they should rather be seen as epiphenomena on the real causes, in 
particular the social causes, which have shaped the scientific enterprise. 
This, in a nutshell, is the position of the 'strong programme' in the 
sociology of science. The history of science cannot serve as a warrant 
for any philosophy of science, because reasons (rational or irrational) 
have been irrelevant to the development of science. Since these sociolo-
gists have taken the biometry-Mendelism controversy, which is also 
subject of my case-study, as prototypical support for their theory, I 
will treat their approach separately in chapter IV. 
III. The last possibility to be mentioned here is to join the relativists in 
their rejection of the quest for general criteria of theory-appraisal, a 
priori or a posteriori, but to maintain that rational arguments have 
played a decisive role in scientific development. In this approach, which 
will be further elaborated in the course of this study, rationality in 
science is considered to be dependent on the content of science.' So 
there are no time-independent criteria of theory-appraisal; the criteria 
employed in the appraisal of knowledge are co-determined by the content 
of that knowledge itself. We learn what knowledge is as we attain know-
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ledge. ° Accordingly, the criteria of rationality in science change undei 
the influence of scientific development itself. 
With this third possibility to step across the pittfalls of foundationa-
lism we have come to the most controversial thesis touching on the 
temporal dimension of science, the one to be defended in this study, viz. 
the thesis that scientific rationality itself is historical in character. 
3. The historical character of scientific rationality 
Let me start this section with the remark that if we succeed in 
showing that scientific rationality is itself historical in character, then 
the problems, discussed in the last section, will have largely disappeared. 
No problem of circularity arises, neither do we have to invoke a 'Cun-
ning of Reason' if we try to take account of the 'local' rationality in 
the scientific episodes under study. The first thing that we want to 
investigate is whether scientists behaved rationally according to their 
own standards and in relation to the content of their own science. 
Subsequently we would like to discover how these standards changed 
under the influence of the further development of science and how these 
changes have ultimately shaped our standards of scientific rationality. 
Of course, this will be a difficult task, not in the last place because 
of Polanyi's justified skepticism towards our ability to render this 'local* 
rationality, which is largely implicit or 'tacit knowledge', into an explicit 
statement of the views of the scientists involved. Moreover, the 
'strong' historicist will have to face up to other problems. He will be 
hard pressed to give an explanation of progress in science. How would 
he give such an explanation without invoking some general principles of 
rationality? And how could he draw a distinction between rational and 
irrational episodes in scientific history? Or between science and pseudo-
science? What, e^g., will he have to say about the Lysenko era in 
Russian genetics?^ if he wants to condemn it as bad science, then this 
seems to -require the use of independent, time-transcendent criteria. 
These questions will be dealt with at the end of this section. 
I will now proceed with a detailed discussion of the alleged historical 
character of scientific rationality and its consequences for the relation 
between the history and philosophy of science. 
Few philosophers of science would deny the historical character of 
explicit scientific rationality. On the contrary, most of them will eagerly 
concede that their discipline, the philosophy of science which has as its 
foremost task to unearth the rational principles operative in scientific 
reasoning, made some striking progress in the last decades of its history. 
But most of them would strongly oppose to any allegation of a historical 
character to the implicit scientific rationality which they are trying to 
expose. Almost every philosopher of science has assumed that there is 
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one set of rules for scientific method which are permanent and trans-
temporal. The philosopher's task is to give a full statement of these 
rules and subsequently to show that these rules were, implicitly or 
explicitly, operative during the successful episodes in the history of 
science. 
This traditional position, too, has been challenged during the 'histori-
cal turn' in the philosophy of science. We have already encountered the 
extreme relativist's view, i.e. Feyerabend's view, that the history of 
science shows that virtually every kind of argument, reasonable or not, 
has been used with success in the development of science. Feyerabend 
infers from this observation, that the one lesson that we can and should 
learn from history, is that scientific progress will be enhanced by the 
rapid proliferation of theories and methods. This conclusion is not jus-
tified. One might just as well infer, that all scientists should stick to 
one method and one theory for, say, at least a century, because that 
strategy has not been tried out yet. Any strategy can be used if the 
scientist has no criteria to lean on. If every choice is arbitrary, why 
should scientists believe in 'progress' - by means of proliferation - as 
Feyerabend would have it? On the other hand, if progress is possible in 
any sense at the level of science, why not at the second level, the level 
of 'rational' procedure?^ Feyerabend's overt concern with progress in 
science evokes more than once the impression, that he might have been 
better off if he had been more sensitive to the possibility of progress -
instead of mere chaos - on the other levels of the scientific hierarchy -
the levels of the 'rules' and the 'aims' of science - as well. 
The approach that I want to defend in this section fully agrees with 
Feyerabend that examples of 'rule-breaking behaviour' abound in the his-
tory of science. But instead of drawing the conclusion that science is 
sheer anarchy, it will be argued that often 'rule-breaking' was the most 
rational thing to do for the scientist relative to his aims or to the state 
of scientific knowledge at the time. More than that, a scientist may 
even rationally change his aims, if that is what is strongly suggested by 
new scientific developments. 
So the alternative to the relativist approach is to maintain the as-
sumption that rational standards have guided scientific development - if 
only because we want an explanation for scientific progress -, and to 
investigate whether alongside or interwoven with progress in science 
there has been progress in the rational standards as well. 
To get a general idea of how such an approach may get off the 
ground, let us first have a look at a distinction made by Shapere be-
tween local and global presuppositionism. Shapere states that a funda-
mental difference between Kuhn's views and his views can be put by 
saying that "whereas Kuhn's view is a global presuppositionism (the same 
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over-arching presupposition or paradigm is brought to bear in every 
activity or idea in the paradigm tradition, and no contrary presup-
positions are allowed as "scientific"), (his) is a local presuppositionism 
(different presuppositions may be brought to bear in different situations, 
and where there is a more general and widely applied approach, as in 
current elementary particle theory, it too is subject to being 
questioned)".^ 
According to Shapere, 'local1 presuppositions can change gradually and 
there can be reasons leading to the adoption of new presuppositions or 
sets of presuppositions. So there are several ways in which the ideas of 
a certain period from the history of science can be evaluated. One is in 
terms of the criteria and well-founded beliefs available at that time and 
in thai part of science; another one is in terms of later ideas which 
showed the first in need of modification or rejection. 
This brings me to a distinction that I will make throughout this sec-
tion and that is derived, though only partly, from Shapere's distinction. 
I think we should separate two kinds of evaluation, viz. local and global 
evaluations. Local evaluations are made by scientists with respect to 
their science, but also with respect to their 'rules' and 'aims', relative 
to the well-founded beliefs available to them. We can also take a 'local' 
stance in evaluating certain episodes from the history of science by 
trying to get a picture of the 'local' background knowledge and beliefs. 
Global evaluations are always made by applying one's own standards of 
rationality, diachronically, to episodes from the history of science or, 
synchronically, to other, sometimes widely remote, scientific fields. 
Notice that 'global' is not to be understood as universally valid or as 
universally applicable, but as temporally or spatially extended beyond 
one's own domain. Global evaluations are possible at any time and at 
different levels of abstraction. For instance, we can treat a global 
evaluation made at an earlier period 'locally' or 'globallv'. Let me illu-
strate this by means of an example taken from Laudan.™ 
It is well-know that Newton thought to have followed the method of 
induction. His scientific achievements were the result of enumerative 
induction; no use was made of hypotheses that were not inductive 
generalizations. Given the overwhelming success of his theories and 
assuming that, indeed, he did follow the inductive method, it is not 
surprising that contemporary scientists and philosophers inferred that 
scientific progress depended on the eschewal of hypothetical reasoning 
and the rigid adherence to inductive generalization.55 Henceforth many 
scientists tried to develop theories that could be regarded as inductive 
generalizations from experimental data. 
But soon several of them discovered that their specific scientific 
fields were not suited for such an approach and that in fact they came 
to promulgate theories which in no way could be reconciled with an 
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inductivist philosophy of science. Le Sage's chemical and gravitational 
theories. Hartley's neurophysiological theories and Boscovich's theories of 
matter were all highly speculative theories which were intended to 
explain observed phenomena in terms of an unobservable micro-structure. 
As was to be expected, these theories were heavily criticized for 
their alleged epistemologica! and methodological deficiencies. To confront 
this criticism, there were two ways open for the scientists involved: 
either to drop their theories or to develop an alternative epistemology. 
All three scientists mentioned chose the latter alternative. They were 
convinced that their science simply required a new method, viz. the 
method of hypothesis. Their strategy was to defend this method and to 
point out weaknesses in the dominant method of induction. Le Sage even 
succeeded in demonstrating that the inductivists themselves, including 
Newton, extensively utilized the method of hypothesis. We know now 
that the defence of the method of hypothesis was successful and that 
this method finally gained wide-spread acceptance through the work of, 
e.g., Whewell and Herschel. From our viewpoint, moreover, we feel 
justified to conclude that Le Sage, Hartley and Boscovich did well to 
maintain their method instead of dropping their theories. 
What kinds of evaluations have taken place or could have taken place 
with respect to this episode in the history of science? First there are 
the local evaluations: For instance, the evaluation of theories by means 
of methodological rules (the inductivists' evaluation of Le Sage's theory) 
or the evaluation of methodological rules by means of scientific examples 
(the justification of inductivism by the success of Newton's theory or 
the devaluation of inductivism because of its failure in the scientific 
fields of Le Sage c.s.). In each of these cases we can ask whether the 
various judgments have been sufficiently supported by local reasons. 
Secondly, there are the global evaluations. These are made at 
different times and at different levels of abstraction. Le Sage acquired a 
good reason for rejecting the inductive method by his demonstration that 
Newton himself utilized hypotheses which were not inductively generated. 
This reason formed part of a global evaluation of the inductive method. 
It is important to note, that Le Sage could already have asked whether 
Newton himself nevertheless had good - local - reasons to think that 
the inductive method was the right method in comparison, for instance, 
to another deductive method, based on clear and distinct 'hypotheses', 
the Cartesian method. We can go one step further In his posthumous 
collection of Le Sage's essays on hypothesis" Prévost comes to the 
conclusion that Le Sage made a right decision, given the background 
knowledge of Prevost's time. But he could also have asked whether Le 
Sage's global evaluation of Newton's inductivism was locally supported, 
given the background knowledge of Le Sage's time. Skipping many steps 
in between we will finally end up by our evaluations. We may have our 
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reasons for judging the adoption of the hypothetical method by Le Sage 
es. as a good decision, but we can still ask for their reasons and for all 
the reasons which have played a role in intermediate evaluations of the 
hypothetical method. 
So we see the development of a complicated interrelation between the 
two kinds of evaluation. This picture will be further complicated by the 
introduction of synchronic local and global evaluations. Many scientists 
are able to and in fact do evaluate rival theories not only by their own 
standards and presuppositions but also by temporarily adopting the stan-
dards and presuppositions of their adversaries. In my case-study some 
examples of this switching between local and global evaluations will be 
given. 
Why is it important to distinguish between these global and local 
evaluations and to be aware of the relations which can exist between 
these kinds of evaluations? I think we will need a distinction and a 
connection between these kinds of evaluation, if we want simultaneously 
to avoid 'Whiggish' histories of science and to escape the traps of 
relativism. In the first case only the global type of evaluation is used. 
In the second case only local evaluations are permitted. 
The approach to be defended in this study is three-fold. To give a 
rough scenario of this approach: we will start with an investigation of 
the local evaluations of a particular scientific episode, looking for the 
reasons that have been used in the evaluation not only of scientific 
development itself but also of the rules and aims governing this 
scientific development. Then we will give our own - global - evaluation 
of this episode. Finally, whether there is a difference between our 
evaluation and the local evaluation or not, we will try to get an 
accurate picture of the development between the local reasoning process 
and our reasoning process with respect to this particular episode. Only 
then may we discover, why we are justified in thinking that our 
judgment is better than the local judgment. For we may find out that in 
history there have been good reasons - always relative to the state of 
knowledge at any particular time - for changing the beliefs about what 
rules and aims one should adopt in governing and judging scientific 
development. 
If we want to use the history of science as a warrant for our philo-
sophy of science, we should not look for particular scientific episodes 
supportive of our philosophy. On the contrary, we will expect that, in 
general, these episodes will not match our standards of scientific 
rationality. But we do need the history of science and the history of 
ideas about rationality in order to examine if and how our standards of 
rationality have changed for the better in the interaction between 
science and philosophy of science. Ideally, it is a historical continuum of 
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ideas that will serve as a warrant instead of particular time-slices from 
the history of science. 
It is not excluded, in principle, that we might discover that there has 
not been any progress at all in our ideas about rationality. For example, 
history may show us an unintelligible hotch-potch of alternating 
standards of rationality. But such a discovery would be difficult to 
match with our widely shared intuition that there has been progress in 
science proper. If we accept that there has been progress in science (as 
even the staunchest relativist does) and if we accept that our ideas 
about rationality change through time, then it seems reasonable to 
expect progress in our ideas about rationality as well. To paraphrase 
Shapere, we suppose that empirical, historical investigations will show 
that we have managed not only to learn, but also to learn how to learn. 
But, again, it is not excluded beforehand that this pressupposition will 
be falsified by history. 
The naturalist approach to science and rationality is a truly empirical 
approach. Its first aim will be to sort out which - if any - of the 
contemporary ideas about rationality are best supported by history. For 
several reasons this already turns out to be a very complicated task. 
First, of course, we have to cope with the complexity of the history of 
ideas itself. The best strategy to start with, it seems, is to investigate 
the most recent history of these ideas. 
Secondly, our ideas about scientific rationality are not suspended in 
the air; they are embedded in different contexts, which depend upon, 
e.g., the different scientific fields, the particular history of these fields 
and the contemporary state of knowledge in these fields. To give an ex-
ample, research in 19th century history of ideas may give us information 
that leads us to such conclusions, that we have good reasons - relative 
to the development of science and rationality - to be realists with res-
pect to genes but not with respect to, say, quarks. Research in the 
history of ideas may turn up reasons for us to be realists in some scien-
tific fields and instrumentalists in other fields. 
To give another example; in my case-study I will suggest that the 
biometricians had good reasons to be phenomenalists, first and foremost, 
because it enormously helped them to develop their statistical theories 
and secondly because it enabled them to give an explanation of gradual 
evolution. I also suggest that the biometricians should have become 
aware, that gradual evolution could be explained in terms of shifts in 
the statistical distributions of genetic factors. On the other hand they 
may still have had sufficiënt reasons to remain phenomenalists with 
respect to other fields of their inquiry, such as e.g. psychology. These 
reasons were largely provided by the success of their statistical methods 
of investigation. So, again, we may learn that it can be rational to be 
realist in one scientific field and instrumentalist in another, if that is 
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what is strongly suggested by the - successful - scientific research 
method. 
This brings me to the last kind of complexity to be mentioned here. 
This complexity arises as soon as we fully realize that every aspect of 
scientific reasoning can change in the course of that reasoning. The 
biometricians kept their method and shifted their field of inquiry - from 
biology to psychology - but they could just as well have maintained 
their scientific field and adapted their method, so as to include the 
investigation of unobservable entities. Each strategy can in principle be 
backed up by reasons. As we will see, the Mendelians changed the 'aims' 
as well as the 'rules' of their research program in evolutionary theory 
under the influence of the empirical discovery of chromosomes. 
Apparently there can be great differences as to which aspects in the 
process of scientific reasoning are kept constant and which aspects are 
allowed to change. 
During his research in the history of ideas, the strong historicist may 
reach the insight that, indeed, 'anything goes'. But he will not be satis-
fied by merely that insight. He will try to find out whether each time 
the scientists had good reasons to make such highly diverse decisions. 
To find that out he will often have to give a fairly complete picture of 
the extant scientific and extra-scientific beliefs at each particular 
period. The strong historicist has saddled himself with a difficult task, 
but in the exchange he will be able to warrant (or to raise specific 
doubts about) the confidence of contemporary scientists in their scien-
tific methods. And this is a result which, as we have seen, the 'logicists' 
and the 'minimal' historicists failed to accomplish. 
However, as we have also seen, the strong historicist has still some 
serious questions to answer 1) How does he explain progress in science 
without any recourse to general, time-transcendent principles of rationa-
lity? 2) How does he distinguish between rational and irrational episodes 
in the history of science? 3) Shouldn't he have some demarcation-
criterion, i.e. shouldn't he formulate some general characteristics of 
science to mark it off from other human activities? 
As to the first question, I hope that the preceding discussion has 
sufficiently revealed, that in my view progress in science is strongly 
coupled to progress in rationality. We have reasons to expect that both 
progress in science and progress in our ideas about rationality can be 
explained by the historical interaction between each other. Most of the 
times we use our 'aims' and 'rules' as standards to measure progress in 
science, but sometimes we use our scientific theories - or other items of 
information - as standards to measure progress in our 'aims' and 'rules'. 
Both science and rationality lift themselves up at each other's bootstraps 
or to use another metaphor, there is a positive feedback between science 
and rationality, which ensures that they progressively spiral around each 
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other. Ultimately progress in science is to be explained in terms of a 
succession of these bootstrap-phenomena, which can only be 
demonstrated by means of piecemeal historical investigations. 
Such an empirical explanation of progress in science will also provide 
us with an answer to the second question. If we have good reasons -
and most of these reasons wil be supplied by our research in the history 
of ideas - to believe that our standards of rationality are the best 
standards available, then there is nothing against using these standards 
in our - global - evaluation of the history of science. If we can support 
our shared conviction that there has been progress in science by means 
of such an empirical explanation, then this explanation will also serve as 
a justification of our confidence in our standards of rationality. On the 
other hand, we will remain particularly alert to the local evaluations. So 
we may discover that some scientists have made the wrong decisions 
from our point of view, although they had good reasons given their own 
beliefs and background knowledge. But, alternatively, we can also 
discover that some scientists, given their own context, have still made 
the wrone decisions. This may be the case with respect to the Lysen-
ko-affair!->' 
The strong historicist has a straight answer to the third question: 
There is no room for any unchanging demarcation-criterion between 
science and non-science. Our ideas about the boundaries of science are 
highly influenced by science itself. In a hundred years these boundaries 
- which are determined by i.a. the rules, aims, concepts and empirical 
content of science - may be shifted in totally unforeseen directions. 
E.g., for Newton it was unthinkable that it would ever become scientific 
usance to talk about the curvature of space or observing the center of 
the sun", while on the other hand he would have been surprised to 
learn that alchemy became a prototypical example of pseudo-science. 
My conclusion is that the strong historicist can not only avoid some 
of the refractory problems, that the minimal historicist has to cope with, 
but he is also able to give straightforward answers to the questions that 
seem to become highly relevant as soon as all kinds of general criteria 
of rationality are rejected. But this approach also implies that all hopes 
for a foundation of scientific rationality have to be given up. Our 
present standards of rationality, however justified they may seem by the 
historical evidence, can always become subject to doubt under the 
influence of further scientific developments. 
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CHAPTER II 
CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM SOLVING IN SCIENCE 
In the naturalist approach to science it is hypothesized that our 
ideas about scientific rationality have changed, progressively, under 
the influence of scientific development. I have argued that this hypo-
thesis can give us a good explanation of scientific progress (and of 
progress in rationality as well). But apart from being a promising 
explanation, the hypothesis is also based on empirical historical 
observations. Historical research has shown that scientists have often 
occupied themselves not only with the explanation of 'sense-data' or 
'empirical correlation', but also - as Mach puts it - with "adapting 
their ideas to other ideas, rather than immediately to the facts". A 
significant part of the latter activity consisted of the resolution of 
conflicts between different scientific and/or extra-scientific ideas. 
Examples of such conflicts abound in the history of science.2 
A superficial glance at the history of science makes it also clear 
that these conflicts were often resolved by changing the 
extra-scientific ideas. E.g., the increasing tension between Ptolemy's 
epicyclic astronomy and the then prevailing Platonic assumption that 
the heavenly motions were 'perfect' was in the end resolved by 
dropping the latter assumption as an unreasonable constraint on the 
kind of hypotheses astronomers were allowed to make. The growing 
science of astronomy itself, though initially guided by Platonic meta-
physics, led the scientists to the insight that they needed other 
foundational, guiding principles to make progress in astronomy. This 
example and many similar examples from the history of science strongly 
suggest that our changing metaphysical, but also epistemologica! ideas 
which govern scientific development should be regarded as inextricably 
intertwined with overall scientific progress. 
Preconditional to the recognition of the relevance of these kinds 
of changes for scientific development is the philosopher's open 
attitude towards that part of scientific acitivity that concerned 
itself with solving difficulties of a non-empirical character. Many 
empiricist philosophies of science failed to come to terms with the 
complex nature of scientific rationality, because they all assumed that 
theory choice in science should be governed primarily by empirical con-
siderations. Theory appraisal along nonempirical, conceptual vectors was 
often ignored or rejected as 'unscientific' or 'prescientificV A corollary 
of this philosophical bias is the restricted interest of the philosopher of 
science in 'theories'. Theories are the main objects of his study, because 
it is primarily by theories that empirical facts are explained or pre-
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dieted. The philosopher's devotion to the analysis of theories had blinded 
him to the variety of problems that a scientist may confront. 
Only recently several philosophers of science-* have drawn our 
attention to the analysis of problems and problem solving behaviour as 
being a more promising approach to the study of scientific development. 
Apart from making it still possible to deal with the traditional problems 
of theoretically explaining empirical data, this approach will also help us 
understand the 'normal' scientists' 'puzzles', which may concern such 
'non-empirical' problems as the improvement of methods and techniques 
for dealing with already familiar phenomena. More importantly, this 
approach will give us the opportunity to analyze conceptual problems, 
i.e. higher order problems about the well-foundedness of the conceptual 
structures (e.g. theories) which have been divised to solve the first 
order, empirical problems. Neither the 'normal' scientists' 'puzzles' nor 
the conceptual problems are typically solved by 'theories' and many 
conceptual problems do not even involve empirical data, at least not as 
an important component. 
In the problem solving approach scientific appraisal is no longer 
restricted to the comparison of theories with data. Since problem 
solutions may take many shapes including the shapes of theories, rules 
and all kinds of models and worldviews, appraisal in science has to be 
extended so as to take account of such diverse kinds of solutions. This 
will not be an easy task, but at least it will enable us to judge whether 
scientists have done well in "adapting their ideas to other ideas, rather 
than to the facts", instead of rejecting this strategy as 'unscientific' 
beforehand. 
Although Kuhn and Toulmin should be seen as the pioneers of the 
problem solving approach to science. Laudan has to be credited for first 
developing a more or less elaborate problem solving model. In this 
chapter I will heavily lean on Laudan's model, but I will primarily be 
interested in his analysis of conceptual problems, since these are the 
kinds of problems that are the most relevant for a naturalist approach 
to scientific development. In addition, I will try to improve on some of 
Laudan's points and add some more details to his model. 
Laudan distinguishes between empirical problems and conceptual 
problems. Roughly, empirical problems concern questions about what the 
world is like; conceptual problems concern questions about our solutions 
to the empirical problems. Laudan further distinguishes between different 
types of empirical problems and different types of conceptual problems. 
In this chapter I will only deal with the latter types of problems. Two 
main types are distinguished: Internal conceptual problems, such as 
conceptual ambiguity, circularity or inconsistency, and external 
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conceptual problems, which arise when a theory clashes with other 
theories, principles, methodological rules or world-views. 
Of course, these distinctions give only a very rough and sweeping 
classification of scientific problems. Just as there is no sharp distinction 
between empirical and conceptual problems - some authors even reject 
the distinction, because it only confuses the issue" - there is no sharp 
distinction between internal and external conceptual problems either. For 
instance, what constitutes an internal ambiguity or unclarity can be 
highly dependent on external rules. One of the conceptual problems 
generated by Newton's theory may serve as an illustration: Finocchiaro ' 
discusses a well-known problem with Newton's theory, viz. the unin-
telligibility of the concept of gravitation. Prima facie this problem can 
be classified as an internal problem in Laudan's scheme. But in 
Finocchiaro's analysis there was primarily an external problem, because 
Newton's theory was in conflict with the methodological norm that phe-
nomena should be made intelligible in terms of ideas that are already 
understood. This analysis was further supported by the fact that the 
problem was solved at the time, not by clarifying the concept of 
gravitation, but by changing the methodological norm. 
So what seems to constitute an internal conceptual problem may be 
highly dependent on external rules or world-views and may in the end 
be solved as an external problem. Vice versa, a seemingly external con-
ceptual problem may appear to be only solvable by means of a clarifica-
tion of the theoretical concepts. Nevertheless, Laudan's distinction can 
still serve as useful heuristic device to grasp some of the many different 
ways in which conceptual innovations take place in science. This 
becomes clear as I proceed with my survey of Laudan's taxonomy of 
conceptual problems. 
We have seen that internal problems arise because of, e.g., incon-
sistencies or circularities within the theories. One of Laudan's examples 
is the alleged circularity in 19th-century kinetic theory of gases. This 
theory was criticized for being non-explanatory because it explained the 
elasticity of gases by postulating elastic constituents, viz. molecules. 
Since nothing was known about the elasticity of solids, this explanation 
was considered to be question begging. The kinetic-molecular theory 
faced an internal conceptual problem. 
Increase in the conceptual clarity of theories is an important way in 
which science progresses. But, Laudan adds, internal problems have not 
played as decisive a historical role as external problems have. 
Laudan distinguishes between three major kinds of external concept-
ual problems. External problems arise, when between two (or more) con-
ceptual structures there exists I) a relationship of mutual inconsistency, 
2) a relationship of mutual implausibility or even 3) a relationship of 
mere compatibility.* Subsequently, a sub-distinction is made of three 
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classes in which these conceptual structures are specified. There are 
three kinds of relationships that can generate conceptual problems: 1) 
cases where two different scientific theories are in tension (mutually 
inconsistent, implausible etc.) 2) cases where a scientific theory is in 
conflict with the prevalent world-view, and 3) cases where a scientific 
theory is in conflict with the methodological rules. So in Laudan's - by 
no means exhaustive - scheme there are at least nine possible ways in 
which external conceptuáis problems can be generated. 
I will now cite three historical examples from Laudan in order to 
show that these kinds of conceptual problems really have played a role 
in scientific history. We have already met an example of theory-method 
inconsistency in chapter I. Many theories in the 18th century appeared 
to be inconsistent with the widely accepted Newtonian inductivist metho-
dology. This inconsistency constituted a conceptual problem not only for 
those theories but also for the methodology. In the end the problem was 
solved by dropping the methodological constraint. 
The second example is one of theory-theory implausibility. Once 
Newtonian physics was accepted, many physiological theories became 
implausible, because they were based on (Cartesian) mechanistic ex-
planations. Though these explanations were consistent with Newtonian 
physics, it was thought to be highly improbable that all changes in 
systems as complex as living organisms were exclusively determined by 
mechanistic processes. 
The last example to be mentioned here - several other examples will 
be given in the case-study - is one of mere compatibility between theory 
and worldview. To be sure, a compatibility between two different con-
ceptual systems does not have to - and usually does not - constitute a 
conceptual problem for either of the systems. But if there exists a 
strong interconnection between such systems - which depends on the 
background knowledge at the time - then scientists may have good 
reasons to expect more of the relation between these systems than the 
mere absence of mutual inconsistency or mutual implausibility. In the 
17th century, for instance, it was expected that any physical theory 
should be positively relevant to, and not merely compatible with, 
Christian theology. " If physics would not have vindicated the 
theological doctrines, one way or another, this would have been felt as a 
cognitive threat, or at least a cognitive weakness, by the scientists at 
the time. 
Laudan's model of conceptual problem solving adds an important new 
dimension to our conception of the scientific enterprise. It directs our 
attention to the fact that a large part of scientific reasoning has been 
invested in conceptual innovation. Therefore, to understand the scientific 
enterprise, we should include these kinds of reasoning processes in our 
investigations. This extension of our research constitutes a considerable 
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departure from the traditional philosophy of science. Positivists and 
Popperians alike considered conceptual or theoretical innovations to be 
philosophically uninteresting phenomena which should be relegated to 
such sciences as psychology or sociology. Relativists, like Kuhn and 
Feyerabend, did consider conceptual innovations to be philosophically 
important, but basically unintelligible; real conceptual innovations are to 
be seen as intellectually elusive 'Gestalt-switches'. There are no cogent 
reasoning processes involved in these 'revolutionary' transitions. 
What the historical examples show, is that scientists actually have 
been engaged much of their time in arguing towards certain conceptual 
innovations in order to solve their conceptual problems. This - empirical 
- discovery has at least two important consequences: In those cases in 
which e.g. specific theoretical innovations are argued for, our attention 
will be turned towards the possible relevance of the process of discovery 
of theories for the philosophy of science (this will be the topic of 
chapter Ш). In other cases, in which e.g. methodological or metaphysical 
innovations are argued for, it may turn out that scientists have had 
good reasons - in defiance of Kuhn and Feyerabend - for changing their 
methodological or metaphysical presuppositions. Such reasons are usually 
provided for by new theoretical developments or new empirical dis­
coveries. 
The latter kind of conceptual innovations, i.e. those concerning 
methodological or metaphysical innovations, are especially relevant for a 
naturalist philosophy of science. If one wants to defend the view that 
the rules and aims of science have changed for the better under the 
influence of science itself, then this implies that one takes conceptual 
problems and conceptual problem solving to be part and parcel of the 
scientific enterprise. We have encountered the different shapes in which 
these conceptual problems can arise and actually have arisen in history. 
However, the actual occurrence of conceptual problems does not relieve 
us from the task to answer the following fundamental questions, 
concerning the origin of conceptual problems: Given that our research is 
guided by our rules and aims of science, how is it possible that, e.g., 
theories arise that are incompatible with these rules and aims? And 
given such a theory, how can we ever have reasons to accept that 
theory and even change our rules and/or aims, if the validity of our 
reasons is largely determined by these same rules and aims? In the next 
paragraphs I will try to give a detailed, though incomplete, answer to 
these questions. 
The first question is relatively easy to answer. In fact it exemplifies 
a traditional problem in the theory of action. It is well known that 
there are often tensions between an agent's avowed and explicit goals 
and the goals that - actually or 'in practice' - seem to inform his 
actions. ' In such cases the agent will be unaware most of the times 
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that his actions are at variance with his explicit aims. But as soon as 
this inconsistency is pointed out to him, he will be hard pressed to 
change either his actions or his goals. 
Since scientific practice is a special branch of human action, one can 
only expect that similar things will happen in science. Scientists are not 
always fully aware of all the scientific rules and aims they subscribe to, 
so once in a while they will find themselves advocating theories or 
choosing lines of investigation that are later discovered to be at odds 
with one or more of the professed scientific rules or aims. So one 
answer to the first question is, that scientists are human beings who 
sometimes do not practice what they preach. Sometimes they will come 
out with theories that are forbidden by the book of rules that they, or 
their scientific community, explicitly go by. 
There are several other ways in which theories can arise, that are 
incompatible with the rules and aims of science. E.g., such theories may 
be expected, if the set of rules and aims is itself internally inconsistent, 
or if the different rules and aims are differently weighted by the 
scientists subscribing to them. But in these cases scientists usually have 
initial reasons for violating the rules and/or aims, so I will discuss them 
in my answer to the second question. 
The second, more interesting question was, whether scientists can 
possibly have good reasons to develop or to maintain a theory that 
violates one or more of the rules and aims of science. For the naturalist 
this is the crucial question. If it can be answered positively, then his 
conception will contrast favourably with the foundationalist's conception 
of science, which prescribes the adaption or rejection of the theory 
according to his universally valid rules and aims. 
At this point I want to introduce a new terminology, borrowed from 
Nickles1^, which, I think, is to be preferred to, e.g., Laudan's tripartite 
distinction between 'aims', 'rules' and 'theories', because it promises to 
capture more kinds of reasoning processes which can lead to conceptual 
innovation. Nickles, too, characterizes science as a problem solving 
activity. In his conception theories are not randomly produced, but the 
production of theories is restricted, because theories are usually pro-
duced as possible solutions to specific problems. Scientists try to reason 
to these theories and their reasoning will be "restricted and heuristically 
guided by the constraints on a successful problem situation, constraints 
which set the problem in its most specific form". ^ In other words, what 
theories will be produced and how they will be evaluated as problem 
solutions is highly determined by the constraints on the problem 
situation. 
Nickles has a lot more to say about problems and problem solving in 
science, but I will postpone a further discussion of his views to chapters 
III and IV. For the time being it is the introduction of 'constraints' as a 
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technical term which is interesting for us. Nickles employs the term 
'constraint' "to include most any item of information, any more or less 
established or accepted 'law', principle, rule, or fact, which helps to set 
the problem by imposing a condition on its solution".1'* Notice, that in 
this characterization the 'rules' and 'aims' too are to be considered as 
part of the constraints on the problem situation. They are set in one 
line with other items of information, facts or principles which may serve 
as constraints for the scientist. 
The point of introducing the term 'constraint' is to bring out that 
the 'rules' and 'aims' do not have any specific status different from 
other items of information. They are part of the scientific baggage that 
every scientist needs in order to discover problems and then to solve 
them. Moreover, we will be more inclined to see the 'rules' and 'aims' as 
intricately connected with the other constraints specifying the problem 
situation, as highly content-specific1^, instead of as sacred untouchables 
hovering above the scientific swarming. What methods a scientist will 
follow or what goals he will try to attain is often strongly determined 
by the kind or research he wants to do, or by the specific content of 
the scientific domain he is working in. 
So the picture of science which arises from this characterization is 
that every scientist will be working with a more or less complicated set 
of constraints or constraint-structure, that specifies which problems have 
to be solved, what solutions are allowed and what methods and 
techniques should be used to find these solutions. More often than not 
several scientists will share their set of constraints, thus constituting 
scientific communities with specific research programs. 
With this as yet rather coarse characterization of science we can 
return to our second question - what reasons can we have to break the 
rules and/or aims of science? - and generalize it to the question: what 
reasons can we have to violate the constraints on our scientific pro-
grams? Generalizing the question in this way gives us the opportunity to 
realize that violating the other constraints may be just as problematic as 
breaking with rules or aims. On the other hand changing the rules may 
be just as much part of the scientific enterprise as the more prozaic 
activities, like e.g. extending the empirical domain. Moreover, it will 
appear that what reasons we can have for violating one of the con-
straints is often highly dependent on the kind of interconnection with 
the other constraints. 
So the question to be answered now is: Can scientific constraints be 
violated rationally?1^ I think that the answer is in the affirmative and 
that at least three classes of reasons for violating and changing the 
constraints can be distinguished: 
1) A mutual inconsistency or implausibility between the constraints on a 
program in itself provides sufficient reason for violating one of the 
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constraints. Such tensions between constraints are in particular to be 
expected in young programs, which are still in the phase of 
articulating the main problems that have to be solved or in fully 
developed programs with very complicated constraint-structures in 
which it has become increasingly difficult to keep the interconnection 
between the constraints transparent. 
2) A scientist may develop a theory without knowing that this theory 
violates one or more of the constraints of his program. Once develop-
ed, however, this theory may be so successful, that it provides 
sufficient reasons to change the violated constraints. 
3) In a full-grown program, with an intricate and refined constraint-
structure, many sub-problems will arise. These problems will be 
determined by only a part of the overall constraint-structure. In 
solving these sub-problems scientists will temporarily slacken the less 
relevant constraints, at the risk of discovering an increasing 
encroachment upon these constraints in the course of their research. 
At every stage of this research scientists may have good reasons to 
continue their research in full consciousness of its constraint-viola-
ting character. 
I will discuss each of these classes separately and I will show that each 
kind of rational constraint-violation has played an important role in the 
history of science. 
1) A new program may be about to arise, when someone conceives of 
a new idea which reformulates some old (unsatisfactorally) solved or 
unsolved problems. Such a reformulation may already contain a promise 
to a (new) solution, though often only in a general and vague direction. 
An example of such a new idea was Darwin's principle of natural 
selection. It reformulated many old biological problems and it promised 
to give a simple and elegant explanation of evolution. But by itself the 
principle was far too general. Many additional assumptions had to be 
introduced to constitute a useful line of research. Darwin himself 
immediately put a constraint on further research by assuming that only 
those variations are evolutionarily relevant that are small, continuous 
and random. Later, to explain the transmittance of variations, he added 
the constraint that small variations are inherited by blending 'gemmules'. 
However, it was soon pointed out by Fleeming Jenkin that these con-
straints were mutually inconsistent. So the 'Darwinists' at the time were 
forced to drop either one or more of the constraints. Accordingly, 
'Darwin's bulldog', Huxley, decided to drop the small variations-postulate 
(but to keep the randomness-postulate) and Darwin himself decided to 
change his theory of heredity by adopting a 'Lamarckian' influence of 
environment (thus dropping the randomness-postulate). Such changes in 
the set of constraints on evolutionary theory eventually resulted in 
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different, competing research programs. Two of these programs will be 
discussed in the case-study. 
This example should suffice to show that young programs have to 
invest much research and reasoning in first formulating a consistent and 
heuristically promising set of constraints, before they can start to do 
'normal' research and problem solving. The example also indicates that 
the adoption of a new 'paradigm' or a new research program is not 
merely the result of a 'gestalt-switch' (Kuhn) or a basically irrational 
decision (Lakatos). New sets of constraints are hard to come by and 
their adoption is usually preceded by some arduous reasoning process. 
Incompatibilities between constraints are to be expected in young, 
emerging programs. But at the other end of the scale, when programs 
have been running successfully for a while, in the meantime elaborating 
and refining their constraint-structures, the complexity of the problem 
situation may have grown to such a degree that, again, incompatibilities 
or incongruities between the constraints will easily arise. Late 19th-
century physics is best known for these kinds of internal conceptual 
tensions and Einstein is best known as the scientist who recognized 
these tensions and based his revolutionary theories on a penetrating 
reappraisal of the constraints operating on the physics of his days. 
Einstein began three of the most famous papers he published in 1905 by 
pointing out such conceptual tensions between constraints. I will give 
one example here: In the paper on Brownian motion Einstein noticed an 
incongruity between the demands of classical thermodynamics and the 
'kinetic molecular theory'. According to the first theory suspended 
particles exert no pressure on a semipermeable membrane, whereas in-
visible molecules do. According to the second theory the size of the 
particles is of no theoretical interest, so there should be osmotic 
pressure in both cases. It was impossible to satisfy both demands. In 
order to develop a completely succesful theory one of the constraints 
had to be changed or rejected.17 Einstein's - argued - solution was to 
reject the, demands of classical thermodynamics in favour of the mole-
cular theory of heat. Again, history of science confirms - now with 
respect to fully developed programs - that incompatibilities between 
constraints can actually arise and generate conceptual tensions which are 
rationally solved by violating one of the constraints. 
2) Though ignorance on the part of the scientists plays, to a certain 
extent, a role in the first class of rational constraint violations - how 
else could there exist incompatible constraints on programs? -, in the 
second class it is primarily by ignorance that constraints are violated. 
This class concerns those cases in which a scientist or a group of 
scientists explicitly subscribe to all of the mutually consistent-con-
straints, but nevertheless develop a theory which violates one or more 
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of those constraints. This behaviour can be marked as irrational, though 
it seems to depend on whether scientists alway can know whether they 
are violating constraints on their program. However, as soon as they 
become aware of their rule-breaking behaviour, the new theory may 
provide the deviant scientists with enough reasons to continue their 
research, despite the violated constraint(s). In that case the constraint-
violation becomes rational and some alteration in the constraint-structure 
will be called for. This bootstrap phenomenon "in which a theory, 
illegitimate in its conception, is powerful enough to overcome the 
established framework of constraints and thus becomes, to a degree, 
self-legitimizing, self-rationalizing"19 is one of the most important ways 
in which conceptual innovations break through in science. 
We have already encountered one example of such a self-legitimi-
zation in chapter I. There it was shown that LeSage's, Boscovich's and 
Hartley's theories violated the 'Newtonian' methodological constraint by 
hypothesizing unobserved entities instead of inductively generalizing from 
observed entities. Initially these scientists were unaware of their rule 
breaking behaviour, but as soon as they came to realize that their 
theories were incompatible with the prevailing methodological standards, 
they argued from the success and heuristic promise of their theories to 
the inadequacy of these standards. 
Another revealing example is mentioned by Nickles and is again taken 
from early 20th century physics. Planck's quantum theory of blackbody 
radiation violated two important constraints on his own theorizing, viz. 
the absolute entropy law of classical thermodynamics and Maxwell's 
electromagnetic theory. If Planck had known this, he probably would 
have rejected the theory immediately. Planck considered both constraints 
to be the most important constraints on physics at the time. In fact the 
conceptual innovation implicit in Planck's theory did not become fully 
apparent until the appearance of the papers of Bose and Einstein in 
1924. As a result of these papers and the development of Bose-Einstein 
statistics Planck's theory was legitimized at the cost of the constraints, 
which Planck himself considered to be fundamental for physics. 
The last example to be mentioned here is excerpted from my case-
study, where it will be elaborated in extenso. In 1903 Johannsen 
discovered that quantitative variations are inherited discontinuously. This 
discovery was received by the Mendelians as an unexpected and well-
come support for their program in evolutionary theory. However, over 
the years they became gradually aware that, while Johannsen's dis-
covery did support their theory of heredity, it was incompatible with 
their saltationary theory of evolution. In the meantime Johannsen's dis-
coveries had led to some indispensable theoretical innovations such as 
the genotype-phenotype distinction. These developments provided the 
Mendelians in the end with enough reasons to drop some of the most 
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central constraints on their evolutionary program in favour of the 
further elaboration of their theory of heredity. 
These three examples clearly demonstrate the way in which con-
straint-violating theories, which are more or less accidentally produced 
thanks to ignorance on the part of the scientists involved, may lift 
themselves on their bootstraps by accumulating reasons for their own 
maintenance at the cost of the broken scientific rules. Lest the reader 
should object that I have only given one clear example of scientific 
'rules' being 'overruled' viz. the Newtonian inductive method - I must 
emphasize again that most of the times the 'rules and aims' of science 
are strongly interconnected and hardly separable from the other, more 
specific constraints. To get an idea of such interconnections the reader 
should note, for example, that the Mendelian saltationary theory of 
evolution was tightly linked to a typological conception of species and 
that this conception in its turn was partly rooted in an essentialistic 
worldview. The elaboration of Johannsen's discoveries, therefore, also 
constituted a considerable departure from the basic 'metaphysical' aims 
of the Mendelian program. The situation in early 20th-century physics 
was far more complicated, but Planck's constraints were surely linked to, 
e.g., the metaphysical presumption that all physical processes are 
continuous. This constraint, too, was violated by the quantumhypothesis 
as Einstein pointed out. 
3) The third and last class of rational constraint-violations differs 
from the second class in that the deviant scientists are fully aware of 
the constraint-violating character of their research. In the second class 
the constraint-violation becomes rational by a bootstrap method; in the 
third class there are antecedent reasons for violating the constraint. The 
initial - weak - rationality of the constraint-violation is then further 
enhanced by a bootstrap method. 
As I already indicated, this kind of rational constraint-violations 
occurs more frequently the more sophisticated the research program is. 
Such programs can be expected to contain many sub-problems and sub-
subproblems; these problems are - by definition - differently determined 
by a different weighting of the constraints of the entire program. So, it 
is inherent to sophisticated programs that there will be a considerable 
divergence among the members of the scientific community with respect 
to their weighting of the constraints. In itself this does not imply that 
any constraints will be violated, but the risk of such violations increases 
the more specialized the different kinds of research within a program 
become. At a certain moment specialized researchers may have good 
reasons to violate one of the constraints of the overall program, in the 
first place, because this constraint does not play a central role in their 
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research and secondly, because their - successful - research requires 
them to violate the constraint. 
In this way, to take an - admittedly oversimplified - example from 
physics again, quantum mechanics, which started as a highly specialized 
branch of physics, accumulated reason after reason to violate several 
traditional constraints of the overall program of physics. Among other 
things, it led to the development of totally different, only 
mathematically conceivable, notions of place, time and action at the 
micro-level and to the acceptance of indeterminism as an irreducible 
property of fundamental physical processes. But many other - less ex-
treme - examples of this kind of constraint-violations can be given. I 
submit, that in fact these are the most common rational constraint-
violations, at least in the recent history of science. In my case-study I 
will show that the elaboration of Mendel's theory of heredity, which 
initially seemed to be in accord with all of the constraints of Bateson's 
evolutionary program, entailed one-by-one the violation of most of the 
program's central constraints. These violations, however, were justified 
by the empirical success of research in heredity, although this research 
was initially intended to support the overall program. 
To give a foretaste of the case-study I will briefly discuss one 
episode from the development of the theory of heredity. Around 1910 
there existed compelling reasons for those scientists, specialized in 
working out the 'hereditary' aspect of evolution within the Mendelian 
program, to accept the chromosome theory as a 'provisional hypothesis', 
despite its violation of the epistemologica! constraint, that prohibited 
any materialistic interpretation of hereditary factors. One important 
reason came from the striking similarity between the observed behaviour 
of the chromosomes during gamete-formation and the hypothesized 
behaviour of the Mendelian factors in inheritance. This similarity 
strongly induced the Mendelians at least to tolerate research in the 
chromosome theory of heredity within their program. However, the 
tolerated 'pursuit' of the chromosome theory of heredity further 
enhanced, in bootstrap fashion, the reasons for continuing research and 
for dropping not only the violated epistemologica! constraint but also 
some other central constraints of the Mendelian program. In the end the 
chromosome theory emerged as a successful theory of heredity from a 
decaying Mendelian evolutionary program. 
These three classes of rational constraint-violations do not exhaust 
all possibilities (see for another classification Nickles 1980), but I do 
think that they are the most common forms of rational 
constraint-violations. Anyway, my main intention was to show how 
scientists can have reasons to violate and change constraints or how 
conceptual problems can arise and reasonably solved. 
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In this chapter I have primarily made a case for the role of con-
ceptual problem solving in science. I submit, as several other authors 
have done before/1 that solving conceptual problems has been at least 
as important an activity for the development of science as the 
explanation and prediction of empirical data. As we have seen, this 
thesis is already confirmed by many historical cases. But, since the 
naturalistic conception of scientific development even implies a 
prominent role for conceptual problem solving in science, more detailed 
historical case-studies will be necessary. 
Such studies are especially urgent, because I have only shown sofar 
that constraint-violations - including the violation of rules and aims -
do occur in science and that scientists can have good reasons for 
violating and subsequently changing the constraints on their scientific 
disciplines; the most important issue, viz. whether scientists actually did 
have good reasons to 'break the rules1, has only occasionally been 
touched upon. As can be gleaned from my exposition of the naturalistic 
conception thus far, this issue will not and can not be dealt with in 
general terms. Ultimately, the question about rationality in science can 
only be answered by detailed case-studies, in which local and global 
evaluations are delicately balanced against each other. But before I 
proceed with my contribution to the list of case-studies that will be 
necessary, I will discuss another important aspect of the naturalist 
conception of science, which concerns the fading of the distinction 
between the context of justification and the context of discovery in the 
evaluation of scientific development. 
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CHAPTER III 
SCIENCE AS DISCOVERY 
In the positivist era the philosopher's task was to investigate 
the relation between theories and their test results and to articulate 
a logic of scientific inquiry. Since there was no logic in discovery, the 
method of discovery was considered to be irrelevant for the philosophy 
of science. Discovery was inductive at the most and it was only by 
deduction of data from theories that theories could be tested and 
established as scientific. Discovery fell outside the scope of the philo-
sophy of science: It was a phenomenon to be studied by psychologists. 
However, the increasing knowledge of the history of science, which 
was partly the result of the historical turn in the philosophy of science, 
appeared to have some serious implications for this conception of the 
philosopher's tasks. One of these implications was that the confirmation 
or corroboration of theories was not as neat a logical process as the 
positivists and early Popperians had taken it to be.1 This detraction 
from the reputation of the 'logic of science' also initiated the breakdown 
of the sharp distinction between the contexts of justification and dis-
covery and at least made discovery a topic to reckon with. 
At first discovery was only negatively relevant. The Popperian and 
Lakatosian requirement of 'novel' predictions, which induced philosophers 
to take the history of a theory into account for its appraisal, conferred 
a negative but nonetheless very important role on discovery: Whenever a 
succesfully predicted fact had contributed to the development of the 
theory in the first place, this fact was not to be counted as a con-
firming instance for the theory. By giving discovery a negative probative 
force the Popperians, unwittingly, committed themselves to a coupling of 
discovery and justification. 
This commitment of the Popperians is even more surprising, because 
it also provides a possible answer to Laudan's challenge at the address 
of the 'friends of discovery'^ to show that something which happened in 
the context of discovery can have probative weight (and thus add to 
justification) by virtue of its role in theory-generation. In the 
Popperian viewpoint a predicted fact, by virtue of its role in generation, 
'adds negatively'' (substracts from) justification. Surely, the 'Popperian 
answer' is unacceptable to Laudan, who denies any special status to 
novel predictions, and, surely, it is not the kind of rejoinder that the 
friends of discovery have in mind. But the fact that discovery has been 
there all along from Whewell on, who was the first to introduce the 
need for novel predictions, at least makes that it deserves special 
attention in the philosophy of science. 
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Though it is significant that discovery already cropped up in this 
minimal relaxation of the logicists' grip on the philosophy of science, in 
reality the role of discovery came only gradually into philosophical focus 
because philosophers learned to recognize the relevance of the history of 
a theory and, in general, the history of science for their appraisal. It 
was, in particular, the recognition by philosophers like Kuhn and Lakatos 
of the role of dogmatism in the development of science which again 
introduced discovery as a relevant topic in the philosophy of science. 
Apart from giving science enough inertia to prevent it from stumbling 
over its own dynamics, as it would do in Popperian falsificationism, some 
dogmatism was also necessary to guide the scientist in choosing or 
developing the theories to be tested. Pure logicist philosophies of science 
lacked virtually any form of heuristics that went beyond Popper's im-
perative to select the most falsifiable theory. By letting theory choice 
depend on random guessing or blind variation, they made scientific in-
quiry highly inefficient. To resolve this inefficiency and restore economy 
in research Lakatos, and in his wake many other philosophers, made a 
distinction between more or less rigidly held beliefs which function as 
heuristic principles and the theories which were chosen or formed under 
their guidance. In chapter I we have seen that these theories and beliefs 
- the latter embodied in 'hard cores', 'models' or 'priors'^ - were taken 
together to function as units of appraisal. Henceforth it was the career 
of a theory or a program, which signified the fruit fulness of the prior 
beliefs, that became the focus of appraisal. Accordingly, the efficiency 
with which new, relevant theories were discovered came to fall within 
the scope of appraisal. 
This development shows that discovery has become important, metho-
dologically but to a certain extent also epistemically, because it has been 
recognized as an indispensable supplement to consequential testing. Dis-
covery and justification have to be coupled, because consequential 
testing can be highly inefficient, even at the risk of becoming irrational 
(as it would be in an endless series of instantly falsified theories). Some 
concern for the relative efficiency of means to ends is an important part 
of rationality. The study of the constraints on theory-generation and of 
the economy of research in general should therefore be one of the main 
tasks of any philosophy of science. 
It is important to notice that the 'rediscovery of discovery' is almost 
a natural consequence of the development, discussed in chapter I, in 
which it became apparent that science should rather be seen as a pro-
cess than as a set of finished products (theories). One of the main 
reasons for emphasizing the process-character of science was the central 
place that heuristics seemed to take in scientific progress. A revaluation 
of discovery was more or less inherent to the historical turn in the 
philosophy of science. 
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But many 'historicist' philosophers of science have, explicitly or im-
plicitly, even made a stronger claim with respect to the role of 
discovery in scientific appraisal. One of the central theses of many (both 
'minimal' and 'strong') 'historicists' is that the history of a theory 
should be taken into account in its appraisal (cf. chapter I, section I.). 
The idea is that the career of a theory adds something to its appraisal. 
And what else can this be than the particular way in which the final 
version of the theory was reached at or discovered? So, what this thesis 
actually amounts to is the claim that the mode of generation of a theory 
has a special probative weight in addition to the probative weight pro-
vided by justification. This, in effect, is the strong claim of the friends 
of discovery that Laudan has challenged in his historical study of the 
revival of the method of hypothesis. 
Laudan argues that heuristic methods may have a role in the economy 
of research, but they will never have any special epistemic weight. 
Whatever epistemic role discovery has played in history has been 
preempted by the revival of the theory of testing in early 19th-century. 
Laudan agrees with the friends of discovery that methods of generation 
may have de facto epistemic force, but he denies that they will ever 
have de jure epistemic force, i.e. by virtue of their role in generation. 
The epistemic force they do have is the same force they would have had 
if first introduced in the context of justification." So the friends of 
discovery are challenged to show that generation methods add something 
to consequential justification. 
However, as Nickles has pointed out and as I have indicated above, 
the friends of discovery do not have to feel compelled to take up this 
gauntlet. Even if generational arguments do not add to justification, they 
do add to rationality by limiting the number of theories to be tested and 
thus making justification into an efficient procedure. Given also the 
growing consensus among philosophers of science that a broader sense of 
rationality rather than mere justification should be their object of study, 
this will be enough to reinstate discovery as a bona fide topic in the 
philosophy of science. At least, any of the doubts, as expressed by 
Laudan, with respect to the legitimacy of the discovery-program in the 
philosophy of science have been taken away. 
This is not to say, that most friends of discovery do not want to 
give discovery the status which it is denied by Laudan. But, as Nickles" 
pointed out, many of the attempts1" to confer more power upon dis-
covery have as yet failed to establish that generational arguments 
provide epistemic weight in addition to consequentialist arguments. 
Nickles demonstrates that most arguments which have been furnished to 
prove a tight connection between discovery and justification, in effect, 
only succeeded in showing a de facto coupling between discovery and 
justification. 
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Nickles tries to break this impasse by showing that his notion of 
'justification as discoverability' finally does establish a de jure 
connection between discovery and justification. ' Although Nickles' 
solution seems to be promising, I will not go into his arguments here 
because I want to call Laudan's challenge into question rather than 
answer it. I think that the discovery-debate will still be better off, if 
one gives heed to the presuppositions inherent to Laudan's challenge, 
instead of trying to riposte it at face value. 
Laudan's claim was that discovery lost its philosophical relevance 
from the moment that the method of discovery as a method of justifi-
cation was completely superseded by the method of testing. This claim 
pressupposes that justification is the one and only relevant topic in the 
philosophy of science. We have already seen that this conception is far 
too restrictive and that at least, the economy of research should be 
included as an important issue in the philosophy of science. But there 
are additional reasons to weaken the philosophically central position of 
justification. 
In fact, the philosophically more basic problem is to detect what 
reasons scientists have to accept theories and subsequently to extract 
criteria for the future acceptance of theories. We have learned that one 
important reason to accept a theory is its justification by the data. But 
we have also learned - since the revival of the method of hypothesis -
that justification is never complete, which may leave room for additional 
reasons to accept theories. More importantly, we have learnt that 
scientists may have good reasons to accept theories, despite the fact 
that these theories have not (yet) been justified by the data or have 
been falsified one or more times. Here again, I want to stress Kuhn's 
and Lakatos' introduction of the role of dogmatism in science which 
opened the gates for a reentry of non-justificationary and especially 
generational arguments in the philosophy of science. Since we are just 
as well interested in the scientist's reasons for being 'dogmatic' about 
theories, we can infer that Laudan actually poses a false dilemma: it is 
not justification but acceptance which is (or has become) the central 
issue in the philosophy of science. What the friends of discovery should 
try to find out is whether generation methods have epistemic weight by 
virtue of their role in generation with respect to the acceptance of 
theories. And this promises to be a successful research program indeed. 
To be sure, I do not deny that in the end it is justification, one way 
or another, that counts. But I do want to stress that often it is only in 
the end that facts decide the issue of theory-choice by means of conse-
quentialist justification and that often the end, in which justification is 
the last and only arbiter, is never reached. For that matter, I have not 
even mentioned the problems concerning the method of justification 
about which there is still so much controversy, that it remains highly 
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unclear in what way justification can be finally decisive. In the mean-
time scientists do not grabble about without rhyme or reason; they try 
to find reasons for their acceptance of theories in the hope of finally 
justifying them in the (far) future. Part of these reasons are the 
occasional justifications coming in; by themselves these justifications are 
not worth very much, but they may have a considerable influence, / / 
there exist already many reasons to accept the theory. ^  A major part 
of these reasons usually stems from the context of generation. 
So, what this conception boils down to, is the view that the larger 
part of science is in the 'pursuit'-phase, as Laudan would call it, with 
justification as a kind of limit-condition. And if reasoning to the 
acceptance of theories is, in effect, what science primarily consists of, 
what other task can there be for the philosopher of science than to 
study this reasoning process in the first place? 
To put it in another way: the majority of theories is accepted 
(provisionally) for a mixture of reasons, which are considered to be con-
tributive to the development and final 'discovery' of sufficiently justified 
theories. Science is a process of discovery which only occasionally 
generates sufficiently justified - discovered - theories as final products. 
Since it is the process of discovery which forms the bulk of the scien-
tific enterprise, it is also the 'problem of scientific discovery' which 
should be the fundamental problem of the philosophy of science. 
Now, at last, we are ready to discuss the kinds of generational 
arguments that actually play a role in scientific development and the 
way in which this view of science as a process of discovery naturally 
fits in with the conception of science developed in this study. 
I think that there are at least two major kinds of arguments which 
stem from the generation-context and which contribute, by virtue of 
their role in generation, to the acceptance of theories (or programs): 
1) The arguments used to arrive at a solution to a problem 
2) The arguments used in judging the fruitfulness or future prospect of 
a theory or a program. 
1) In chapter II it was shown that science is best conceived of as a 
problem solving activity. An important aspect of this conception is the 
view that problems do not arise by themselves. Problems arise as a 
result of previous attempts to resolve other problems or they are 
themselves discovered as 'gaps' within a particular frame-work of 
kwowledge. Problems are always embedded within and even determined by 
a particular context. There are no 'gaps' without boundaries. This con-
text already indicates what kinds of solutions there may be for the 
problem (for example, to keep it very general, by specifying in which 
scientific dicipiine the solution should be searched for). In a sense, a 
problem can be defined as a set of possible solutions.14 But if a seien-
48 
tist discovers a problem and he wants to solve it, then most of the 
times the initial set of possible solutions is still too vague to be of 
much help. The first stage in the process of the discovery of the 
solution will be the further encapsulation of the gap in the frame-work 
of knowledge so as to delimit the set of possible solutions. 
To show that this kind of activity is part of the scientific enterprise 
I will cite an example from my case-study: After Fleeming Jenkin's 
detection of the inconsistency between Darwin's conception of inheri-
tance and his theory of evolution, it was commonly recognized that 
there was a 'Problem of Variation'. But, initially, no one had an idea 
how to solve this problem: the boundaries were too fuzzy. Im my case-
study I show that the biometricians' program as well as Bateson's pro-
gram in evolutionary theory came off the ground by first specifying 
these boundaries, or 'limitations' (Bateson's phrase), or constraints on 
the problem of variation. E.g., Bateson used an inductive generalization 
from his observations in Russia - where he failed to encounter any con-
tinuous transitions between related species - and an analogy borrowed 
from Galton - which stated that the mechanism of speciation would be 
that of the tumbling of a multi-faceted stone from facet to facet - to 
back up his first constraint on research in the problem of variation. 
This constraint restricted the evolutionarily relevant variations to those 
variations that are large and discontinuous. Notice that Bateson used 
typically generational arguments, not to formulate a specific theory, but 
to formulate a constraint on theory-formation. And, given the state of 
knowledge at his time, at least his inductive generalization gave him a 
good reason to (provisionally) accept this constraint. In the case-study I 
will show that he had other reasons too. 
In formulating a satisfying constraint-structure to delimit the set of 
possible solutions a scientist will especially rely on information - laws, 
facts, methodological prescriptions, world-views - from his background 
knowledge. Moreover, because the constraints are intended to give the 
scientist direction in his research, he has to have reasons to hold 
'dogmatically' to these constraints in order to give his research some 
leeway. To what extent he can maintain his dogmatism depends on the 
epistemic reliability of the items of information that he uses as con-
straints, in his own research program and in the contemporary back-
ground knowledge. So, in a sense, the surplus-value which renders the 
constraints less vulnerable than the newly developed theory, is drawn 
from the fact that they belong to reliable background knowledge. 
If the scientist has a more or less elaborate constraint-structure at 
his disposal, then the constraints will serve him as a heuristic guide to 
the development of, for example, theories as solutions to the problem. 
But there is more to it the constraints will also determine which kinds 
of theories are permitted and which not, i.e. they will give an epistemic 
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warrant to the problem solutions. This warrant derives from the 
reliability of the background knowledge or, specifically, from the 
reliability of the constraints. To show how this happens I will make use 
of an interesting observation from Gutting. ^  Gutting has shown that, if 
science is construed this way, then also it becomes clear what the 
method of abduction actually amounts to. 
In his Patterns of Discovery™ Hanson argued, following Peirce, that 
the method of abduction was a general method of discovery. Hanson 
described this pattern of inference as follows: 
1) Some surprising phenomenon Ρ is observed 
2) Ρ would be explicable as a matter of course if Η were true 
3) Hence there is reason to think that Η is true. 
Many criticisms have been raised against this schema. Most importantly, 
it has been argued that the Peirce-Hanson schema does not provide a 
method of generation of hypotheses, as Hanson sometimes claimed it did, 
because the hypothesis appears among the premises and not in the con­
clusion of the inference. So it remains unclear in what sense abductive 
inference really differs from hypothetico-deductive inference. Such 
doubts are further increased by Hanson's repeated suggestions that dis­
coveries are the result of perceptual events - 'Gestalt-switches* - rather 
than discursive reasoning. 
Another critique was that, even if a surprising fact suggests an hypo­
thesis for its explanation, this fact does not provide any reason for 
accepting that hypothesis. We may abductively infer from the - not so 
surprising - fact that I am writing this study the hypothesis that I have 
been offered a million dollars to do so. But by itself the explained fact 
does not provide any support for the hypothesis. ' Gutting makes it 
clear that this objection was in fact already answered by Peirce, where 
he stated that there are many other constraints, apart from the 
surprising phenomenon, on the valid abductive inference to a hypo­
thesis1* and that there must be independent reasons that render the 
chosen hypothesis plausible. So, what the method of abduction really 
amounts to is that one reasons from a phenomenon plus constraints to a 
hypothesis. Moreover, as Hanson has emphasized later on, abduction does 
not lead to the precise formulation of a particular hypothesis, but to a 
more or less vague intimation of the kind of hypotheses that is 
acceptable. Thus interpreted, the method of abduction is highly germane 
to my construal of the reasoning process in problem solving. ' A 
problematic phenomenon - not necessarily a datum - plus a set of con­
straints delineate the problem and the set of possible solutions. The 
scientists argue from the constraints to a solution and the constraints 
determine whether the solution is accceptable or not. 
The Peirce-Hanson schema only failed, because it was incomplete. If 
the role of background knowledge or constraints is taken into account, 
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then many of the criticisms of the method of abduction will be obviated. 
Thus interpreted and adapted to the problem solving approach abductive 
inference might well be a more common form of inference than either 
inductive or deductive inference in actual scientific practice. 
Lest I be accused of the fallacy of hasty conclusions, I should 
immediately add here that abductive inference constitutes only an overall 
pattern of inference in the process of discovery. If the details are filled 
in, the pattern will be complicated by, for example, the conceptual pro­
blems that will arise as a result of terminological ambiguities or 
conceptual tensions within the constraint-structures or between con­
straints and theories (cf. chapter Π). Furthermore, since a fresh set of 
constraints gives only a vague intimation of the kind of solutions that 
are permitted, the constraint-structure wil be refined by means of, for 
instance, the incorporation of already accepted solutions, so as to 
telescope, as it were, into the problem and to arrive at more specific 
solutions. 
Last but not least, since consequential justification by facts serves as 
a limit condition on theory-acceptance, such justification will 
occasionally function as a decisive arbiter not only with respect to 
specific problem solutions but also with respect to complete constraint-
structures. 
So far this rough sketch of the discovery-process in science should 
suffice to show that the generation of problem solutions, which are 
epistemically warranted by the generation method itself, constitutes an 
important part of the scientific enterprise. 
2) If the major part of science consists of the pursuit of problem 
solutions or theories, then it is also to be expected that problem 
solutions are not only judged with respect to their past performance, i.e. 
with respect to the way they have solved a problem in concord with the 
constraints on the problem situation, but also with respect to their 
promise to contribute to the future discovery process. 
Under point 1) I have discussed what is commonly called the 
epistemic appraisal of problem solutions. Under the present heading I 
will discuss the heuristic appraisal of problem solutions and programs. 
We have already met this kind of appraisal in chapter I, where it was 
shown that the historical turn in the philosophy of science was partly a 
result of the recognition that it is not simply a finished theory that is 
being appraised in science but the career of a theory. In terms of past 
performance it is, as McMullin^ puts it, the proven fertility of the 
original model or metaphor, which is included in the (epistemic) appraisal 
of a theory. But at every stage of the career of a model or theory there 
is also the as yet untested fertility (or, in Hesse's^' phrase, the 'neutral 
analogy'), the potential for future extension and modification of the 
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model or theory, which should be taken account of in general theory-
appraisal. Few philosophers still dispute the philosophical relevance of a 
heuristic appraisal of the future prospect of a theory - for one thing it 
will contribute to the economy of research -, but many of them will 
deny any connection between this heuristic appraisal and the epistemic 
appraisal of a theory. The estimated future potential of a theory, so 
they say, has nothing whatever to do with its epistemic credentials. 
In what follows I want to call this unrelenting separation into 
question. I even want to argue that one cannot consistently subscribe to 
the philosophical relevance of heuristic appraisal and at the same time 
deny it any epistemic relevance. Part of my argument will be that the 
economy of research depends on the epistemic relevance of the future 
prospect of a theory, model or program. I will use Urbach's22 plea for a 
role of heuristic appraisal in Lakatos' theory of scientific research pro-
grams as a target of my argument, mainly because he does give a clear 
exposition of the kinds of arguments that are used in heuristic appraisal. 
This enables me to show that these arguments are 'generational' 
arguments which epistemically contribute to the acceptance of a theory 
or program. 
Urbach argues that "unlike other philosophies of science the metho-
dology of scientific research programmes enables one to make some 
assessment of the potential for future development of a research 
programme". ^ He regards this "as one of the most important and 
original aspects of this methodology".2'* It is this aspect which is 
further exploited by Urbach in his account of the heuristic power or 
objective promise of a research program. 
Urbach distinguishes three dimensions along which researchprograms 
can be compared with respect to their heuristic power Heuristics may 
vary in the precision with which they guide the development of new 
theories; they may vary in their resourcefulness in the face of empirical 
difficulties; and they may vary with respect to the autonomy with which 
new theories are developed in fields other than those already covered by 
existing theories. 
I will discuss these aspects in due course, but let us first have a 
look at the role these heuristics get assigned by Urbach. Urbach claims 
that a program with a powerful heuristics is likely to show greater 
theoretical progress than a weaker rival but that there can never be an 
appeal to the assignment of some probability to future empirical pro-
gress. So there is no guarantee whatever that a heuristically powerful 
program will have any empirical success. I believe that Urbach's claim, 
qualified in this way, fails to be a useful guide in scientific research. 
Heuristic appraisal ceases to have any force, I will argue, if it is 
completely separated from epistemic appraisal. 
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Urbach's claim presupposes that scientists (should) prefer programs 
with the greater theoretical progress. This is probably right, but in 
Urbach's construal it remains unclear why they should do so. Since the 
theoretical progressiveness of a program does not say anything about its 
empirical adequacy, I cannot think of any other reason for scientists to 
prefer theoretically progressive programs than that they promise to be 
more efficient: They will be more likely to produce a rapid succession of 
relevant theories. But, on the other hand, if the a priori chance of 
empirical success is the same for a heuristically powerful as for a 
heuristically weak program, as it is claimed by Urbach and many other 
authors, then scientists may be better off to choose the heuristically 
weak program. If such a program appears to be empirically unsuccessful, 
the scientist has invested comparatively little energy in it and he can 
immediately search for another heuristically weak, but possibly successful 
program. Ironically, the most efficient strategy would be to 'proliferate1 
heuristically weak programs, instead of running a great risk that one's 
prolonged research in a heuristically powerful program only leads to 
empirically unsuccesful theories. In extremis the best heuristic would be 
to drop heuristics. 
This unpalatable conclusion is, to my opinion, a consequence of the 
fact that there is an inconsistency in simultaneously subscribing to the 
philosophical relevance of heuristic appraisal and denying it any 
epistemic relevance. I do not think that research can be efficient if one 
has no idea at all of the future empirical success of this research. 
Urbach's plea for heuristic appraisal can only be saved if it is assigned 
some epistemic relevance. If we know - fallibly, as ever - that a 
heuristically powerful program has a better chance of success, then this 
may provide us with enough reason to prefer it above a heuristically 
weak program. Consequently there are only two options left with respect 
to heuristic appraisal: either one rejects its philosophical relevance tout 
court or one assigns it epistemic relevance too. 
Thus, heuristic appraisal consists of the assessment of the future 
potential of a theory or program, including an estimation of its future 
empirical success. How do Urbach's three characteristics of heuristic 
appraisal fare within this conception? In Urbach's presentation they 
achieve too little to serve as a guide for a scientist in his choice 
between different possible research programs. But if it can be shown 
that they are somehow linked to the potential empirical success of a 
program, they may appear to be useful criteria indeed. But how can we 
have any idea of the future empirical success of a program? We may get 
an answer to this question if, again, we beware of putting too much 
weight on the consequentialist justification of theories. 
I have already argued that most of the time scientists are engaged in 
solving problems, instead of testing theories and that most of the time 
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they can have reason enough to accept a theory if it contributes to the 
solution of the problem in concord with the constraints of the problem 
situation. They get their reasons 'abductively' from the reliability of the 
background knowledge, which is partly laid down in the set of con-
straints. A theory is epistemically warranted if it contributes to the 
problem solution. From this it follows that, if a program or a set of 
constraints shows a high production of theories that contribute to the 
problem solution, then this program is not only heuristically but also, to 
a certain extent, epistemically successful. And this in turn, means that 
the heuristic appraisal of the future potential of a program serves as an 
epistemic appraisal at the same time. What in fact is being appraised is 
the range of possibilities to reason abductively from a problem and a set 
of - reliable - constraints to an acceptable solution. 
If we can find a means for determining this range of possibilities, 
then also we will have a - weak - measure for the future empirical 
success of the program at the same time. There will be no need for any 
extra criteria to estimate this future empirical success. Fortunately, 
Urbach's three dimensions along which programs are heuristically 
appraised are still available as well-come criteria for our heuristic-
cum-epistemic appraisal. I will end this discussion with a brief survey of 
those criteria. 
The heuristic promise of a program increases with the precision with 
which the constraint-structure delineates the problem solution(s). A 
program has a high precision if it paves a clear way to the problem 
solution(s). In the ideal case the solution is completely and uniquely 
determined by the constraints. If such an ideal is attained and the con-
straints consist of well-established data, theories and other items of 
information, then scientists may well conclude that the solution is not 
only epistemically warranted but even justified, to the extent that no 
empirical testing will be necessary. However, such cases are rare and 
we will see that too much precision, short of complete determination, 
does not sit well with the other two criteria. 
If solutions are hard to come by, a program will benefit from its 
resourcefulness. If particular research within a program fails to bring 
out a satisfactory solution, the program should have enough resources 
and flexibility to point out alternative pathways to solutions. It will be 
clear that maximum precision and maximum resourcefulness are 
incompatible requirements. Normally, scientists will strive to attain an 
optimum balance between both requirements. An illuminating example of 
a program with too much precision and too little resourcefulness is the 
Ptolemaic program/^ Its constraints - the most important one being the 
metaphysical constraint that all heavenly motions are perfect - set out a 
clear line of research. Had the sun, the moon and the five, then known 
planets turned out to move in perfect circles around the earth, the 
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program would have had maximum success. But this ideal was not 
realized and the program, being too precise, had only one alternative 
resource, viz. to add epicycle on epicycle, which in the end failed to 
lead to a satisfactory solution. 
Moreover, the Ptolemaic program was also weak according to the 
third criterion, that a program should display a considerable autonomy. A 
program will gain in value if it does not only lead to solutions of the 
problems at hand, but also to new problems and new kinds of solutions. 
Problems are just as hard to come by as solutions and much research is 
invested in discovering, more or less articulated problems. Again the 
high precision of the Ptolemaic program precluded it from having any 
autonomy. Had the program been successful, then it would have been 
immediately extinguished. Its heuristics would have been exhausted. ' 
So far Urbach's three dimensions along which a program's heuristic 
power can be evaluated. Of course, these kinds of heuristic appraisal can 
be further specified and other kinds of heuristic appraisal are not 
excluded. My aim has been to show how programs - in every stage of 
their development - can be evaluated with respect to their future pro-
blem solving capacity. I have also argued that heuristic appraisal always 
should carry some epistemic force to serve as a genuine guide to future 
research and I have shown that it does carry epistemic force, because 
the acceptability of problem solutions is for a large part determined by 
the constraints on the problem situation. 
Again I hasten to add that in the end consequential testing must 
carry the burden of justification. But throughout this chapter my point 
has been that consequential testing only serves as an - indispensable -
limit condition on scientific research. The major part of science consists 
of the discovery and pursuit of adequate problems and problem solutions. 
This view of science as a discovery-process is well in accord with 
the naturalist conception of science developed in this study. In a sense 
it is even the case that the naturalist conception cannot be fully under-
stood if science is not seen as a discovery-process. One important thesis 
of the naturalist approach is that theoretical and conceptual innovations, 
including innovations on the levels of 'rules' and 'aims', are reasoned to 
under the influence of science itself. Another important thesis, defended 
in chapter II, is that these theoretical and conceptual innovations con-
stitute at least as large a part of the scientific enterprise as empirical 
problem solving. These two theses already imply that the rationality of 
discovery is a necessary ingredient of the naturalist conception of 
science. 
Nevertheless, I am aware that the relevance of discovery for the 
naturalistic conception of science should be further clarified. Sofar I 
have only shown with respect to discovery how problem solutions are 
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reasoned to from a surprising or problematic phenomenon and a set of 
reliable constraints. Throughout this chapter it was more or less pre-
supposed that scientists would always have such a set of reliable con-
straints at their disposal. But there is more to discovery than just the 
discovery of problem solutions under the guidance of already available 
constraints. Reliable constraint-structures themselves have to be dis-
covered! 
Scientists have to engage part of their time in specifying relevant, 
coherent and heuristically promising constraint-structures which should 
delineate the initially vague problem-situations. Though, usually, there 
will be no direct problems with respect to the reliability of the con-
straints separately, since they are drawn from accepted background 
knowledge, the development of a reliable set of constraints may be high-
ly problematic. As I have shown in chapter II, conceptual problems may 
arise if different items of information, put together in the set of con-
straints, appear to be incompatible with each other, thus pointing out an 
incoherence in our background knowledge. I have also shown that during 
the process of problem solving it may appear that a particular problem 
solution is highly supportive of and supported by some of the constraints 
but incompatible whith one or more of the other constraints. In such a 
case the latter constraints may be dropped or changed after a careful 
consideration of the pro's and contra's of such an alteration. 
What all this means is, that we can only have confidence in our 
background knowledge to a certain extent. Often situations will arise in 
which we are hard pressed to change some of the items of information 
we have been using as heuristic guides in our research. In these 
situations we are faced with a conceptual tension between different 
parts of our knowledge, which can often be traced to a basic, as yet 
undetected, incoherence within our background knowledge. 
The discovery-process is a complicated process in which new - con-
ceptual - problems can arise during our attempts to solve the original 
empirical, conceptual or, as Nickles would have it, conceptually deep 
empirical problems. In the preceding chapters I have argued that some of 
these conceptual problems are best resolved by changing even the most 
highly valued parts of our background knowledge, such as the 'rules' and 
'aims' of science. This is the main characteristic of the naturalist con-
ception of science. In this chapter I have been primarily concerned with 
showing that empirical and conceptual problem solving alike are part of 
the overall discovery-process, in which scientists try to develop reliable 
and heuristically promising constraint-structures in order that they may 
reason 'abductively' from the constraints to problem solutions. To 
emphasize the naturalistic aspect of this process, I will paraphrase 
Shapere again: during the discovery-process we do not only discover 
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problem-solutions, but we also discover how to discover problem 
solutions. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE NATURALIST CONCEPTION AT WORK: THE EXPLANATION 
OF CONTROVERSY AND CONSENSUS FORMATION 
In the preceding chapters I have discussed three more or less 
distinct topics from the philosophy of science each of which has con-
tributed to the naturalist conception of scientific development. In 
this chapter, in section I, I will bring the results of these 
discussions together so as to give a general idea in what way a 
naturalist conception can be put to work in the actual study of 
historical and contemporary scientific cases. Given its rejection of 
any general methodology and its strong dependence on actual science 
itself, it is in the nature of the conception, which is defended in 
this study, that only a general outline of such an approach can be 
given. Ultimately, the naturalistic approach will have to be filled in 
with a long series of detailed historical case-studies. 
An important strategy in the study of history in general and of 
history of science in particular is to look for recurrent themes or 
tendencies. One recurrent theme which, I think, is especially relevant 
for the naturalist conception of science is the arisal and subsequent 
solution of scientific controversies. There are many well-known con-
troversies in the history of science. For instance: Priestly versus 
Lavoisier in chemistry, Einstein versus Bohr in quantum mechanics, uni-
formitarians versus catastrophists in geology and Mendelians versus bio-
metricians in evolutionary theory. As Laudan has pointed out, these 
controversies are basically a mystery both for foundationalists and 
relativists in the philosophy of science. To put it crudely, 
foundationalists have difficulties to explain the arisal and continuance of 
controversies between scientists, while relativists have difficulties to 
explain the resolution of such controversies. In section 2 I will argue 
that the naturalist conception avoids these difficulties and promises to 
be successful in explaining both the arisal and the resolution of 
controversies. 
Not accidentally, controversies have also been used as the main ob-
jects of investigation by a rival naturalist approach to scientific 
development, viz. the 'strong program' in the sociology of science. In 
this approach controversies are primarily explained in terms of clashes 
between social interests instead of rational disagreements. In section 3 I 
will argue that the 'strong program' has not yet succeeded in 
demonstrating that social interests are the ultimate causes of a scien-
tist's theoretical preferences. Since the Mendelism-biometry controversy, 
which is also the subject of the case-study in part II, has been con-
sidered as particularly supportive of the 'strong program"s claims, 
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section 3 can be seen as a kind of entr'acte between parts I and II of 
this study. 
1. A general outline of the natural conception of science 
Since the basic ideas of the naturalist conception of science have 
already been presented in the preceding chapters, a brief survey of the 
results obtained in those chapters will suffice here to convey a general 
outline of this conception. 
One main theme running throughout this study is the strong inter-
dependence between the history of science and the philosophy of 
science. In chapter I I have shown how this interdependence met with 
increasing appreciation among philosophers of science. To start with, 
they recognized that the career of a theory should be taken into 
account for its appraisal. Soon it became widely accepted that a theory 
is not just a finished product, but that it is stretched over time in a 
sequence of modified versions. To evaluate a theory scientists do not 
only look at the final version of the theory, but they ask themselves 
how well the original version has guided them in their research. How 
well, for example, has it enabled them to overcome anomalies? Or how 
'natural*, rather than ad hoc, was the sequence of modifications it has 
gone through? In short, how fertile have the theory and its associated 
model been?^ 
However I have also emphasized that usually it is not only a specific 
theoretical model which is being appraised with respect to its proven 
fertility, but also a set of additional - inter alia metaphysical and 
methodological - ideas which guide the scientist in the elaboration of 
the model. The role of these prior beliefs was first fully recognized by 
Kuhn and Lakatos. Lakatos, moreover, has shown us a way, how these 
extra-scientific beliefs can be taken into account, if we take programs 
instead of theories as our units of appraisal. This view of science as 
consisting of scientific programs, in which more or less dogmatically 
held prior beliefs are considered to be indispensable for the development 
of theories, is an important ingredient of the naturalist conception of 
science. 
The interdependence of the history and philosophy of science became 
even more apparent, when philosophers of science fully realized that 
every philosophy of science should be tested against the history of 
science in order to guarantee that their models of science would accord 
with at least part of actual scientific practice. But, while this seemed to 
be a reasonable and even necessary requirement, it raised at least two 
quite refractory problems. Foundationalist philosophers of science had 
grave difficulties to avoid a circularity or the invocation of a 'Cunning 
of Reason' in their endeavour to support their models by means of 
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actual historical examples.4 Not really able to manage these problems 
philosophers are lured either back into extreme apriorism or into the 
pitfalls of relativism. I have argued that instead we can steer a middle 
course if we reject foundationalism, i.e. if we accept that there has been 
no common core of implicit or explicit rationality in the reasons used by 
scientists throughout the history of science. Relativism can be avoided 
and rationality preserved, if we can show that local rationality has pro­
gressively evolved in its interaction with science proper. The naturalist 
expects that both science and the conceptions of rationality have pro­
gressed by means of positive feedback or by pulling themselves up at 
each other's bootstraps. There is no other way to confirm this 
expectation than by means of piecemeal historical investigations of local 
changes in science and rationality. 
So far, theoretical considerations have led us to the idea of 
'bootstrap rationality'. But, as I have shown in chapter Π, there are also 
prior empirical reasons, which have contributed to the initial plausibility 
of the naturalist explanation of scientific progress. Laudan's historical 
studies have shown that conceptual problem solving has been at least as 
important a part of scientific activity as empirical problem solving. A 
major part of these conceptual problems concerned tensions between the 
scientist's ideas about how he ought to proceed his research and the 
theories and problem solutions actually produced during his research. 
Such tensions are not only expected but even implied by a naturalist 
philosophy of science. For our ideas about rationality to change under 
the influence of science, it is necessary that particular scientific 
achievements regularly call these ideas in question. 
The naturalist conception of science finds support in the fact that 
such conceptual tensions were often resolved by an actual change in the 
scientists' ideas about rationality.^ To show how scientists can have 
reasons at all to change their ideas about what serves as a good reason 
in science in the first place, I have taken over Laudan's and Nickles' 
characterization of science as a problem solving activity. According to 
Nickles problems can be defined as sets of possible solutions which are 
determined by the constraints on the problem situation. In his attempts 
to find the right solution the scientist is guided by these constraints. 
The constraints constitute the direction in which the scientist thinks he 
ought to proceed his research. Part of the constraints are the 'rules' 
and 'aims' that the scientist subscribes to. Within this conception it is 
not difficult to show how, for instance, some constraints will 
(temporarily) get a higher value - e.g., because they have helped the 
scientist to find some interesting problem solutions - than other 
constraints and how this different weighting may provide the scientist 
with reasons to drop or change the lesser valued constraints if 
necessary. The scientist's (sub-)aims or (sub-)rules may just as well be 
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part of these latter constraints as any other items of information. This 
means that, during his research, a scientist may accumulate good reasons 
to change - usually in a piecemeal fashion - even his most basic ideas 
about scientific rationality. 
In the conception of science developed sofar the scientist's prior 
beliefs concerning his particular field, discipline or problem area are 
given a main part to play in his research. In chapter III I have shown 
that his conception fits well with a view of science as a process of 
discovery. There I argued that abductive inference from a particular 
phenomenon and a set of more or less dogmatically held beliefs or con-
straints to a certain problem solution is probably the most common form 
of reasoning in science. Such abductive arguments are not only heuristi-
cally valuable in so far as that they provide the scientist with an effi-
cient research procedure, but they will also, to a certain extent, confer 
an epistemic warrant on the final problem solutions. Partly because the 
constraints are drawn from reliable background knowledge and partly 
because the constraints are amenable to change during the process of 
problem-solving, there is little danger of an epistemic circularity here. 
Mostly, abductive inference consists of a complicated chain of argu-
ments, in which, e.g., the constraints are further refined in order to get 
more specific problem solutions. This process of articulating the con-
straints by means of intermediate problem solutions will often be inter-
rupted by the arisal of conceptual problems, which may force the scien-
tist to readjust the already extant constraints. In the naturalist concep-
tion science can be globally characterized as a discovery process in 
which scientists also discover how to discover new and better problems 
solutions. 
The naturalist expects that detailed historical studies will reveal that 
in successive periods in the history of science, scientists have learned to 
develop ever better discovery-procedures. Science itself has taught them 
to adopt new and more adequate constraints, for the further development 
of science. Piecemeal reconstructions of these changes in 'local' 
rationality can, in principle, add up to an overall progress in science and 
rationality. There are no time-transcendent criteria of rationality in this 
conception." 
There are two main objections to my construal thusfar. Both are 
basically questions about the meaning of the phrase 'progress in science': 
Wat is progress? What is science? I have already answered the first 
question in chapter I. There I discussed the objection that we cannot 
speak of progress in science, if all of science, including its goals or 
aims, is in flux. There can only be progress relative to some fixed 
cognitive end. In my answer to this objection I referred to the intercon-
nection between 'local' and 'global' evaluations. On the one hand there 
is only one way indeed to assess progress in science and that is by 
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'whiggishly' asking whether the development of science has furthered 
cognitive ends which we deem to be worthwhile.' This is what I have 
called our 'global' evaluation of scientific development. But on the other 
hand we can also ask whether our cognitive ends themselves are as 
worthwhile as they seem to be. The naturalist tries to answer this 
question by investigating 'local' evaluations in the history of science. He 
expects that our confidence in our cognitive ends will find support in 
the evolution of 'local' rationality. Of course, he cannot be sure of that. 
Probably, he will discover that at least some of our cognitive ends are 
not as reasonable as we take them to be. But such discoveries, as long 
as they remain incidental, will only support the naturalist conception of 
science. So the answer to the first objection is that, surely, we can only 
assess progress in science relative to our cognitive ends, but we can 
also evaluate our cognitive ends by means of a study of the history of 
science and rationality. 
The second objection concerns the demarcation of science. We cannot 
speak of progress in science if we do not have any time-transcendent 
criteria to demarcate science from other human activities. If science 
could change in all of its aspects, then it could just as well in the 
future turn out to be a football-game.^ Evidently, we need some general 
characteristic of science to ensure that there is at least a continuity in 
what we call science. Derksen1" has suggested two such general 
characteristics, which he claims to be essential parts of our conception 
of science: First there is the common aim of all science, viz. the 
acquisition of reliable knowledge about the world. Secondly, given our 
fallibility we have to consult the world to get such knowledge. From 
this we can infer the hallmark of science, viz. that the empirical world 
has to be the final arbiter with respect to the reliability of our know-
ledge. These general characteristics will serve to demarcate science, 
while at the same time we can maintain, as Derksen has shown, a 
naturalistic conception of science. All our further ideas about scientific 
rationality, for example about the way in which the empirical world will 
actually function as an arbiter, can be subject to change in the course 
of scientific development. Formulated this way the second objection is 
not really an objection, but the assertion that the naturalist is at least 
committed to this or a similar demarcation-criterion. 
However, it remains unclear why the naturalist should feel compelled 
to accept this criterion as an unchanging, time-transcendent criterion. 
Surely, he will admit that the acquisition of reliable knowledge about the 
world has been the primary aim of most scientists for centuries. But he 
can still try to explain this wide-spread consensus by showing that 
scientists have come to agree that this should be the aim of science for 
particular reasons. There has been a time that the function of science 
was to serve God, to expose his magnificence, which was partly mani-
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fested in the external world. The study of the Book of Nature was seen 
as a supplement to the study of the Bible and all knowledge - 'reliable' 
or not - which would possibly detract from God's magnificence was 
rejected beforehand. Apparently, our ancestors have changed the primary 
aim of science and we can think of several reasons why they have done 
that. They may have discovered that their aim was a Utopian aim . 
God's magnificence is too elusive to be exposed by simple human beings. 
Or they may have discovered that they would be better off to improve 
the chance of survival in this world than to strive for the little chance 
of a place in Heaven. What reasons our ancestors really had is food for 
historians. My point is that they may have had good reasons to change 
the aim of science. One could of course say that what our ancestors did 
was not science, but then one is simply giving an uninteresting, analyti-
cal definition of science. 
It should be noticed here that there is not really much at stake. The 
naturalist agrees that the common aim of science is the aquisition of 
reliable knowledge about the world, but it is contingently so. Apparently, 
it has been a highly succesful constraint on science. But the fact that 
during the past centuries scientists have not had reasons to change this 
constraint and the fact that we cannot think of reasons to change this 
constraint in the future should not lead us to the conclusion that it is a 
necessary constraint on science. The history of science has given us 
already too much examples of the limitedness of our powers of 
imagination. 
Similar remarks can be made with respect to the 'hallmark' of scien-
ce. For a long time the empirical world has been regarded as an obstacle 
to reliable knowledge about the world. The only reliable way to achieve 
knowledge was to transcend the world of appearances and, for instance, 
to retrieve our hidden knowledge about reality by means of anamnesis 
(Plato) or to deduce our knowledge form clear and distinct ideas 
(Descartes). We have learnt that we cannot be autonomous sources of 
knowledge, that we are fallible and that we have to probe the world of 
appearances. We cannot imagine that there is any other way to get 
knowledge of the world. But why should we even want to conclude from 
that, that it will always be the only way to learn about the world? 
Of course it is not excluded that our conception of science, with this 
common aim and hallmark, turns out to be the best conception of 
science. But we will never know for sure. As things are now, we can 
only rejoice in the fact that most scientists agree about the basic 
characteristics of science. This gives us the opportunity to compare 
different scientific programs or disciplines with respect to their success 
in satisfying these basic demands. 
Such agreement, however, is a historical contingency and in a 
naturalist conception there is no specific need for such generally shared 
63 
values to come to a comparison between science or programs. The only 
presupposition the naturalist has to make is that two scientists or two 
scientific communities should agree about something if they want to 
compare their sciences or programs. Preconditional to any comparison 
between two entities is the existence of some shared standard with 
respect to which these entities can be measured. But this does not mean 
that scientists should come to agree about what they perceive to be the 
general aims of science. They may, e.g., agree that there is some 
particular, as yet vaguely formulated, problem that has to be solved, but 
completely disagree about the aims and methods to be followed. The fact 
that they are trying to solve the same problem gives them the oppor-
tunity to compare their programs with respect to their success and pros-
pect - relative to each own aims and methods - in attaining the 
solution. 2 in the end it may even give them the opportunity to come to 
an agreement about the aims and methods to be adopted in their parti-
cular scientific discipline. This brings me at last to the topic of con-
troversy and consensus formation in science. 
2. Controversy and consensus formation in science 
In the introduction to this chapter I suggested that foundationalists 
have difficulties to explain the arisal and continuance of controversies. 
As Laudan ^  has pointed out, these difficulties are primarily due to the 
influence of the hierarchical model of rationality, in which goals or 
values are "perched precariously at the top of the justificatory ladder"14 
and in which there is only a one-way, top-down, direction of justifi-
cation (aims to methods to theories). This model implies that the basic 
aims or goals of science cannot be rationally negotiated. Accordingly, 
foundationalists, like Popper or Reichenbach, have endorsed the view 
that the adoption of a particular cognitive goal is a mere matter of 
convention. There can be no reasonable grounds, short of the demon-
stration of an internal inconsistency in someone's aims or values, for 
changing or abandoning one's basic cognitive goals. ' Partly for this 
reason foundationalists have to assume that basic to all successive 
episodes in the history of science there must have been an - implicit or 
explicit - consensus about the aims of science. Progress in science would 
be inexplicable, if one would tolerate - irrational - transitions in the 
aims or values basic to the successful parts of the history of science. 
But then the foundationalists are hard pressed to explain why there is 
still such wide-spread disagreement about the aims and methods of 
science. One would expect that scientists would gradually learn that 
there is only one common aim and method (such as either Popper's or 
Reichenbach's) to all science. 
64 
These problems give the relativists some good reasons to posit that 
we would better admit that scientists can have different aims and values 
and that, therefore, it is often impossible to compare their theories 
rationally. With respect to the problem of consensus formation this is no 
solution either. The relativist may be freed from the obligation to ex-
plain a consensus on the level of aims and values, but as a consequence 
he has troubles to explain any consensus whatsoever. In Kuhn's theory, 
for instance, it remains unclear why, after the break-down of an old 
paradigm, scientists would group themselves under a new paradigm. Why 
should they agree with respect to a new set of aims and values? They 
cannot have reasons for that, and to resort to social or political causes 
to explain their agreement does not seem to help very much, because the 
multiplicity of possible causes and effects leaves it still a mystery how 
scientists come to rally around a single new paradigm. " 
I have already shown, in chapter II, how in a naturalist conception of 
science these problems are avoided. There I discussed several ways in 
which scientists can acquire good reasons for changing their basic 
cognitive ends or their rules and methods. The fact that science itself 
gives us reasonable grounds to adopt certain beliefs about the aims and 
methods of science takes us already a long way to the solution of the 
problem of consensus formation. But as yet, I have only indicated how 
within a particular program or paradigm scientists can change their 
minds about their most basic cognitive ends. Although this kind of con-
sensus formation is remarkable enough by itself - it creates the 
possibility to rationally change one's program or 'paradigm1 - it still 
leaves us with the question how disagreements between scientists from 
competing programs are resolved. 
Controversies do not last forever. We have learnt from the history of 
science that disagreements are brought to a closure. At some time 
scientists come to agree that there is no disagreement about the old 
issue anymore. Such consensus can be reached for different reasons: It is 
possible that in the end the subject of disagreement is deemed to be 
really unimportant. It is shelved and after some time perhaps forgotten. 
Or both sides may discover that - as yet - they lack any means to solve 
the controversial problem. Again the subject of disagreement is put 
aside, to await more promising times. In both cases scientists can have 
good reasons to end their disagreement. But, for our purposes, there are 
two more interesting cases in which a disagreement is ended. In the 
first case one of the contestants simply comes out as the winner. The 
disagreement ends because all scientists - or the next generation of 
scientists1 - of that particular discipline adopt the winning program. In 
the other case one or both of the contestants, or an informed outsider, 
may discover that both sides are or have been promising to a certain 
extent, but that their outlooks would considerably improve if they joined 
65 
forces. The disagreement ends because the programs or part of the pro-
grams are fused or synthesized. 
Now, the crucial question is how scientists can come to an agreement 
that a particular program has won the contest or that both programs 
should be synthesized. As I already stated above, the first requirement is 
that scientists should agree about something that can serve as a measure 
for comparison. Part of my answer to the question is that this 
requirement is easily met. We can safely assume that the number of 
topics on which scientists agree is usually greater than the number of 
topics they so heavily disagree about. Many items of information drawn 
from a common background knowledge can serve in principle as a 
measure of comparison. But new discoveries - inside or outside the pro-
grams - too can do this job. One kind of discoveries, the discoveries of 
new research-techniques, has been particularly influential with respect to 
the choice between competing programs. The gradual development of ever 
better microscopical techniques and the subsequent discovery of hitherto 
unobserved entities repeatedly decided the issue with respect to 
competing realistic and instrumentalistic programs (cf., e.g., chapter II of 
the case study). Similarly, the development of the telescope has had a 
decisive influence on the astronomers' choice for the Copernican instead 
of the Ptolemaic worldview. The inevitable results of new - reliable -
research techniques have often provided scientists with a neutral 
standard not only with respect to their theories, but also with respect 
to their programs, including the aims and methods of their programs. 
However, hard-boiled relativists will object that if our aims and 
values differ, then also our methods, theories, observations, in short our 
whole world-views will differ. This means that no neutral standards will 
be available. Laudan has convincingly argued that this is a fallacy, the 
so-called 'co-variance fallacy''", but let us for the sake of argument 
assume that there is a case for the relativist's objection. Many authors 
have pointed out that the complete absence of neutral standards would 
make any disagreement incomprehensible. At least we have to assume 
that scientists believe they have something in common to disagree about. 
The relativist's point is that such beliefs will always be false. Take, for 
instance, the well-known controversy between Priestly and Lavoisier. 
There can be no doubt that both believed that they tried to solve the 
same problem, the problem of combustion, and that we believe that 
Lavoisier solved the problem and Priestly did not. Both beliefs, Kuhn 
argues, are false: Lavoisier solved one problem. Priestly another. To a 
great extent, this is true and, to be sure, it is also implied by my con-
strual of science as a discovery-process. Problems are identified by the 
set of constraints, including a scientist's aims and values. Since Lavoisier 
and Priestley had different aims and values™, they faced different pro-
blems. Kuhn concludes that there is no common problem to compare 
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their programs with and that therefore we are not justified to assert 
that Lavoisier's was the better program. 
This conclusion, however, is too strong. Sophisticated problems are 
determined by the constraints on the problem situation, but problems 
must first be discovered before they can be specified by means of 
constraints. Problems are usually discovered as vaguely delineated 'gaps' 
in our framework of knowledge. An example of such a 'gap' is the open, 
'naive' question: What happens to material when it burns? Both 
Lavoisier's and Priestley's problems can be traced back to this common 
ancestor. Basically, both believed they answered this question and, 
basically, both were right to believe they answered the same question. 
It is hard to believe that Kuhn would deny that there could be such 
agreement on, what we may call, the proto-scientific level. His point 
seems rather to be that, as soon as research is started, the - initially 
common - problem will be differently specified and the solutions to the 
problem will be differently appraised according to the aims and values of 
the different programs or paradigms. And given the assumption that 
the aims and values adopted in a program or paradigm are not nego-
tiable, it will be impossible to compare programs or paradigms with 
respect to their problem solving success. 
Here we have a crucial difference between the Kuhnian relativist and 
the naturalist. For the naturalist claims that aims and values are ratio-
nally negotiable. This means that in a naturalist conception even only an 
agreement on the proto-scientific level may in principle be sufficient to 
salvage the possibility of a rational comparison between programs or 
paradigms. In the naturalist conception the whole conceptual framework 
of a program can be at stake in the comparison between programs. If 
the shared, proto-scientific, problem is the only thing two programs have 
in common, then the way to compare these programs is to investigate 
how successful these programs have been or will be according to their 
own standards, i.e. by taking a 'local' stance in the evaluation of these 
programs. Such an investigation may reveal that one program has been 
more successful than the other. In that case scientists may find reason 
to defect the latter and to join the former program (cf. the case of the 
American biometricians, ch. Ill in the case study). 
I hasten to admit that, if the proto-scientific problem were the only 
thing programs had in common, then this would furnish a very small 
basis indeed for comparison. Consensus formation would probably be a 
rare phenomenon in the history of science. For one thing it would be 
highly problematic to attach a value to 'success' in the comparison of 
both programs, since there are no independent criteria of 'success'. But 
I do not think that this is in principle impossible (cf. Laudan's 
unsatisfactory but heuristically valuable attempt to determine success by 
means of 'problem-counting'). Luckily, however, competing programs 
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usually have much more in common than only their shared proto-scien-
tific problem. Rival scientists agree about many items of information and 
each of these items can in principle serve as an additional measure of 
comparison. Since there is no necessary covariance between aims and 
methods and theories, scientists may even disagree about their aims but 
agree about their methods. In our time, realists and instrumentalists will 
globally agree about the method of theory-testing but disagree about the 
aims - true knowledge of the unobservable world or 'saving the pheno-
mena' - these methods lead to. They can use the shared method as a 
frame of reference to compare, for example, the feasibility of their aims. 
Last but not least, scientists can agree about the common aim and the 
hallmark of all science , as most of them seemed to have done in the 
past centuries, and use these as a common measure to compare their 
programs with. The impressive history of these characteristics is a sign 
that they probably provide the best, though often too general and too 
vague, criteria for the comparison between programs. But, on pain of 
being repetitive, I want to emphasize that being the best thus far does 
not mean being the best forever. 
I end this section with the conclusion that if we want to give an ex-
planation of the emergence and subsequent resolution of scientific con-
troversies, then we should accept that all aspects of science are ratio-
nally negotiable. Only if we accept that scientists can have reasons to 
adopt a new set of aims and values, are we able to explain that scien-
tists can reach a consensus about their aims and values. 
Rational consensus formation will be the main topic of the case-study 
in part II. There I will show how one particular - proto-scientific -
problem, the Problem of Variation in evolutionary theory, came to be the 
object of investigation of two heavily competing programs, viz. the 
biometrie and Mendelian research programs. It will turn out that both 
programs, which possessed highly different mutually incompatible con-
straint-structures, had to readjust their constraints in the course of 
their research, and that as a consequence both programs converged to 
each other. Finally, the controversy ended, because a consensus was 
reached, not that one of the programs should be preferred, but that 
both programs possessed valuable aspects which should be brought to-
gether to form a more promising, synthesized program, the program of 
population genetics. 
But before passing on to this pièce de résistance, I will first briefly 
discuss an alternative approach to the Mendelism-biometry controversy, 
viz. the approach of the 'strong program' in the sociology of science. In 
the 'strong program' the controversy is taken to be a prototypical 
example of the determination of scientific beliefs by social interests. Not 
only irrational but also rational beliefs can be and are to be explained 
by social causes instead of reasons. Since I will argue to the contrary, 
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viz. that the controversy and the resolution of the controversy can -
often - be explained in terms of reasons, it will be worthwhile to 
examine to what extent these sociologists have succeeded to implement 
their program. 
3. The "strong program" in the sociology of science 
The 'strong program'^ -* in the sociology of science has its origin in 
the Edingburgh school in the history and sociology of science. Its most 
vocal members are Bloor, Barnes, Mackenzie and Shapin. Basically, the 
program is built on the 'thesis of the homogeneity of explanation'. 
This thesis implies that scientific knowledge has no special status and 
should be subjected to sociological explanations in the same way as all 
other claims to knowledge. The program is further articulated as in-
volving the following four tenets^: 
1. The explanation of all scientific knowledge should be causal, that is, 
concerned with the conditions which bring about belief or states of 
knowledge. Naturally, there will be other types of causes apart from 
social ones which will cooperate in bringing about belief. 
2. The explanation should be impartial with respect to truth and falsity, 
rationality or irrationality, success or failure. Both sides of these 
dichotomies will require explanation. 
3. The explanation should be symmetrical. The same types of cause 
should explain, say, true and false beliefs. 
4. The explanation should be reflexive. It must be applicable to socio-
logy itself. This is an obvious requirement, because otherwise socio-
logy would be a standing refutation of its own theories. 
These are the four theses which characterize the 'strong program' in the 
sociology of science. Notice, that thus far the program seems to be 
innocent. For one thing, there is nothing specifically sociological about 
the program yet. According to the first tenet all types of causes, such 
as physiological or psychological causes, can bring about belief. For 
another thing, reasons are not explicitly excluded as a type of causes 
that bring about belief. Prima facie the program could be made com-
patible with a rationalist philosophy of science. 
However, if we take a closer look at the symmetry-thesis, then it be-
comes clear why, in fact, the strong program is a rival to any rationa-
list philosophy of science. Rational and irrational beliefs alike should be 
explained by the same type of causes. This monistic approach, the socio-
logist asserts, is basically different from the dualistic asymmetric -
approach of the rationalist, who tries to explain rational beliefs in terms 
of reasons and irrational beliefs in terms of causes. Undoubtedly, there 
is a fundamental difference here, but it should also be noted, that there 
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is an ambiguity in the way the sociologist formulates the asymmetry in 
the rationalist's explanation. 
The asymmetry as formulated above seems to imply that reasons can-
not act as causes: either a belief is explained by reasons or by causes. 
Similarly, it is often implicitly or explicitly suggested in the writings of 
the strong program that if one rejects the symmetry-thesis one also 
relinquishes causal explanation. As a consequence, the sociologist some-
times seems to think that to give a natural, causal explanation of know-
ledge one should be indifferent with respect to reasons. Reasons, being 
themselves causally ineffective, are only epiphenomenal by-effects of the 
real causal process. It remains unclear what position the sociologists of 
the strong program actually take, but if they endorse the view that 
reasons can only be effects, then it is no wonder that they are being 
accused of rendering every belief irrational or rather a-rational. " 
Nevertheless the sociologists hold that they can explain rational belief 
formation as well as irrational belief formation. This claim renders the 
program ambiguous, to say the least. And clearly, many of the misunder-
standings between sociologists and philosophers are not due to the fact 
that philosophers find it so hard to understand how causal explanations 
can be applied to 'rational' belief formation, as it is often suggested2', 
but to this ambiguity in the strong program. 
The strong program does not have to be committed to the view of 
reasons as being causally ineffective. For the sake of clarity I suggest 
therefore that we accept an interpretation of the strong program, in 
which the having of reasons is admitted as a type of cause. But this 
means also that the symmetry-thesis should get a different interpre-
tation, than it has frequently been given. If reasons can be causally 
effective in belief formation, then, presumably, what the symmetry-thesis 
really asserts is that ultimately beliefs can only be sufficiently explained 
by one type of causes, i.e. sociological causes. The rationalist, in con-
trast, holds that some beliefs can be sufficiently explained by a chain of 
causally effective reasons. That is, the scientist's perception of some-
thing as a reason to accept a belief, can be the cause of his accepting 
that belief. Moreover, the scientist can have further reasons (for 
example, his reasons to accept certain principles of rationality) to 
perceive something as a reason to accept a belief. 
It is important to note that in this construal of the scientist's chain 
of reasons there is no preconceived level at which his reasoning process 
necessarily stops short. Should we accept that there are basic principles 
of rationality, which by themselves are not rationally negotiable, then 
there is a real danger that in the end we will have to accept the claims 
of the strong program. If principles of rationality cannot be backed up 
by reasons, then the existence of so many different conceptions of 
rationality can only be explained by causes other than reasons. Thus 
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conceived, the strong program poses a challenge primarily to 
foundationalist philosophies of science. Though probably any issue will 
soon reach an impasse, because the foundationalist will claim that there 
is only one right conception of rationality, viz. his conception, and that 
all other conceptions are inadequate and, therefore, surely amenable to 
sociological or psychological explanations. 
If, however, one accepts that principles of rationality themselves are 
rationally negotiable, then there is no necessary end to the chain of 
reasons responsible for a particular belief. And this implies that the 
sociologist's claim that every belief is ultimately based on socio-psycho-
logical determinants simply lays down an a priori.™ 
The symmetry-thesis is not a matter of indisputable principle. It 
contains an empirical hypothesis. The sociologists of the strong program 
do have some prior but certainly not decisive reasons to believe in the 
promise of their program. These reasons are largely drawn from the 
observation that theory-choice is generally underdetermined. The 
sociologists assume - though sometimes they suggest that it is implied -
that the requisite extra-determination of theory-choice must come from 
social factors. The naturalist philosopher, instead, denies that such 
extra-determination is necessary; what reasons a scientist has - and this 
may be a long chain of reasons - can be sufficient to explain this 
theory-preference. Theory-choice is often in fact underdetermined, only 
because the scientist is not asked to give further reasons for his choice. 
The naturalist thesis is that, if the scientist would be pressed to give 
further arguments, then he would be able - in principle and perhaps 
with some help of a professional philosopher - to give reasons even for 
his 'basic' principles of rationality. 
So, what we have are two empirical hypotheses about scientific belief 
formation. To see which hypothesis has the better credentials we will 
have to investigate actual examples from scientific history. But before I 
come to that, it should be noted that the strong program already starts 
with two serious drawbacks: 1) Since all conceptions of knowledge are 
culturally bound, we cannot have any reason to believe that our con-
ception of knowledge is better than the conception of, say, the Hopi-
indians. Similarly, the Ptolemaic belief that the sun revolves around the 
earth has the same epistemic status as our belief that the earth revolves 
around the sun. Both beliefs have their own social determinants. In the 
strong program any distinction between rationality and irrationality or 
scientific success and failure is basically senseless. 2) Despite ingenuous 
arguments to the contrary^1, the reflexivity-thesis renders the strong 
program potentially self-destructive. If scientific beliefs are dependent 
on social interests, then there can be no reason for anyone, who does 
not share the interests of the Edinburgh-school, to accept their program. 
As Newton-Smith observes, it is somewhat paradoxical that the 
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Edinburgh-school, like other academics, are prepared to spend hours 
arguing their case, given their knowledge that reasons do not work in 
theory-choice. ^But let us nevertheless assume that there is still some-
thing to argue about and finally have a look at the empirical support as 
provided by the historical research in the strong program. The 
Edinburgh-sociologists have primarily focused on controversies in the 
history of science. This seems to be no accident: If a correlation can be 
found between a scientist's social interests and the side he took in the 
controversy, it gives a prima facie case for thinking that the explanation 
of the controversy should, at least partly, rely on social analysis. Such 
correlations are far less significant in scientific episodes where no con-
troversy occurred. 3 In the sociological literature we encounter some 
favourite examples like the determinism-inde terminis m controversy in 
1920 German physics^*, the Pasteur-Pouchet controversy , the nature-
nurture controversy with respect to intelligence^" and, probably the 
most favourite example of all, the Mendelism-biometry controversy. ' 
In all these cases severe criticisms have been made against the strong 
program's historical analyses. In the following I will discuss some 
recurrent themes in these criticisms and I will proceed with a brief, but 
more detailed, critique of Mackenzie and Barnes' views on the 
Mendelism-biometry controversy. 
One recurrent theme of criticism is that many case-studies have been 
insufficiently elaborated to establish that ultimately social interests and 
not arguments determine theory-choice. It has never been denied that 
sociological analysis can be illuminating with respect to the history of 
science. Neither has it been denied that a scientist is influenced by his 
social interests in choosing a theory for further development. On the 
contrary, it would be odd if he did not choose a theory that suited him 
well. The question, however, is whether such social causes prevent him 
from having rational arguments for his choice. ° In many cases socio-
logists succeed in showing the influence of social causes but they fail to 
show that these causes were decisive in theory-choice. 
Another theme of criticism is that in those cases in which there 
seems to be a strong correlation indeed between social interests and 
theory-choice, the historical analysis is plainly inadequate. In several 
cases it has been convincingly demonstrated that, contrary to the socio-
logists' claims, internal reasons did play an important role in theory-
choice: Cf. Hendry's critique of Forman's analysis of German physics™, 
Roll-Hansen's critique^" of the analysis of the Pasteur-Pouchet contro-
versy and Roll-Hansen's critique'*' of the analysis of the Mendelism-bio-
metry controversy. 
The last theme of criticism to be mentioned here is that the corre-
lations, discovered by the sociologists, are often too global to have any 
explanatory force; they are simply 'just so'-stories. Those social 
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circumstances which are posited as causes can often explain the choice 
of widely different, even incompatible, theories. What to say, for in-
stance, of Bloor's explanation of Popper's 'mystification' of knowledge'42: 
Popper mystifies knowledge, because he writes in a time that knowledge 
is threatened. But at the same time this threat is answered by the 
logical positivists by means of a scientific worldview, that surely seems 
to be the contrary to mystification.43 Bloor's explanation is not only 
inadequate, it even fails to be illuminating. We will come across another 
example of a 'just so'-story in the following discussion of the strong 
program's explanation of the Mendelism-biometry controversy. 
At first sight the Mendelism-biometry controversy seems to be a 
highly profitable object of investigation for the strong program in the 
sociology of science. For at least one decade both programs were in-
volved in a heavy competition, which was openly fought out by means of 
often clearly unreasonable accusations at both sides. The discussions -
especially between Bateson on the one side and Weldon and Pearson on 
the other side - were often larded with imputations springing from an 
increasing personal enmity. But even in those cases in which genuine 
arguments prevailed no rational discussion seemed possible, because of 
the 'differences in the language' used by the contestants. The programs 
were incompatible on all levels of the scientific hierarchy; they were at 
variance on the level of theories as well as on the levels of methods 
and aims. They seemed to be 'incommensurable'. This is nicely confirmed 
by Pearson's complaint that "Mr. Bateson and I speak in totally different 
tongues".44 
Given 1) this 'incommensurability', 2) the vehemence of the contro-
versy and, in addition, 3) the public avowal by both Bateson and Pearson 
of the connexion between their scientific ideas and some of their social 
and political interests, this controversy seems to be especially apt for an 
explanation in terms of a clash of social interests. Let us therefore 
consider whether Mackenzie and Barnes4^ and Mackenzie4" have actually 
succeeded to give a satisfactory explanation. In my discussion I will 
follow .the three themes of criticism from the exposition above in 
reserve order. 
Mackenzie and Barnes claim that, though the controversy cannot -
as yet - be explained in detail, it can certainly be understood in terms 
of the social classes to which, in particular, Pearson and Bateson 
belonged. 
Pearson was a typical representative of the rising professional middle 
class. He revolted against Victorican 'laissez faire' capitalism. As a 
member of the 'Fabian society' he strived for a 'socialistic' society. To 
attain this ideal, Pearson developed a variant of social Darwinism, with 
which he pursued collective social reform under the guidance of the 
intellectuals from the professional middle class. Part of this project was 
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the gradual biological improvement of the lower classes. Efficient 
improvement, in Pearson's opinion, was only possible by means of an 
'eugenic' selection of the best properties. In effect, Pearson believed 
that social change could be controlled by means of eugenic selection. 
Bateson, in contrast, was a member of the traditional academic elite. 
He was a 'romantic conservative'47 and profoundly dissatisfied with the 
bourgeois society. He despised the impoverished view of the organism 
and the utilitarianism inherent to orthodox Darwinism. Bateson opposed 
the view that social or biological evolution could be predictably con­
trolled. Instead, he felt that real advance could only come from the 
occasional appearance of a 'sport' in biology or an exceptional 'genius' 
in society. Real progress in society and in nature depended on the rare 
occurrence of favourable mutations. 
To all appearances, there seems to be a good fit indeed between 
social interests and scientific conceptions. However, the problem still is 
that there is only a global correlation. Bateson's saltationism, for 
example, is in no way explained by his social background. On the 
contrary: Why should we suddenly believe, counterintuitively, that a 
conservative's interests are best served by revolutionary changes? Would 
not Bateson be better off with the gradual changes as predicted by 
Darwinism? Mackenzie and Barnes put great effort in showing that 
Bateson was a special kind of 'romantic conservative', but such 
specifications - apart from seeming utterly ad hoc sometimes - tend to 
make Bateson's case an individual historical case and to detract from the 
real issue, viz. the alleged, sociological, lawlike character of the 
connection between Bateson's conservatism and his conception of 
evolution. It remains unclear how Bateson's conservatism compelled him 
to adopt saltationism instead of gradualism. 
But even if we grant that there are some deep explanatory 
correlations between interests and knowledge in this case, then those 
correlations that have been put forward can repeatedly be called in 
question, or even refuted. In part Π I will show that Bateson gradually 
changed his position from being a full-blown saltationist from the start 
to being a non-Darwinian gradualist in the end. I will explain this 
development in terms of internal reasons, as they are provided by, for 
example, Johannsen's discoveries. The sociologist, instead, will have a 
hard time to explain why Bateson changed his scientific ideas. Because 
of a simultaneous change in his social background perhaps? 
In a similar vein, Mackenzie and Barnes will have difficulties to 
explain Pearson's rejection of Fisher's biometrical genetics. If Pearson's 
political and social interests, which with respect to evolutionary theory 
found expression in his engagement with eugenics, were the ultimate 
causes of his biological ideas and theories, how is it possible then that 
Pearson persistently rejected Fisher's synthetic theory? Fisher - a 
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staunch eugenist himself - had convincingly argued that his theory pro-
mised eugenics to be much more effective than it was under the wings 
of Pearson's biometrical program. Shouldn't that be enough to give it a 
try at least? 
In my analysis, Pearson's research may have been motivated by his 
social and political background, but the development of his program is to 
be explained internally. Pearson's rejection of Fisher's approach in 
evolutionary theory should be explained by his aversion to Mendelism for 
scientific and philosophical reasons. Fisher's approach was unacceptable 
because it was partly based on the Mendelian theory of heredity which 
in Pearson's opinion could not a be true or empirically adequate theory, 
because it assumed impermissible 'hidden realities'. So Fisher's eugenics 
would not work or in so far as it would be successful, this success 
would be the result of Fisher's use of biometrical insights. Pearson had 
internal reasons to reject Fisher's theory which in fact went against his 
social interests. If his interests had prevailed, he should at least have 
tolerated Fisher's program as a heuristically promising alternative to his 
biometrical program. 
These examples show that there were no straight correlations between 
Bateson's and Pearson's social classes and their scientific ideas. But even 
if there were, Mackenzie and Barnes would still be obliged to show that 
the scientists' social interests were also the causes of their theory-
preferences. This will be a difficult, if not impossible, task especially 
because there are many indications that scientific arguments actually did 
play a decisive role with respect to theory-change and theory-choice 
within the programs. Several of these arguments will be discussed in 
part II. Here I will mention one particularly influential case, viz. the 
impact of Johannsen's empirical discoveries on both the Mendelian and 
biometrical programs. 
Both Mendelians and biometricians almost immediately recognized in 
1903 that Johannsen's discoveries would be highly relevant to their 
already long lasting disagreements. For the Mendelians these discoveries 
came as a well-come support to their program, but they became also 
aware that the adoption of these discoveries within their program forced 
them to change some of the most important constraints to keep the 
program internally consistent. 
On the other hand Johannsen's discoveries constituted a threat to the 
biometrical program. To ward off this threat the biometricians tried, 
with little success, to detect incongruities in the methods used by 
Johannsen or to point out flaws in the Mendelian interpretation of 
Johannsen's results. Such attempts could not prevent the 'defection' of 
some American biometricians to the Mendelian camp. Part of the reason 
for their defection was that in their opinion Johannsen's discoveries had 
demonstrated the superiority of the Mendelian program. Johannsen's 
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influence on the Mendelism-biometry controversy will be extensively 
discussed in part II. 
For the time being my conclusion is that we have good reasons to 
expect that a major part of the controversy can be explained internally. 
The strong program's analysis, on the contrary, may shed light upon 
hitherto undetected and interesting aspects of the controversy, but it 
fails to demonstrate the causal primacy of social interests. 
In part II I will argue in detail that the controversy can be explained 
in terms of rational arguments as soon as we take account of the con-
ceptual tensions between the programs on all levels of the scientific 
hierarchy. The controversy is best understood if we realize that not only 
the theories but also the aims and methods of the scientists involved 
were rationally negotiable. This was possible because both sides of the 
controversy still shared at least one common basis for the assessment of 
the relative merits of their programs, viz. their aims to solve the 'Pro-
blem of Variation'. The vehemence of the controversy can now be partly 
explained from the fact that both sides felt that not only their theories 
but their entire conceptual systems were at stake in their attempts to 
solve this problem. 
In my analysis the conceptual tensions between the programs were to 
be resolved by internal scientific developments in each of the programs. 
These developments were responsible for changes in the conceptual 
systems which eventually led to the convergence of the programs. This 
convergence paved the way to a final consensus with respect to the 
solution of the problem of variation, which took shape in a synthesis of 
the programs into the program of population genetics. 
I submit that the naturalist approach to scientific rationality will 
provide the best explanation not only of the controversy between 
Mendelians and biometricians but also of the resolution of their con-
troversy. By the same token, the controversy should not be seen as an 
exemplary confirmation of the strong program in the sociology of 
science, but as a well-come support to the naturalist conception of 
science. 
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PART II 
THE DARWINIAN SYNTHESIS: AN EXAMPLE OF CONSENSUS 
FORMATION IN SCIENCE 
INTRODUCTION 
In the epilogue of the 1980-conference on The evolutionary synthe-
sis^ Provine states that "One certain conclusion emerged from the con-
ference. All participants, whether scientists or historians, young or old, 
agreed that a consensus concerning the mechanism of evolution appeared 
among biologists during the 1920-1950 period".2 This consensus consisted 
in the acceptance of natural selection operating on small differences as 
the primary mechanism of evolution. 
Although, at first glance, this statement seems to be rather innocent, 
it is in fact a highly remarkable and probably historical conclusion, since 
it is made after a conference in which 'gradualist', 'punctuationalist', 
'saltationist* and 'neutralist' conceptions of evolution have been dis-
cussed. Apparently, all biologists agreed about the primary mechanism of 
evolution, although they surely disagreed about any further, more 
elaborated explanation of the evolutionary process. Given the fact that 
before the 1920-1950 period Darwin's theory of natural selection was 
only one among a plethora of rival evolutionary theories, it would be 
interesting both for the historian and the philosopher of science to 
know how this consensus was actually brought about or more generally 
how the transition between the pluralistic pre-1920 period to the 'monis-
tic' post 1950 period took place. 
In fact, one of the aims of the conference was to sort out what the 
'evolutionary synthesis' in reality amounted to. What do biologists or 
historians mean when they talk about the 'evolutionary synthesis' or the 
'modern synthesis'? Do they, for example, refer to the fusion of 
Darwin's theory of evolution and Mendel's theory of heredity? Or do 
they mean that all or most of the biological disciplines have been 
brought together under some common denominator?^ I think that, in 
order to answer these questions and to understand what the 'evolutio-
nary synthesis' is about, we shall first have to explain how this 
agreement about the primary mechanism of evolution arose form the 
pre-existing wide-spread disagreement among biologists. What we have 
here is an instance of the scientific 'consensus formation' and this 
immediately confronts us with a philosophical problem, viz. the 'problem 
about the dynamics of convergent belief change'. 
My case-study should be seen as a contribution both to the 
explanation of this agreement about the evolutionary mechanism and to 
the solution of the general philosophical problem of consensus formation. 
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It is not my aim to give a full explanation of the final agreement among 
post-1950 biologists. But I do intend to argue that what is commonly 
regarded as a first stage in the process of the evolutionary synthesis, 
viz. the development of the program of population genetics in the 1920s, 
should be considered as a particular instance of consensus formation and 
that this consensus laid a strong foundation for the further development 
of the evolutionary synthesis. 
In particular, I will show how the development of the program of 
population genetics can be explained from the convergence of two 
competing programs in evolutionary biology, viz. the biometrie and 
Mendelian programs. These programs, which were incompatible with each 
other in many respects, gradually resolved their primarily conceptual 
disagreements by means of their own empirical and theoretical research 
and the ensuing convergence of the programs made it possible at last to 
merge them into one synthesized program, the program of population 
genetics. 
The fact that programs rather than theories were synthesized already 
indicates what kind of consensus was reached. I will argue that the main 
reason why the programs could be fused and why, as a consequence, 
Darwin's theory of natural selection and Mendel's theory of heredity 
could be brought together, resides in the fact that scientists reached an 
agreement about the scientific standards or the 'values and methodo-
logies' that should govern their research in evolutionary theory. 
Accordingly, I will especially emphasize the role of conceptual pro-
blem solving and the 'feed-back' of empirical and theoretical research on 
the scientific standards in both the Mendelian and biometrie programs. 
This naturalistic approach enables me to show in detail how both pro-
grams converged to each other and to what extent they could be merged 
into the program of population genetics. 
The structure of this study is as follows: First, in section I, I will 
give an outline of the constraint-structures of both the Mendelian and 
biometrie programs. Then in sections 2 and 3, I will discuss the in-
fluence of Johannsen's discoveries and of the chromosome theory on the 
Mendelian program. These discussions form the bulk of my casestudy, 
because the changes in the Mendelian constraint-structure have been the 
most conspicuous and the most revealing with regard to the mutual 
interaction between scientific research and the scientific standards 
governing that research. This is followed by an exposition of the con-
ceptual changes in the biometrie program in chapter 4. Finally, in 
chapters S and 6, I will show how as a result of these changes both 
programs converged to each other and how the remaining constraints of 
the programs were to be pooled together to constitute the program of 
population genetics. This pooling of constraints, I will argue, gave a 
forceful boost to subsequent research in evolutionary theory. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE CONSTRAINT STRUCTURES OF THE MENDELIAN AND 
BIOMETRIC PROGRAMS 
In part 11 have argued for the value of the problem solving approach 
to scientific progress and rationality. One important advantage of this 
approach appeared to be that, much more than traditionally has been the 
case in the philosophy of science, the conceptual aspects of scientific 
reasoning and the conceptual problems raised in the development of 
science are understood to be at least as important as empirical problems 
and problem solutions in assessing progress and rationality in science. 
An additional advantage of the problem solving approach is that it 
gives us a better opportunity to understand the early development of 
new scientific fields. We have seen that a problem is defined, in analogy 
to the definition of 'question' in erotetic logic , as a set of possible 
solutions, where this set is determined by the constraints on the problem 
situation. The constraints select the admissable solutions and determine 
the methods and techniques to be used to get the solutions. The term 
'constraint' is employed "in a wide sense to include most any item of 
information, any more or less established or accepted 'law', principle, 
rule, or fact, which helps to set the problem by imposing a condition on 
its solution. Constraints are of different varieties and degrees of flexi-
bility and importance". 
Given this characterization of a problem in terms of constraints, it 
becomes the first task for a newly developing science or scientific re-
search program to elaborate such a constraint-structure that a set of 
possible solutions, relevant to the aim of starting the program in the 
first place, will arise as clearly as possible. Now it may be expected that 
in the formulation of the constraints and in the tentative development 
of theories guided by these constraints a new research program will 
above all have to cope with conceptual problems. Its constraints (meta-
physical, methodological etc.) may be incompatible with widely accepted 
(metaphysical, methodological etc.) theories, newly formulated constraints 
may be incompatible with already accepted constraints within the new 
program and theoretical developments within the new program may be 
imcompatible with some accepted constraints elc. 
In many cases a solution of these conceptual problems is best 
achieved by changing or eliminating some of the already accepted con-
straints. Thus with respect to a new scientific program it is to be 
expected that much time will be spent changing and articulating the 
constraints on the problem situation. 
This view of scientific research puts us in a good position to 
understand the scientific developments within the Mendelian and bio-
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metric programs. In this chapter I will show how, starting from a 
vaguely delineated 'gap' in the frame-work of biological knowledge, viz. 
the so-called 'Problem of Variation', both Mendelians and biometricians 
gradually developed sets of reliable constraints that should guide them in 
their attempts to solve this problem. In the following chapters I will 
show that the biometricians, but especially the Mendelians had to deal 
with conceptual problems that arose as a consequence of 1) theoretical 
developments that were incompatible with already accepted constraints^ 
and 2) terminological ambiguities often not recognized before there 
existed a tension between a theory and the constraints of the program. 
Most of the times these problems were solved by means of a change or 
an elimination of the violated constraints accompanied by a resolution of 
the terminogical ambiguities. 
How, then, did the Mendelian and biometrie programs arise? In the 
discussion of the strong program of the sociology of science' we have 
already seen that the Mendelians and the biometricians were to get into 
a heavy competition with each other. For two programs to compete there 
is a necessary precondition that they should have something in common 
to compete over. In the case of the biometrical and Mendelian programs 
the community of interest consisted in the 'Problem of Variation'. This 
problem was a heritage of the debates about Darwin's theory of 
evolution. Darwin never succeeded in convincing his critics that small 
variations were the primary stuff of evolution. The majority of the bio­
logists had no problems with Darwin's thesis of the existence of 
heritable variation and of the survival of those organisms that exhibit 
variations best suited to the environment. But Darwin's theory that 
evolution takes place by natural selection of small advantageous 
variations was much harder to swallow. In a letter to Darwin Т.Н. 
Huxley wrote that "you have loaded yourself with an unnecessary dif­
ficulty in adopting natura non facit saltum so unreservedly". One of 
the difficulties was that one would expect intermediate forms between 
species in both the paleontological record and the record of existing 
species, if natural selection operated only on small individual variations. 
But both records showed gaps rather than continuity. However, if the 
raw material for natural selection was large, discontinuous variations, 
then such gaps or 'saltations', in Huxley's terms, were to be expected." 
Another problem was, as Fleeming Jenkin showed, that Darwin's 
theory of heredity, his 'provisional hypothesis of pangenesis', was not 
consistent with the theory of the natural selection of small continuous 
variations. A corrollary of Darwin's theory of heredity was that every 
variation, advantageous or not, would be 'swamped' out of existence in 
about two or three generations. Selection would never work. The 
opponents (among them Huxley and Galton) believed saltations to be 
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more stable and less susceptible to the swamping effect of blending 
inheritance. 
So the basic problem that Darwin left behind was to find an answer 
to the question, which variations would be sensitive to natural selection 
or which variations would be inheritable and stable enough for selection 
to work upon. 
Both Weldon and Bateson, the pioneers of the biometrical and 
Mendelian programs'^ respectively, set out to solve this problem. They 
felt that this problem had to be tackled first, before they could think of 
an adequate theory of evolution. But they started from totally different 
perspectives. 
After a study-tour to Russia (in 1886) Bateson became convinced of a 
discontinuous, typological distribution of variations. This motivated him 
to develop his saltationary research program. The aim of his program 
was to show that only saltationary variations or 'sports' are inheritable 
and that these variations are the direct and only causes of speciation. 
Variations should be large, species-constitutive, and therefore also 
discontinuous to be evolutionarily relevant. If this aim could be reached, 
a non-Darwinian, saltationary theory of evolution would be vindicated. 
In contrast with Bateson, Weldon (around 1890) and soon also 
Pearson, together the leading biometricians, seized an opportunity for 
defending the natural selection of small variations by adopting from 
Galton a method of statistical analysis of small, continuous variations, 
such as height in human populations. They hoped to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of natural selection by showing a gradual shift in the 
statistical distribution of small variations under the influence of 
selection. Within a short time the biometricians developed a well-defined 
research program. Apart from the central constraints that, to be 
evolutionarily relevant, variations had to be small and continuous, they 
had a powerful heuristic in Gallon's statistical method. The first thing 
for the biometricians to do was to design some suitable statistical laws 
and apply them in their study of the effect of selection in large 
populations. The biometricians had an advantage over Bateson, because 
Bateson clearly lacked a comparably good research method. 
However, after the rediscovery of Mendel's laws in 1900 the situation 
changed. Mendel's laws seemed to demonstrate that only discontinuous 
variations are inheritable. Bateson, therefore, annexed Mendel's theory as 
the much needed support for his research program and adopted Mendel's 
experimental cross-breeding as the primary method of research. * 
So, already from the start, but especially after 1900, there was a 
considerable difference in perspectives on the 'Problem of Variation'. 
Weldon as well as Bateson had strong opinions about and were confident 
of the direction of research that should be taken and the kind of 
solutions that should be expected. Although both programs shared the 
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main problem to be solved, they differed in evaluating the problem-
situation, i.e. in their expectations with respect to the problem solutions 
and in their divisions of the main problem into sub-problems. This 
differentiation becomes even more prominent if we have a look at the 
other constraints of the programs. After the annexation of Mendel's 
theory by Bateson, both Bateson's program - from now on to be called 
the Mendelian program - and the biometrical program can be roughly 
characterized by elaborate sets of mutually connected central (biolo-
gical), metaphysical, epistemologica!, methodological and empirical con-
straints. 
Although a detailed investigation of the process as to how these sets 
of constraints were actually developed would be interesting, I will now 
proceed with a survey of the most important constraints on both pro-
grams as they existed just after the rediscovery of Mendel's laws in 
1900. These constraints are 1) the central, biological, 2) the metaphysi-
cal, 3) the epistemologica!, 4) the methodological and, 5) the empirical 
constraints. In this survey the contrasts between the constraints will be 
accentuated.12 
1) The central, biological constraints 
When we compare the biometrie program and the Mendelian program 
the first thing which attracts attention is the contrast between the 
central, biological constraints on the size of the variations and on 
continuity versus discontinuity in evolution. Both programs were initially 
based on contrasting views concerning the size of the evolutionarily 
relevant variations. From the start, moreover, there seemed to be an 
obvious connection with the continuity-discontinuity distinction. If 
variations are very small, then a continuous, almost indistinguishable 
gradation in variation can be expected. If, on the other hand, variations 
are large these variations at least have to be discontinuous. ^ Thus with 
respect to each program the central constraints can be stated as follows: 
The biometricians - Weldon and Pearson, but also Davenport, Pearl 
and Harris among others - argued, like Darwin, that selection will 
always be effective, however small the variations. Even imperceptible 
variations, if advantageous, will lead to evolutionary changes in 
populations. Large variations were not excluded as evolutionarily 
relevant, but since they have a small chance of being advantageous in an 
already adapted population, they have a minor part to play in evolution. 
In addition to being small, evolutionarily relevant variations show 
continuity. While the continuity-thesis was already an important part of 
Darwin's evolutionary theory, it became even more essential in the 
statistical approach of the biometricians. Variations were seen as 
statistically expected deviations from the mean, which show a continuous 
83 
distribution statistically represented by the binomial curve. If selection is 
operative then the mean of the curve will be shifted to the left or the 
right. 
Some of the objections against the Darwinian conception of evolution 
have been mentioned above. These objections will not be repeated here, 
their upshot being that small variations simply won't do. Only repeatedly 
occurring large variations, many of them admittedly disadvantageous, 
could have made evolution possible. For the Mendelians - Bateson, 
Saunders, Hurst and Punnett, later joined by, among others, Johannsen, 
Pearl, Jennings and Morgan14 -, who based their program on these 
criticisms, only large variations were evolutionarily relevant, where these 
variations were necessarily discontinuous as well. Since these were the 
basic assumptions of the Mendelian program, one would like to know 
how large these variations were supposed to be. During the early 
development of the Mendelian program the answer seemed clear enough: 
Only those variations which constituted new species, the so-called 
'jumping' variations or 'saltations' or 'sports', were evolutionarily 
relevant. The distinguishing mark of these variations appeared to be 
speciation. Thus a 'large' variation was a variation that laid the 
foundation for a new species. Although the Mendelians often wrote in 
terms of the size of the variations it was not so much the size of the 
variations as the fact that the variations were constitutive of new 
species which made them evolutionarily relevant. ^ 
During the development of the Mendelian program however, the 
variations allowed to be evolutionarily relevant were getting smaller and 
smaller and at the same time there was an increasing vagueness, with 
respect to the question whether these variations still had to be seen as 
distinct species or not. In the end the Mendelians would come to face 
the dilemma of either considering all variations, counter-intuitively, as 
distinct species or granting some, if not many, of them evolutionary 
relevance within the species. But in the latter case the nature of the 
relevance would call for explanation. In chapter II I will return to these 
problems. Before that I will continue the survey of the constraints on 
the biometrie and Mendelian programs. 
2) The metaphysical constraints 
At least in the early development of both programs there was a 
strong connection between the central constraints and the metaphysical 
constraints or the 'worldviews' inherent in each of the programs. Various 
representatives of the Mendelian program have held an essentialistic 
worldview or more specifically, an essentialistic conception of species. 
Especially the pioneers of the Mendelian program, Huxley and Galton, 
seemed to have been committed to such a conception. The ease with 
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which they wrote about the 'fixity of species1 (Huxley) or the 'stability 
of types' (Galton) displays their predisposition in that direction.10 
Johannsen too was an essentialist: he considered the genotype as the 
(Aristotelian) form, the essence of a species. ' The prevailing 
essentialistic view of the organic world was a major stumbling block for 
the Darwinian conception of the evolution of species. However the 
common thesis that most Mendelians were essentialists is subject to 
doubt. In some of his articles1" Mayr gives the impression that he 
considers the rivalry between the biometricians and the Mendelians as a 
largely irrational affair, partly because the Mendelians did hold on too 
tightly to an essentialistic way of thinking. Several reservations can be 
made here: First, for a considerable time the Mendelians had sufficient 
reasons to hold on to their worldview, especially since the alternative 
(i.e. the worldview inherent to the Darwinian conception of the organic 
world) was not all that convincing yet. Secondly, while most Mendelians 
may be characterized as typologists, this does not necessarily imply that 
they were essentialists too. The Mendelians may have regarded species as 
'stable types' without assuming the types to be essences. " Thirdly, 
other theoretical and empirical reasons played an important part in 
establishing and maintaining the theory of types in the Mendelian pro-
gram. After all Huxley and Galton did have reasons^" for believing in 
'stable types', which may have been totally independent of an 
essentialistic worldview. As to Bateson there are indications that he had 
a rather open attitude towards Darwinism before he went to Russia2 , 
but that his research there convinced him of the typological distribution 
of species. 
Thus while an essentialistic worldview might have functioned as a 
constraint during the inception of the Mendelian program, its influence 
on the further development of the program must certainly not be 
overstated. What did function as a (reasoned) constraint was a typolo-
gical conception of species. 
Much more outspoken and of continuing importance were the meta-
physical views of the biometricians, in particular Pearson and Weldon. 
Both had what mav be called an 'anti-typological' worldview. In his 
philosophical work^2 Pearson unfolds a kind of non-causal statistical 
world-picture, in which no entity can be said to be of the same nature 
as any other entity. This means, among other things, that homogeneous 
classes have to be banished from all branches of science. There exists 
no absolute sameness on the observable level, only statistical sameness. 
From individual to individual there is always variation. Given Pearson's 
instrumentalistic v iew" that only observables are real, the conclusion is 
justified that Pearson was averse to types and essences in any branch of 
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science whatever/4 With respect to evolutionary theory Pearson and 
Weldon may be considered as the first real 'population thinkers'. ^ 
3) The epistemologica! constraints 
As can be expected from the difference in worldviews there were 
contrasts at the epistemological level as well. The biometricians could 
permit theoretical terms like 'atom' or 'gene' as economic descriptions, 
as long as the propositions which contained them could in principle be 
unpacked into equivalent propositions about sense-impressions. But they 
would not accept any 'hidden realities' as used in causal explanations. 
Mendel's theory and especially the successful elaboration of Mendel's 
theory, as in the chromosome-theory, constituted a conceptual problem 
to the biometricians, primarily because the theory was unacceptable from 
their philosophical viewpoint and only secondarily because it seemed 
exclusively to support the discontinuity-constraint of the Mendelian pro-
gram. 
A rather sad illustration of the influence of the epistemological 
constraint is Pearson's persistent rejection of the Mendelian theory of 
inheritance, although he had overcome his objections against the 
Mendelian explanation of continuous variability. Several authors, 
including Pearson, had discovered that continuous variation could be 
explained within the Mendelian model by means of the multifactorial 
theory.2" Pearson had even derived the same numerical values for the 
correlations between relatives in the Mendelian interpretation as well as 
in the biometrical interpretation. ' This similarity in outcomes meant, 
among other things, that it was not necessary to take ancestry into 
account for predicting the offspring's character. The Mendelians only 
needed to know the inheritable properties of the parents to predict the 
properties of the offspring. So the Mendelian model was simpler than the 
biometrie model, in which all ancestors contribute to the offspring's 
character. However, the values derived by Pearson were the same, only 
if dominance was not taken to be complete in inheritance. And partly 
because the Mendelian law of segregation could only be made ex-
perimentally visible by using properties which showed complete 
dominance, it seemed at first sight as if complete dominance was an 
important assumption in the early interpretations of Mendelian theory. 
This gave Pearson his 'reason' for rejecting the Mendelian theory: The 
Mendelians were committed to the assumption of complete dominance, 
which meant that the Mendelian predictions did not match those of the 
biometricians, the latter ones being empirically well supported. Pearson's 
'reason' was in fact a rationalization: Pearson must have known of 
Bateson's repeated denial of this commitment to complete dominance and 
his assertion of the possibility of imperfect dominance or no dominance 
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in the Mendelian theory of inheritance. 8 As Norton^y convincingly 
argues, the real reason for Pearson's rejection of the Mendelian theory 
and of his own achievements, which could have been the foundation for 
the synthesis of both programs, was his epistemologica! objection 
against the kind of theory that the Mendelian theory was, based as it 
was on causal explanations by means of 'hidden realities'. Pearson was 
still rational in rejecting the Mendelian theory, given his philosophical 
position. It remains to be seen, however, whether he was rational in 
sticking to his philosophical position, e.g. by comparing past success and 
future prospects of both programs. " 
The representatives of the Mendelian program did not have any 
difficulties with non-observable entities. Mendelian factors were 
acceptable, although there was an important constraint on the 
ontological status of these factors: they were only acceptable as 
dynamic, non-materialistic entities. The Mendelians interpreted 
hereditary factors in terms of 'forces', 'vortices' (Bateson), 'states' 
(Morgan) or 'forms' (Johannsen). 
Another constraint, in my view deeply connected with the constraint 
on the ontological status of the hereditary factors·", was the claim of 
the Mendelians that every theory of heredity should have to account for 
the problem of development as well. Morgan was quite emphatic about 
this: "We have come to look on the problem of heredity as identical with 
the problem of development. The word heredity stands for those 
properties of the germcells that find their expression in the developing 
and developed organism"." For Bateson too "...heredity and development 
were inseparable components of one grand operation."". Johannsen's 
views are less clear, but his Aristotelian conception of heredity and 
development seems to me to imply an equally strong connection between 
heredity and development.^ 
One of the reasons for linking or identifying these problems was the 
inability of the Mendelians to distinguish unambiguously between 
hereditary factors and inherited properties.-" According to the 
Mendelians, properties were not determined by factors, but properties 
and factors were more or less the same. This explains why, from the 
Mendelian viewpoint, inheritance and development formed one continuous 
proces. But then again the Mendelians had important reasons to be 
averse to a materialist interpretation of hereditary factors, because that 
would commit them to a kind of preformationist theory of development, 
in which the hereditary factors-properties-characters had to be 
homunculi of some sorts, a conception already quite impopular in those 
days.^7 
Both the above mentioned constraint on the ontological status and 
the constraint on the identity of the problem of development and the 
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problem of heredity, would lead to conflict with the chromosome-theory 
which was to be adopted and developed within the Mendelian program.-'* 
4) The methodological constraints 
The methodological constraints on both programs are partly derivable 
from the already mentioned metaphysical and epistemologica! 
constraints. The research-method of the biometricians consisted of the 
statistical analysis of great numbers of observable, continuously varying 
properties in large (and therefore) natural populations. The Mendelians 
had Mendel's experimental method at their disposal. This method 
consisted primarily of the cross-breeding of individual organisms showing 
discontinuous variation in one or more properties. The distribution of the 
properties in the next generation could be explained by Mendel's laws of 
segregation and independent assortment. It was not possible to 
experiment otherwise than with relatively small populations. " 
Other contrasts at the methodological level have been suggested. For 
instance, Norton'*" perceives two levels with respect to methodology, the 
phenomenological level of biometrica! research and the phsysiological 
level of Mendelian research. Probably this distinction has to be 
understood as follows: the biometricians were interested only in super-
ficial, observable varying properties asking no questions about the 
origin of these properties. The Mendelians, identifying the problem of 
heredity with the problem of development, also searched for the 
physiological connections between factors and properties. Thus 
understood, Norton's distinction is important in so far as the Mendelians 
were also committed to do physiological research in addition to their 
Mendelian experiments. ' 
Another distinction at the methodological level has been made by 
Mayr.42 He sees a contrast between naturalists and experimentalists. 
Under the category of the experimentalists he counts the Mendelians; 
naturalists were those biologists, such as Poulton and Sumner, who were 
more interested, like Darwin, in geographical variation and speciation. It 
is unclear how Mayr would categorize the biometricians, who hardly 
showed any interest in speciation. 
Before I complete the list of constraints on the programs, it should 
be noted at this point that the contrasts between the metaphysical, 
epistemologica! and methodological constraints are reflected in most of 
the well-known controversies between the biometricians and the 
Mendelians. Most disputes were mainly fought out at the conceptual 
level. Both schools accused each other of irrelevant investigations, 
methodological incompetence, ignorance of biology or mathematics, or 
general epistemologica! deficiencies, like internal inconsistencies and ad 
hoc theorizing. ' The mainly conceptual character of the disputes 
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between Mendelians and biometricians was partly a result and partly the 
cause of the separation of the empirical domains described in the next 
paragraph. 
S) The empirical constraints 
As a consequence of new theoretical and empirical developments the 
constraint-structures of both programs were gradually elaborated and 
refined. These developments, such as the incorporation of Mendel's laws 
of heredity within Bateson's program and the conception of modified 
versions of the law of ancestral heredity within the biometrical program, 
led to an increasing splitting up of the empirical research domains. 
The biometricians primarily made a study of continuously varying 
properties in large populations, concentrating on 'individual', 
'fluctuating' variations within the species. The Mendelians studied 
discontinuously varying properties in small populations, concentrating on 
big variations between species, viz. 'sports' or de Vries' mutations. 
This concludes my survey of the constraints of the Mendelian and 
biometrie programs. In the next two chapters I will show how most of 
the constraints of the Mendelian program changed under the influence of 
scientific research. In chapter 4 I will discuss the less far-reaching 
conceptual changes in the biometrie program. 
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CHAPTER II 
CONCEPTUAL TENSIONS BETWEEN JOHANNSEN'S DISCOVERIES 
AND THE MENDELIAN RESEARCH PROGRAM 
There are at least three episodes in the development of the 
Mendelian program - the incorporation of the results of Johannsen's 
pure line experiments, the adoption of the chromosome theory and the 
further exploration of the chromosome theory - during which the 
Mendelian program accomodated a theory that was incompatible with some 
of the constraints of that program. Each time the ensuing conceptual 
tension between theory and program was accompanied by a (partial) 
recognition and (partial) resolution of terminological ambiguities and 
followed by the change or elimination of some of the constraints of 
the program. 
In chapter III I will discuss the influence of both the adoption 
and the further exploration of the chromosome-theory. In this chapter 
I will primarily describe the effects of the incorporation of 
Johannsen's discoveries. 
By adopting the results of Johannsen's pure line-experiments the 
Mendelians violated several constraints on their program. I will show 
that this gave rise to a conceptual tension within their program which 
was primarily resolved by means of an adjustment of the constraint-
structure. But before I come to that I will first have to discuss some 
changes in the two central constraints of the Mendelian program, viz. 
the constraints on the size and the discontinuity of the variations. 
These changes took place already before 1903 - when Johannsen 
published his experimental outcomes -, partly under the influence of 
the rediscovery of Mendel's laws. I will show that these changes gave 
rise to a tension between the two central constraints. One of my 
contentions will be that this tension was considerabbly increased by 
the adoption of Johannsen's discoveries within the program. 
In section 2 I will proceed with a brief description of Johannsen's 
experiments and subsequent discoveries. Then, finally, in section 3, I 
will have reached the principal part of this chapter, which concerns 
the influence of Johannsen's discoveries on the constraint-structure 
of the Mendelian program. It will be shown that these discoveries were 
incompatible with some of the constraints of the program. The viola-
tion of the constraint on the size of the variations will appear to be 
by far the most serious one. After having discussed some problems 
concerning the rationality of these constraint-violations, I will 
argue that the violation of the constraint on the size of the varia-
tions constituted a conceptual problem for the Mendelian program which 
was solved by weakening and eventually eliminating this constraint. 
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The final elimination took place only after a long time of elaboration 
on Johannsen's discoveries and especially on the conceptual 
refinements which accompanied his discoveries. These conceptual 
refinements, primarily the distinction between genotype and phenotype, 
to be discussed in section 4, were necessary for the development of 
the chromosome-theory within the Mendelian program. In the end the 
chromosome-theory would provide the decisive reasons for dropping the 
constraint on the size of the variations. 
1. Some changes in the central constraints of the Mendelian program 
None of the constraints mentioned in chapter I was rigidly held or 
fixed. As a matter of fact part of the thesis of this study is that 
every constraint may be changed or dropped or new constraints may be 
added as a result of new theoretical developments in the programs. It 
is not my contention, however, that this will always easily be done. 
On the contrary, the more a constraint is valued, the less amenable 
this constraint will be to changes.1 But even the most central con-
straints may be altered in the course of a program's development. In 
the Mendelian program such a change in fact took place with regard to 
the constraints on the size and the discontinuity of variations. 
During the inception of the program - around 1890 - the discon-
tinuity-constraint seemed to be parasitic on the constraint on the 
size of the variations: if a variation is large then it is to be ex-
pected that it is discontinuous as well. Thus every evolutionarily 
relevant variation was supposed to be discontinuous. But under the 
influence of Bateson's study of variation, which he thought to be 
necessary prior to a study of evolution tout court2, and later under 
the influence of the Mendelian theory of inheritance, attention was 
shifted to the discontinuity-contraint at the cost of the constraint 
on the size of the variations. There was a tendency to reverse the 
view that every evolutionarily relevant variation will be dis-
continuous into the view that every discontinuous variation will be 
evolutionarily relevant. 
This tendency is already observable in Bateson's Materials for the 
study of Variation. In his introduction Bateson gives a clear outline of 
his research-program in terms of the problems that have to be solved 
and the limitations on the method that must be followed to solve these 
problems. At the outset Bateson is very explicit about the most impor-
tant constraint on the program: The first limitation thus introduced 
concerns the magnitude of Variations".^ But then this constraint is 
further specified: "We have seen above that the assumption that 
Variation is a continuous process lands us in serious difficulties in the 
application of a hypothesis which, on general grounds, we nevertheless 
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are prepared to receive. If then we can shew that variation is to some 
extent discontinuous, a road will be opened by which these difficulties 
may perhaps in part be avoided. Species are discontinuous; may not 
Variation by which Species are produced be discontinuous too?H¿* The 
point of this long quotation is that Bateson immediately seems to iden-
tify magnitude of variations with discontinuity of variations. And what is 
more important, Bateson proceeds in the rest of his book with the study 
of a long list of discontinuous variations, without indicating in each case 
whether these variations are to be seen as the large variations consti-
tuting different species. There are instances of discontinuous variation 
put forward by Bateson as support for his thesis of discontinuity in 
evolution, such as eye-colour in man', which are relatively small and 
certainly not constitutive of different species. It remains unclear what 
function these variations have in Bateson's theory of evolution. One 
would be inclined to say either that they have no function or that they 
are considered to be small evolutionary steps within the species. Neither 
alternative is acceptable. The first alternative would not be consonant 
with Bateson's intention to support his theory of discontinuous evolution. 
The second alternative would be inconsistent with the saltationary 
theory of evolution. 
It thus appears that already in the early writings of Bateson there 
was a tension between the constraint on the size of the variations" and 
the discontinuity-constraint. This tension was to be increased by the 
adoption of the Mendelian theory of inheritance within the program. All 
Mendelian varieties were discontinuous and in this sense Mendel's theory 
seemed to support the discontinuity-thesis of Bateson's program. But 
what was the evolutionary status of these varieties? Were they distinct 
species or not? As long as Bateson maintained that even the Mendelian 
varieties were distinct species of sorts no real problems would arise; no 
problems with respect to the two constraints that is. This indeed seemed 
to be the position of Bateson at least until 1903. Bateson repeatedly, 
although always hesitantly, identified discontinuous variations with 
species or 'nascent species' or the 'origins of species'' and he even saw 
the Mendelian varieties as nascent species. This last view was clearly 
stated by Bateson in a discussion with de Vries, who was reluctant to 
accept the Mendelian varieties as indicative of different species". Most 
biologists at the time made the same connection as Bateson between 
Mendel's discontinuous variations and discontinuous evolution'. 
Thus concerning the central constraints on the Mendelian program as 
they existed before 1903, the following conclusion is justified: Both the 
constraints that evolutionarily relevant variations have to be large and 
discontinuous were still operative, although a shift of emphasis had been 
made in favour of the discontinuity-constraint. At the same time the 
constraint on the size of the variations became increasingly problematic 
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without being explicitly recognized as problematic. While it was still 
customary for the Mendelians to speak in terms of large, discontinuous 
variations in contradistinction to the Darwinian small, continuous 
variations, the term 'large' in fact could not be taken literally any 
more.'" This brings me to the last change in the constraints to be 
mentioned in this section. 
Concomitant to the shift in emphasis on the discontinuity-constraint, 
another constraint, viz. the claim that evolutionary relevant variations 
had to be qualitatively distinct, became of increasing value. This might 
be interpreted as just an instance of the further elaboration of the 
Mendelian constraint-structure, but it is also arguable that the 
constraint on the size of the variations gradually gave way to the con-
straint on the qualitative distinctness of the variations. Since there was 
no longer any point in using the size or the 'magnitude' of the 
variations as a criterion for evolutionary relevance, this constraint could 
be used as a welcome alternative: to be evolutionarily relevant a 
variation from now on was 'large enough* if it was qualitatively distinct. 
With this constraint discontinuity remained guaranteed and, more 
importantly, it gave the Mendelians the last opportunity to salvage the 
plausibility of their saltationary theory of evolution. The evolutionarily 
relevant variations from this time on were the qualitative 'jumps' 
between the Mendelian varieties, the 'nascent species' or the 'origins of 
species'. 
The constraint on the qualitative distinctness of the variations even 
gained in strength because it also functioned as a demarcation-line 
between the Mendelian and biometrie empirical research-domains. This 
can be illustrated by Bateson's reaction to the criticism of Weldon that 
Mendelian properties could not always be classified accurately11: Weldon 
referred to a report by Bateson and Saunders and a report by de Vries 
on the crossing of 'glabrous' and 'hairy' variants of certain plants. 
Weldon showed that the produced hybrids could not exactly be classified; 
on the contrary the hybrids manifested a wide range of 'hairiness' or 
'glabrousness'. Weldon suggested convincingly that this continuous varia-
bility in the properties of the hybrids might be better explained by the 
law of ancestral heredity than by Mendel's laws. "The Mendelians 
reacted to Weldon's criticism by making certain the characters they used 
in breeding experiments were distinct. Bateson insisted on this". 
Thus by the time of Johannsen's discoveries in 1903 the constraint on 
the qualitative distinctness of the variations seemed to be an important 
constraint on the Mendelian program. In the next sections it will be 
shown that it was especially this constraint that would be undermined by 
Johannsen's experiments. 
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2. Johannsen's pure line-experiments 
In chapter I I argued, that in different episodes in the history of the 
Mendelian program at least two sorts of conceptual problems can be 
distinguished: 1) Problems that arose from new theoretical developments 
which were incompatible with some of the constraints on the program 
and 2) problems that arose from the simultaneous or subsequent recog-
nition of some terminological ambiguities. Solutions to both sorts of 
conceptual problems in part consisted in changing or eliminating some of 
the constraints. The incorporation of Johannsen's experimental 
discoveries within the Mendelian program can be seen as such a new 
theoretical development. This development was accompanied by the 
recognition of an ambiguity in the term 'variation', which was to be 
solved partially by Johannsen's introduction of the terms 'phenotype' and 
'genotype'. In this section I will give a description of Johannsen's ex-
periments. In section 3 I will discuss Johannsen's violation of the 
constraint on the size (qualitative distinctness) of the variations and the 
less serious violations of the methodological and empirical constraints. 
Johannsen's recognition of some terminological ambiguities will be dealt 
with in section 4. 
When Johannsen started his pure line-experiments in 1900, there 
existed already a considerable divergence between the empirical 
research-domains of the Mendelians and the biometricians. This 
divergence was further enhanced by the acceptance of new constraints, 
such as the restriction of the empirical domain to qualitatively varying 
properties in the Mendelian program, described in section 1. Such 
limitations on the empirical research domain had the consequence that 
the disputes between Mendelians and biometricians became more and 
more conceptual in character. While the Mendelians, for instance, based 
their theories on investigations into the inheritance of directly re-
cognizable, qualitatively varying properties, the biometricians responded 
to this by pointing out the irrelevance of their investigations. They 
argued that only continuously and quantitatively varying properties were 
important with respect to evolution. * This accusation of irrelevancy 
constituted a conceptual problem for the Mendelian program, a problem 
which unexpectedly, unexpected that is by Johannsen himself, would be 
partially solved by Johannsen's experiments. For Johannsen succeeded in 
applying the theory of discontinuous variation in inheritance to 
quantitatively varying properties, such as weight and length. 
Before he finished his experiments, Johannsen did not take sides in 
the Mendelism-biometry debate. He took a Galtonian position, that is he 
believed in the effectiveness of selection on small, 'individual', 
'fluctuating' variations, but also in the more prominent part played by 
'sports' in evolution. In his Elemente der exakten Erblichkeitslehre** 
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Fig. 1. Johannsen's Analysis of Phaseolus. In (1) the unselected median bean repeats the normal 
distribution (2). If selection and inbreeding of large or small beans is initiated (2), the curves establish 
pure lines (3). Selection of largest beans in the "large" pure line (or smallest beans in the "small" 
pure line) does not alter the curves (4). This pure line remains unchanged even if the smallest bean 
in the "large" pure line (or the largest bean in the "small" pure line) is used to generate new attempts 
at selection within pure lines (5). Johannsen called the hereditary constitution of the pure line a 
genotype, and the bean size itself he called the phenotype. From E. A. Carlson The Cene: A Critical 
History (Saunders: Philadephia, 1966). 
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Johannsen stated explicitly that his experiments were intended to provide 
more evidence for the effectiviness of selection on fluctuating variations. 
He also wanted to find out whether "a real difference exists between 
mutation and fluctuating variability".1" "He was convinced that mutations 
occur but added, that may be the borderline between mutations and in-
dividual variations is not quite as sharp as Bateson and de Vries 
assume". ' His pure line-experiments gave Johannsen an unexpected 
clear answer, selection on fluctuating variations was ineffective and 
there was a sharp difference between mutations and fluctuating variati-
ons. After this discovery Johannsen definitely sided with the Mendeli-
ans.18 
Johannsen experimented with pure lines. Pure lines are the sets ('In-
begriff) of all individuals descended, by self-fertilization, from single 
self-fertilizing individuals. ' During the experiments it appeared that, 
when bean plants were bred in pure lines, there was a complete 
regression in weight and size of the seeds of the plants, i.e., the 
binomial distribution of the variability of the properties weight and size 
remained constant in each subsequent generation within the pure line, 
irrespective of weight and size of the seed that was selected each time 
for further breeding. Thus, if within a pure line a seed of large size and 
weight was selected for breeding then the binomial distribution of the 
properties size and weight of the offspring was equal to that of the 
offspring of a seed of small size and weight, and both distributions were 
equal to the distribution of the variations in the parent-stock (complete 
regression, see illustration). 
This discovery constituted a refutation of Gallon's law of regression 
(and Pearson's modified versions of this law: the law of ancestral 
heredity), which predicted partial regression: the binomial distribution of 
the properties of the offspring of the large seed should be shifted to 
the left compared with the binomial distribution of the parent seed. 
According to Johannsen partial regression only seems to occur, if 
populations with a mixture of pure lines are investigated (compare 
transition 2 to 3 in the illustration). Within a pure line "the regression 
is complete, quite up to the type of the line. The personal character of 
the motherbean has no influence, that of grandmother etc. also none; 
but the type of the line determines the average character of the off-
spring"/" 
Selection on individual variations within the pure line appeared to be 
ineffective: in each subsequent generation the same average variation 
returned. Johannsen concluded that individual variations could not be in-
heritable and that selection was only effective on 'types' or mutations of 
'types'. The observed individual variations had to be the result of 
environmental influences. ' These discoveries led Johannsen to the 
distinction between the 'average' and an underlying 'etwas', the type of 
96 
the line. The actual observable character of an individual is produced by 
the type in cooperation with the environment. The distinction between 
'type' and 'average' may be seen as an adumbration of the later 
distinction between genotype and phenotype.^ 
In this way Johannsen got answers to his questions, answers which 
supported the Mendelian program. But there was more: Johannsen had 
also demonstrated, that even quantitatively varying properties are in-
herited discontinuously and that the observed continuous differences are 
not inheritable, but just a product of the cooperation between 'types' 
and environment. This was an unexpected, 'novel' confirmation for the 
discontinuity-thesis of the Mendelian program: empirical data, hitherto 
thought to belong exclusively to the biometrie domain, could now be 
explained within the Mendelian program. However, the Mendelian victory 
was not gained without some serious drawbacks. 
3. Constraint-violations by Johannsen's discoveries and some questions 
about the rationality of these constraint-violations 
The discoveries of Johannsen were enthusiastically adopted within the 
Mendelian program. As far as I can see, the Mendelians did not realize 
that in doing this they violated several constraints of their own pro-
gram. Some of these violations were quite harmless in themselves, but 
one of them reveals a clash with one of the basic constraints of the 
program. 
The violations to be mentioned first concern the constraints on me-
thodology and the empirical domain. By adopting and continuing pure-
line experiments (carried out by, among others. Pearl and Jennings) 
within their program, the Mendelians temporarily used a statistical 
research method borrowed from the biometricians. Moreover, large 
numbers of continuously varying properties were introduced as objects of 
study within the program. ' All this was perfectly legitimate, as long as 
the Mendelians succeeded in interpreting the experiments in terms of 
their own theories, but they had to be very cautious and they were 
especially vulnerable to methodological criticisms from the side of the 
biometricians. In fact the main line of attack of the biometricians was 
directed against methodological deficiencies in the pure line experi-
ments. ^ 
With respect to the constraints on the empirical domain, it is clear 
that by the adoption of Johannsen's experiments in the program the 
Mendelian domain had been extended to quantitatively varying properties. 
Again this extension in itself was harmless. It may even be seen as a 
victory over the biometricians. However, as I will show shortly, this 
constraint-violation did not stand on its own; it had serious implications 
for the central constraints as well. Similar implications were to be 
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expected from another domain-extension, namely the extension to 
variations within species in addition to variations between species, due 
to the acceptance of quantitative variations as evolutionarily relevant. 
These implications will be dealt with in the following paragraphs. 
The most serious constraint-violation consequential upon the adoption 
of Johannsen's experiments within the Mendelian program was the 
violation of the constraint on the qualitative distinctness of the 
variations. In section 1 I have shown that the original constraint on the 
size of the variations was gradually replaced by the constraint on the 
qualitative distinctness of the variations, largely as a result of Bateson's 
study of variations and Mendel's theory of heredity. Furthermore, it will 
be remembered that one of the very reasons that started the Mendelian 
program in the first place was the conviction that evolution proceeds 
only by 'jumping' variations constitutive of distinct species. While 
originally these jumps between species were characterized by the size of 
the variations, in the end they were characterized by the difference in 
quality of the variations. The common problem delineated by both con-
straints remained the problem of speciation. 
Another theme of section 1 was the increasing vagueness displayed by 
the Mendelians in specifying the evolutionary status of discontinuously 
inherited variations, some of which clearly did not constitute distinct 
species (such as eye-colour in man). The Mendelians faced the dilemma 
that these variations showed Mendelian inheritance and therefore seemed 
evolutionarily relevant, although they could only be relevant in being 
small evolutionary steps within the species, which would be inconsistent 
with the constraint. 
By the introduction of quantitative variations as inheritable (albeit 
discontinuously) and therefore evolutionarily relevant variations within 
the program, this dilemma was further pronounced. Notwithstanding the 
still wide-spread confusion about the species-concept, most quantitative 
variations could not possibly be seen as constitutive of distinct 
species. Consequently there was a considerable increase in the number 
of evolutionarily relevant variations within the species, which could not 
be accounted for by the Mendelians, as long as the constraint on the 
size (qualitative distinctness) of the variations was still operative. 
The constraint-violation by the adoption of Johannsen's experiments 
in one sense can be seen as just a phase in an already ongoing process 
of the demolition of the constraint on the size of the variations. In 
another sense it constituted a breaking point in that the Mendelians now 
more or less openly accepted variations within the species as evolutio-
narily relevant. 
Thus the extension of the Mendelian domain to quantitative variations 
within the species constituted a serious constraint violation because of 
the incompatibility with the constraint on the qualitative distinctness of 
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the variations, a constraint which was essential for the tenability of the 
saltationary theory of evolution within the Mendelian program. 
At this point one might object that the constraint-violation was not 
as serious as I present it here. For the Mendelians could stick to their 
thesis that real evolution (speciation) only takes place by way of 
saltations, while granting some gradual evolution within the species. ° 
This indeed could have been a possible conception of evolution. But at 
that time such a conception was unacceptable for the Mendelians. 
Species were seen as stable types, which only varied by fluctuating, 
largely environmentally induced, non-inheritable variations. Gradual 
evolution was not possible at all. It is arguable, however, that this was 
the sort of theory, which constituted a possible solution to the con-
ceptual problems generated by the tension between Johannsen's dis-
coveries and the constraint on the size of the variations. I will return 
to this at the end of the section. 
Assuming to have established that the adoption of Johannsen's 
discoveries was a serious constraint-violation, I will now proceed to 
account for the important question, whether and how it is possible that 
constraints which have a restricting as well as heuristic effect in the 
research program, can be violated rationally by developments in the same 
program. ' Nickles has argued that this is possible and he has also 
indicated some directions along which this is possible. * The following 
analysis is - to some extent - indebted to Nickles' ideas. To begin with, 
Johannsen's experiments in themselves were not constraint-violating, 
because Johannsen took a Galtonian position and was committed to 
neither of the programs. "An innovator may violate constraints not his 
own". " Although this statement is rather trivial, as Nickles concedes, it 
does not detract from the value of such innovators for new 
developments in established programs: "However seemingly illegitimate 
the means by which a theory is produced, from the viewpoint of the 
large community (or the competing research-group), once it is available 
as a fait accompli, its presence may essentially alter the problem 
situation and the constraints governing it".™ 
But then the more interesting question to be answered is how the 
problem situation was altered within the Mendelian program and how it 
was possible that Johannsen's discoveries could be incorporated, even 
though violating one of the central constraints. In this case the answer 
can be found in the fact that there were several important constraints 
on the program, which were not logically tied to each other. Johannsen's 
discoveries made it necessary for a choice to be made between two of 
the constraints. Just after the rediscovery of Mendel's laws the contro-
versy between the Mendelians and the biometricians centered around the 
problem as to whether inheritance and evolution were discontinuous or 
not, while the question whether evolution progresses by small or big 
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steps temporarily receded into the background. Next to Mendel's laws 
Johannsen's discoveries gave further important support to the discon­
tinuity-thesis of the Mendelian program (even quantitatively varying 
properties are inherited discontinuously), while, moreover, the biometri-
cians were beaten on their own ground. These two victories provided 
sufficient reason for weakening the momentarily less important con­
straint on the size of the variations. 
On the other hand the constraint-violation was not a slight one, and 
major repercussions on the entire program were to be expected. In the 
short run no indication of any tension between Johannsen's discoveries 
and the Mendelian program can be found. An explanation for this might 
be the above mentioned concentration on the continuity-discontinuity 
conflict and on what, in view of the fact that evolutionary theory and 
the theory of heredity were not clearly distinguished, may be clumsily 
called the 'inheritance-aspect' of evolution.-" 
However, in the long run we see that the constraint was gradually 
weakened. This can be illustrated in several ways: While Bateson before 
1903 repeatedly identified discontinuous variations or Mendelian varieties 
with distinct species or 'nascent species' no such - explicit - identifica­
tions can be found in his writings after 1903. Instead Bateson frequently 
expresses his doubt whether the Mendelians even had a beginning of a 
theory of speciation.32 Another illustration is Bateson's well-known 
remark, hidden in a note in the "Presidential address to the zoological 
section":" "Nevertheless, when the unit of segregation is small, some­
thing mistakably like continuous Evolution must surely exist. (Cp. 
Johannsen, Ueb. Erblichkeit in Populationen und in reinen Linien, 1903) . 
In my view the puzzling phrase "mistakably like continuous" should be 
interpreted as meaning "mistakably like continuous" in the sense that 
evolution really is discontinuous, as Johannsen had showed, but also as 
meaning "mistakably like continuous" in the sense that some sort of 
gradual evolution (albeit discontinuous) "must surely exist". Since Bateson 
meant this note to be a slight restriction on the otherwise praising 
words concerning the mutation-theory of de Vries , this passage might 
reveal the dawning of a solution of the conceptual problems generated 
by Johannsen's discoveries. Гт alluding here to the possible solution in 
terms of an evolutionary theory, analogous to the modern saltationary 
theory, which I referred to earlier in this section. However, it was not 
until the synthetic theory of evolution that this conception of evolution 
really came to light. 
Although many indications can be found of the weakening of the con­
straint on the size of the variations, the ultimate elimination of the 
constraint only took place between 1910 and 1920 as a consequence of 
conceptual problems posed by the research of the Drosophila-group (Т.Н. 
Morgan and his assistente, who did most of their research with the 
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fruitfly, Drosophila.) on the chromosome-theory. The discovery of tiny 
mutations on the chromosomes at last turned the scale, although for this 
discovery to have any import several prior conceptual refinements were 
necessary." 
The best way to describe the influence of Johannsen's discoveries is 
as follows: Initially Johannsen's discoveries provided the Mendelians with 
some compelling reasons to adopt and elaborate his discoveries, at least 
provisionally, notwithstanding several constraint-violations. However, the 
elaboration itself, 'in a bootstrap fashion'^ or by means of 'feedback' in 
Shapere's terms/' gave rise to more and more reasons for weakening 
and eventually eliminating the violated constraints. One of these reasons, 
of course, was the support that Johannsen's discoveries obtained from 
the pure line-experiments of Pearl and Jennings. Other reasons were 
provided by Mendelian experiments with (seemingly) continuously varying 
properties. ° But much more decisive were the conceptual refinements 
introduced by Johannsen, i.e. the distinction between 'type' and 
'average', later to be baptized as 'genotype' and 'phenotype', which 
constituted a basis for the practically forced adoption of the 
chromosome-theory within the Mendelian program. " And as I indicated 
above, the chromosome theory provided the final reasons for eliminating 
the constraint on the size of the variations by showing the inheritability 
of the tiny mutations in the genotype which are responsible for the 
small variations in the phenotype. 
4. Conceptual refinements introduced by Johannsen 
A new theoretical development, such as the incorporation of 
Johannsen's discoveries within the Mendelian program, is often 
accompanied by the recognition of some terminological ambiguities. This 
recognition constitutes, in Laudan's terms, an internal conceptual 
problem which has to be solved by the conceptual refinement of the 
terms involved. I will now proceed with the description of the 
conceptual refinements that took place as a consequence of Johannsen's 
discoveries. 
One of the reasons why Johannsen started his experiments was to get 
an answer to his question whether there was really such a sharp 
distinction between mutations and fluctuating variations as Bateson and 
de Vries would have it. He did not foresee that his discoveries would 
urge him to make such a sharp distinction indeed. 
As shown above, the pure line-experiments induced Johannsen to 
differentiate between 'types of the line' and 'average'. The 'type' stood 
for the stable, inheritable 'etwas', only changed by mutations, and the 
'average' stood for the superposed fluctuating variations, represented by 
the binomial curve, which are produced by the interaction of 'type' and 
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environment and which are not inheritable. This was the first conceptual 
distinction made by Johannsen with respect to the ambiguous term 
'variation'. ' There were two types of variation now, the one 
discontinuous and inheritable, the other continuous and noninheritable. 
Yet another distinction, conditional on the coining of the terms 
'genotype' and 'phenotype', was made, viz. the distinction between two 
levels, the level of the hereditary material and the level of the 
observable properties. The variations in the observable properties were 
determined partly by the variation in the hereditary material and partly 
by the influence of the environment. In his Elemente der exakten 
Erblichkeitslehre^ Johannsen introduced the terms 'genotype' and 
'phenotype' to designate these two levels. 
It would take a long time before this distinction was fully under-
stood. Bateson continued to speak in terms of 'unit-characters', making 
no difference between hereditary factors and inherited properties ^ and 
Morgan never really overcame his difficulties in understanding the 
distinction. 4 Moreover, the concepts 'genotype' and 'phenotype' did not 
have the same meaning as they have now. Nevertheless a first step was 
made in the direction of a differentiation and refinement of the terms 
'type', 'factor', 'character', 'mutation' and 'property', which terms were 
often used as synonyms. Henceforth 'type', 'factor' and 'mutation' were 
more and more associated with the genotype, while 'character' and 
'property' were relegated to the phenotype. The insight that hereditary 
factors had to be distinguished from inherited properties formed a 
necessary, though not sufficient'" precondition for the development of 
the chromosome-theory and the consequent adoption of this theory 
within the Mendelian program. 
Another important conceptual change, which was only the start of a 
long lasting conceptual awakening, concerns the terms 'continuous' and 
'discontinuous'. By showing that at the level of the genotype there are 
discontinuously varying hereditary factors and at the level of the 
phenotype there are both discontinuously varying inheritable properties 
and superposed continuously varying non-inheritable properties, 
Johannsen demonstrated that discontinuity at the level of the hereditary 
material was compatible with continuity at the level of the properties. 
Thus the sharpness of the partition in continuous and discontinuous with 
respect to the theory of heredity and evolutionary theory, evident in the 
controversies between the Mendelians and the biometricians, was toned 
down. But it remains to be emphasized that in the opinion of the 
Mendelians, contra the biometricians, continuously varying properties 
were totally irrelevant to the understanding of heredity and evolution. 
However, here too a foundation was laid for further developments in the 
Mendelian program, which in this case would lead to the demise of the 
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most central constraint since the rediscovery of Mendel's laws, viz. the 
one concerning the discontinuity in inheritance and evolution. 
While in several ways the distinction genotype-phenotype can thus be 
envisaged as a basis for further developments in the Mendelian pro­
gram'*", at first it scarcely had any consequences. Within the Mendelian 
program the кепоtype was often simply identified with the type-charac­
ter property'*' and the phenotype with the individual variation. Within 
the biometrie program the distinction was not accepted and considered 
as a sign of ignorance of statistics. According to the biometricians the 
(geno-)type was nothing else than the statistical average and the indivi­
dual variation the statistically expected deviation. The pure line-experi­
ments (those carried out by Johannsen, but also those by Pearl and 
Jennings and others) were heavily criticized by the biometricians, partly 
due to a lack of understanding^ and partly because many errors had 
indeed been made in the (statistical) research-method and in the inter­
pretation of the experimental outcomes. * 
The changes in the Mendelian program, initiated by Johannsen's ex­
periments and manifested in the dropping of some minor constraints, the 
shifting of weight in the central constraints and the conceptual 
refinement of some central concepts, would be continued under the in­
fluence of new developments in cytology. As I will argue in chapter III 
the influence of cytology asserts itself in a way strongly analogous to 
that of Johannsen's discoveries. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE INFLUENCE OF THE CHROMOSOME THEORY ON THE 
MENDELIAN RESEARCH PROGRAM 
An important problem with respect to the adoption and development 
of a constraint-violating theory is the question whether and how 
scientists can have reasons to maintain such a theory despite its 
incompatibility with their research program. I have discussed this 
problem extensively in chapter II of part I. We have encountered this 
problem again in the preceding chapter, where I argued that the 
Mendelians had reasons to retain Johannsen's discoveries, because they 
supported one central constraint - the discontinuity-constraint -
although they violated another central constraint - the constraint on 
the size of the variations. The Mendelians simply had to make a choice 
as to which constraint they would credit with a higher value. 
In this chapter I will show that the adoption and further 
development of the chromosome-theory within the Mendelian program did 
not accord with several constraints of the program. Again, one of the 
questions will be whether the Mendelians had good reasons to accept 
the constraint-violating theory. I will argue that, indeed, there existed 
good, even compelling reasons that induced the Mendelians to accept the 
chromosome-theory, at least provisionally. My argument will be based on 
an important insight of Laudan, viz. that the mere compatibility between 
two strongly related theories may constitute an acute conceptual problem 
to the scientists involved.' It will be shown that the Mendelians had to 
explain the striking compatibility between the Mendelian theory of here-
dity and some recent cytological discoveries. Since the chromosome 
theory appeared to be the only reasonable explanation at the time, the 
Mendelians, even though reluctantly, had to accept it as long as there 
was no alternative available. 
The assimilation of the chromosome theory within the Mendelian 
program was thus based on good reasons, notwithstanding several 
constraint-violations. The better these reasons were, however, the more 
they contributed to the tension between the chromosome theory and the 
Mendelian program. The second purpose of this chapter will be to give 
some indications how this tension was resolved. I will argue that the 
development of the chromosome theory provided 'in bootstrap fashion1 
more and more reasons to change or eliminate most of the constraints 
on the Mendelian program. So the influence of the chromosome-theory 
on the Mendelian program is comparable to that of Johannsen's 
discoveries as described in chapter II. In the end the resolution of the 
tension between the chromosome theory and the Mendelian program 
brought about the dissolution of the Mendelian program. 
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In order to realize these purpose I will start in section 1 with a 
discussion of the scientific strength of the chromosome theory and argue 
for the view that the Mendelians were practically forced to accept this 
theory provisionally. Next, in section 2,1 will show why the chromosome 
theory violated several constraints of the Mendelian program and how 
the Mendelians managed to live with the resultant conceptual tension 
between theory and program. The topic of the final section is the in-
fluence of the chromosome theory on the Mendelian program. This in-
fluence asserts itself in the weakening of the violated constraints and in 
the resolution of some terminological ambiguities. Further developments 
of the chromosome theory eventually led to the demise of the entire 
Mendelian program. 
1. The scientific strength of the chromosome theory 
In the last decades of the 19th century cytology had rapidly 
developed into a full grown scientific discipline. By means of micro-
scopic study several structures were discovered within the cell and the 
cell-nucleus. Among these structures were the chromatids which became 
visible in the cell-nucleus during cell-division. It was speculated that 
these chromatids might have a function in inheritance and development. 
But as long as no acceptable theory of inheritance was available it re-
mained a matter of mere speculation. This situation changed with the 
rediscovery of Mendel's laws in 1900. Mendel's laws provided a clear-cut 
mechanism of inheritance. The essential question to be answered now 
was whether the cytological and the Mendelian discoveries could be 
reconciled with each other. After three years the confirming answer was 
found in the form of the chromosome theory of heredity. 
In this section I hope to show that, under the circumstances, a 
theory as the chromosome theory was bound to be developed. The 
Mendelians, moreover, were practically forced to accept the chromosome 
theory, at least provisionally, for want of a reasonable alternative. 
Though, formulated in this way, these statements may sound a bit too 
deterministic, it is my intention indeed to argue for the compelling force 
of reason in the present case. As I said, the argument is based on 
Laudan's important insight that, next to the relationships of inconsisten-
cy and implausibility, a relationship of mere compatibility between two 
theories may cause major conceptual problems for the scientists in-
volved.^ In the case of an inconsistency between theories scientists are 
forced to search for an explanation and a resolution of this inconsisten-
cy. Similarly in case of a mere compatibility scientists may be urged to 
search for an explanation and a resolution of this mere compatibility. In 
the latter case the coercion felt by the scientists is dependent on the 
strength of the relationship between the theories involved. Thus if two 
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compatible theories show no direct relationship, no explanation will be 
asked for, but if two theories are strongly interconnected then a mere 
compatibility will be felt as a cognitive threat as long as it is not 
explained. In our own time, for instance, "the enunciation of a chemical 
theory which was merely compatible with quantum mechanics, but which 
utilized none of the concepts of quantum theory, would be viewed 
askance by most modern scientists". Not to put too fine a point on it, 
a similar statement seems to obtain with respect to genetics and 
cytology. Thus the enunciation of a theory of heredity which was merely 
compatible with cytology, but which utilized none of the concepts of 
cytology, would have been viewed askance by most contemporary scien-
tists. In my view the Mendelians were strongly induced to accept the 
chromosome theory, because it explained the compatibility between the 
Mendelian theory of heredity and several recent cytological discoveries. 
To support this view I will now proceed to argue for the following three 
theses: 
1. there existed a strong interconnection between cytology and 
Mendelian genetics 
2. there was a striking compatibility between the Mendelian theory of 
heredity and some recent cytological discoveries 
3. at the time the chromosome theory was the most obvious and 
reasonable explanation of this compatibility. 
1. In the second half of the 19th century there existed an abundance of 
competing theories of inheritance.^ Most of these theories postulated 
germ cells or germ particles as the vehicles of heredity. A well-known 
example are the gemmules postulated by Darwin in his 'provisional hypo-
thesis of pangenesis'. With the development of better microscopes and 
better microscopic techniques it became possible to actually study the 
gametes and to search for structures which might be responsible for the 
transmission and development of inheritable properties. This study was 
already an important part of the rapidly progressing field of cytology. At 
the same time other, less successfull, methods to study inheritance were 
available. One method was the study of pedigree, the other was the 
method of breeding." Both methods which in our terminology belong to 
the field of genetics, at the time largely failed as a means of 
discovering the mechanism of heredity. 
Thus it appears that the same phenomenon, the problem of inheri-
tance, was studied in both the fields of cytology and of genetics. The 
fields were different with respect to their methods and techniques, but 
they shared the main outstanding problem. ' This was a strong intercon-
nection indeed and it meant, among other things, that discoveries in one 
field had to be accounted for in the other field. For instance, the dis-
covery of latent or dormant properties in genetics led to the search for 
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structures in cytology which corresponded to these latent properties. It 
is not surprising then that the rediscovery of Mendel's laws in 1900 
induced the cytologists to search for the cytological equivalents of the 
Mendelian mechanism of heredity.' 
Another indication of the interconnection between cytology and gene-
tics can be found in the common intellectual background of nearly all 
cytologists and Mendelian geneticists. Both groups had been trained as 
embryologists'O and by both groups the emphasis was laid on the 
developmental aspect of inheritance; the question of transmission was 
relatively rarely asked. The problem of inheritance was seen as more 
or less identical with the problem of development. Even the geneticists, 
next to the embryologists and cytologists, were primarily interested in 
solving the problem of development. In this light it was to be expected 
again that these scientists kept their eyes on each other's activities and 
scrutinized their mutual scientific discoveries. 
2. At the time of the rediscovery of Mendel's laws a considerable 
amount of knowledge had been accumulated about the structure of the 
cell. In 1880 it was known that the nucleus and the chromatin threads -
later to be named chromosomes - fullfilled an essential function during 
cell-division. It was speculated that the chromosomes formed the physical 
basis of heredity. Independently several cytologists came to the con-
clusion that "the nucleus contained the physical basis of inheritance; and 
chromatin, its essential constituent, is the idioplasmV^ This hypothesis 
led to the further suggestion - made by Weissmann and Strasburger and 
supported by Boveri and Hertwig between 1880 and 189013 that there 
had to be a 'reduction division' prior to gamete formation to explain the 
constancy of the chromosome number in each generation. At the end of 
the 19th century several cytologists, in particular Weissmann and 
Wilson, accepted the following theses: 1) The chromosomes form the 
physical basis of inheritance 2) chromosomes are paired and only 
separate during reduction division to constitute the haploid gametes 
which fuse into the diploid fertilized egg-cell 3) through the whole 
process of division but also in the resting cell each chromosome remains 
separate and intact.14 
Against this background Mendel's laws were rediscovered in 1900. 
Mendel formulated these laws in 1866, so he could not possibly have had 
any knowledge of these cytological discoveries. One of the reasons that 
the rediscovery of Mendel's laws took so long could be that it had to 
await these cytological developments.15 Looking back now it is hard to 
escape the impression how beautifully both independent discoveries 
matched each other. Mendel's laws of segregation and independent 
assortment were compatible with the behaviour of the chromosomes 
during reduction division. The segregation and independant assortment of 
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the Mendelian factors runs parallel with the separation in the gametes 
and the new assortment in the fertilized egg-cell of the chromosomes. 
All biologists1" at the time must have noticed this striking compatibility, 
though many of them were reluctant to draw the obvious consequences. 
3. Given the strong connection between cytology and genetics, the most 
natural and simple way to explain this compatibility was to assume that 
the chromosomes either were identical with or the carriers of the 
Mendelian factors. This indeed was the explanation given by Sutton an 
Boveri in 1903-04. Their chromosome theory of heredity affirmed the 
connection between cytology and genetics by giving a functional ex-
planation of the behaviour of the chromosomes in terms of genetics and 
a structural explanation of the Mendelian laws of heredity in terms of 
cytology. ' For various reasons, however, the chromosome theory was 
only accepted by a minority of the biologists. Of course there were 
specific objections. For instance, the number of chromosomes often 
seemed to be too low to account for the independent assortment of the 
Mendelian factors. Later this problem was solved by Morgan's theory of 
crossing-over. But more important were the general objections. These 
objections can be traced back to two sources. The first source was the 
primacy of the problem of development. The Mendelian geneticists did 
not see how this problem might be solved by the chromosome theory in 
an acceptable way, because it carried too heavy a smell of the loathsome 
preformationism. The second source was the aversion, among the 
Mendelian geneticists, of a materialistic interpretation of the Mendelian 
factors. Both types of objections will be dealt with when I come to 
discuss the constraint-violations. 
Notwithstanding these objections against the chromosome theory, the 
adversaries simply could not deny its naturalness and elegance. At least 
they had to come up with an elaborated alternative which not only 
provided a non-materialistic account of Mendelian factors but also ex-
plained why it seemed as if the chromosomes were the carriers of the 
hereditary factors. Though, in principle, it was possible to conceive the 
chromosomes, for instance, as epiphenomena on a more fundamental pro-
cess1*, such considerations never resulted in a full-blown theory. 
Bateson's theory of Vortices', e.g., was not much more than a hypothesis 
based on an analogy with theoretical models in contemporary physics.1' 
As such it was considerably weaker than the chromosome theory which 
constituted an interfield connection. " 
The conclusion seems justified that the chromosome theory was the 
best solution, at the time, to the conceptual problem posed by the 
compatibility between recent discoveries in the two strongly related 
fields of cytology and genetics. If the Mendelians would not accept this 
solution, because of its preformationist implications, they would have 
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been stuck with a serious anomaly, viz. the absence of an explanation of 
this compatibility. The best strategy for the Mendelians was to accept 
the chromosome theory at least as a provisional hypothesis and to see 
whether it could be fitted, one or another way, within the Mendelian 
program. The chromosome theory was an offer the Mendelians couldn't 
refuse. 
2. The conceptual tension between the chromosome theory and the 
Mendelian program 
Although the Mendelians had to accept the chromosome theory as a 
provisional hypothesis, they had strong reasons for rejecting it as well. 
For the chromosome theory violated several constraints of their program. 
In this section I will show how these constraints were violated and next 
how the Mendelians managed to cope with the ensuing conceptual 
tension between theory and program. 
In its initial stage, the chromosome theory was incompatible with two 
constraints of the Mendelian program. The first one concerns the on-
tologica! restrictions with respect to the hereditary factors. The 
Mendelian factors were only acceptable in so far as they were seen as 
dynamic non-materialistic entities. By identifying Mendelian factors with 
material particles in the nucleus, the chromosome theory was clearly in 
conflict with this constraint. The other constraint consisted of the claim 
that every theory of heredity should have to account for the problem of 
development as well. For both Bateson and Morgan, the most conspicuous 
representatives of the Mendelian program, one of the main purposes in 
studying inheritance was to find an explanation of embryological 
development. As I have stated in chapter 1 both constraints were deeply 
connected to each other. For the sake of clarity I will repeat my 
explanation of this connection. At the same time some reasons will be 
given, why the chromosome theory smelled of preformationism and why 
the Mendelians did not like that smell. 
There is one basic confusion which underlies both constraints. The 
Mendelians failed to recognize the fundamental distinction between 
hereditary factors and inherited properties or characters. They wrote 
variously about the inheritance of factors, properties and 'unit-charac-
ters'. ' So in the Mendelian conception properties were not so much 
determined by factors, but properties and factors were more or less the 
same. Keeping this in mind, it becomes understandable why the 
Mendelians tended to identify the problem of heredity with the problem 
of development. Inheritance and development were more or less the same 
process, or at least a continuous process. The inherited factors already 
consisted of all adult properties; these properties only needed to be 
'unfolded' during embryonic development. So the Mendelians believed 
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that, if it could be shown how these properties inherited, then they 
should be near to a solution of the problem of development as well. 
Given this view of heredity and development, it is not surprising that 
the Mendelians were averse to any materialistic interpretation of 
hereditary factors. For such an interpretation would imply that the adult 
properties were materially present from the start of development and 
that, as a consequence, the factors-properties-characters had to be some 
kind of homunculi.22 This type of preformationism had not only become 
unpopular at the time, but it was generally held to be obsolete. There-
fore, those biologists who accepted the Mendelian theory of inheritance, 
preferred to think of factors-properties as immaterial 'forms', 'states' or 
'vortices', that would 'actualize' during embryonic development. It is 
conceivable, though hard to demonstrate, that the threat of this type of 
preformationism has been paramount to other reasons for the Mendelians 
to reject the chromosome theory of heredity. In any case there can be 
no doubt about the conceptual tension between the chromosome theory 
and the Mendelian research program. 
At this point something should be done about the emerging ambiguity 
in my account of the Mendelian predicament. I have argued that the 
Mendelians were practically forced to accept the chromosome theory. But 
I also argued that the Mendelians had good reasons for rejecting the 
chromosome theory. In a sense this is precisely the kind of ambiguity, as 
I want to show, that the Mendelian predicament consisted of. But to 
avoid an impending implausibility it would be worthwhile to consider 
what this predicament in reality amounted to. 
Immediately after the publication of the Sutton-Boveri hypothesis the 
Mendelians were firm in their rejection of the chromosome theory. The 
reasons afforded, e.g. by Morgan and Johannsen, were at first restricted 
to accusations that the theory was too speculative or "not based on ex-
periment". 3 Soon specific objections were raised: there was no evidence 
of the association of Mendelian characters and chromosomes, the number 
of chromosomes was too low to account for independent assortment etc.. 
All these objections were gradually overcome by an increasing number of 
experiments supporting the chromosome theory. Thus with respect to the 
specific objections mentioned above it was shown by Stevens and Wilson 
in 190524
 t | i a t s e x w a s determined by the sex-chromosomes, the first in 
a series of proofs of the association of chromosomes and character. In 
1910 Morgan himself would explain independent assortment by the theory 
of crossing over. This theory would become established by further re-
search in the Drosophilagroup. 
How did the Mendelians react to this successful research which 
removed many of their objections? In answering this question I will 
restrict myself to the reactions of Bateson and Morgan. 
по 
Bateson was impressed by the discovery of Stevens and Wilson. He 
admitted that here at least was "one positive case... in which a 
chromosome difference had proved to be associated with a somatic 
difference".2^ Although, prima facie, Bateson seemed to concede some 
plausibility to the chromosome theory, he continued to reject it mainly 
because of the lack of evidence. Unfortunately Bateson did not comment 
on the chromosome theory between 1909 and 1916. From several 
publications after 1916, however, it appears that Bateson was far more 
inclined to accept the theory.2" But only up to a point. He remained 
sceptical because of the one reason that repeatedly recurred through all 
his writings: chromosomes are only associated with the more fundamental 
factors responsible for inheritance. These factors were the forces or 
vortices still to be discovered by Bateson. In the end Bateson seemed to 
accept the chromosome theory for scientific reasons but simultaneously 
to avoid the ontological implications. 
With respect to Morgan a comparable story can be told. Before 1910 
Morgan rejected the chromosome theory for scientific as well as ex­
tra-scientific reasons. In 1910 Morgan made the initial discoveries which 
started research in the chromosome theory by the Drosophila-group. 
From then on Morgan appeared to accept all scientific discoveries of the 
Drosophila-group, but to reject any commitment to the view that the 
chromosomes were the material vehicles of the hereditary factors. ' 
"One might well reject, he (Morgan) suggested, the entire chromosome 
hypothesis and still accept the conclusions which the Drosophila work 
encouraged".28 Sturtevant's statement in his first paper on genetic 
mapping that here was a "new argument in favor of the chromosome 
view of inheritance, since it strongly indicates that the factors 
investigated are arranged in a linear series, ai ¡east mathematically"^ 
could have been made by Morgan himself. The qualification at the end is 
a good illustration of Morgan's (and Bateson's) attitude towards the 
chromosome theory. It reminds one of Osiander's broad-minded 
acceptance of the Copernican theory as a good calculating device, but 
without any correspondence to reality. " 
By giving the chromosome theory a more or less instrumentalistic 
interpretation both Bateson and Morgan were able to cope with the 
paradoxical situation of being forced to accept the chromosome theory 
on scientific grounds and having to reject the theory for philosophical 
reasons.•*' The same strategy even made it possible to provisionally 
adopt the chromosome theory within the Mendelian program as a 
heuristic for further research. This brings me to the last topic of this 
section. 
Up to now I have argued that the Mendelians were more or less 
forced to accept the chromosome theory as the best explanation of the 
compatibility between the Mendelian theory of heredity and the recent 
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cytological discoveries. But to accept a theory as a good explanation and 
to adopt that theory within one's program for further research ('to 
pursue' it in Laudan's terms) are two different things. In this case this 
leaves me to establish yet that the Drosophila research in the 
chromosome theory constituted a part of the Mendelian program indeed. 
This research, also known as Drosophila genetics, was started by 
Morgan in 1910. In order to show the connection between Drosophila 
genetics and the Mendelian research program it would be worthwhile, 
therefore, to say something more about Morgan's position with respect 
to the Mendelian program. Though not completely committed like 
Bateson, Morgan at least was strongly affiliated to the Mendelian pro-
gram. He was an adherent of the saltationary theory of evolution and an 
opponent to Darwinian, selectionist theories. Like Bateson and Johannsen, 
Morgan was a typologist^2 and, again like the other Mendelians, Morgan 
had a dynamic, non-materialistic conception of heredity. In short, 
Morgan accepted all the constraints of the Mendelian research program. 
But there was one aspect in which Morgan did not side with the 
Mendelians. Like de Vries, he did not accept the Mendelian theory of 
heredity. Apart from having various specific objections against this 
theory" Morgan did not agree with Bateson that the Mendelian laws 
supported the saltationary theory of evolution. Before 1910 Morgan only 
believed in de Vries' theory of (macro-)mutations. It was through the 
search of this kind of mutations that Morgan in 1908 took up work with 
the fruitfly, Drosophila melanogaster}* For more than a year Morgan 
was unable to induce de Vriesian mutations. But early in 1910 he did 
observe a curious variation. He found a single male fly with white, 
rather than the normal wild-type, red eyes. The fact that this was a 
discrete, though intra-specific, variation and the discovery that the 
distribution of this variation, if it was seen as a sex-linked, recessive 
variation, was in strict accordance with the Mendelian laws initiated 
Morgan's conversion to Mendelism and the chromosome theory of 
inheritance.-'" Thus Morgan's own work led him to accept first the 
Mendelian, and shortly thereafter, the chromosome interpretations of 
heredity. As a consequence Morgan abandoned the support to de Vries' 
theory of mutations·'', but he maintained his opinions about the 
evolutionary process as being saltationary in character. 
All this should be sufficient to show that Morgan started Drosophila 
genetics under the full direction of the constraints of the Mendelian 
program. But there is also an other reason why the Drosophila research 
should be seen as part of the Mendelian program. Mendelian genetics 
still belonged almost exclusively to Bateson's research program. The 
Mendelian theory of heredity was still viewed askance by most other 
evolutionary biologists, mainly because it was considered to be linked to 
the saltationary theory of evolution. An elaboration of the chromosome 
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theory, which was based on Mendelian genetics, therefore seemed only 
permissible under the wings of the Mendelian research program. 
Thus, to conclude this section, the Mendelians not only accepted the 
chromosome theory as an explanation of the compatibility between 
cytology and genetics, but they also adopted the chromosome theory as a 
working-hypothesis within their program through the agency of Morgan 
and his Drosophila-group. In the following section I will show how the 
conceptual tension, generated by the incompatibility between the 
chromosome theory and the Mendelian program, was resolved by 
weakening and eliminating the violated constraints. 
3. The influence of the chromosome theory on the constraint-structure 
of the Mendelian research program 
So far I have argued that the Mendelians had good reasons for 
accepting and adopting the chromosome theory notwithstanding the 
violation of several constraints of their program. The reader will have 
recognized in my account one of the ways, that I discussed in chapter II 
of part I, by which constraints may be violated rationally. In a 
sophisticated program scientists may have good reasons to accept a 
theory provisionally although they realize that it does not match all 
their scientific standards. Or, as Laudan argued , a scientist can 
rationally pursue a theory without fully accepting it. Within a scientific 
community such pursuit is often done by only a few members of that 
community . "A single community can rationally tolerate and even 
encourage a limited amount of radical research by its members". 
Our case appears to be a good example of such radical research 
tolerated by the scientific community. Thus the Mendelians tolerated the 
pursuit of the chromosome theory by the 'radical researchers' of the 
Drosophila-group. Morgan's position in this picture is quite interesting. 
Several authors41 have described Morgan's influence in the Drosophila-
group as largely restrictive and discouraging. If we accept their descrip-
tions4^, then Morgan should rather be seen as the attentive watch of 
the Mendelian constraints, ready to check the other, radical, members of 
the Drosophila-group. 
Apart from showing how constraint-violations can be rational, I have 
also indicated how the rational standards of a scientific community may 
be influenced by the radical research of some of its members. This part 
of my analysis will be most relevant for an account of the influence of 
the chromosome theory on the Mendelian research-program. The 
argument - borrowed from Nickles - goes as follows: If a theory is 
accepted (provisionally, for pursuit), for specific reasons, as a particular 
type of problem solution which is constraint-violating, then the 
elaboration of this theory may turn up further reasons in its own 
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support. Thus the constraint-violating theory may be self-legitimating 'in 
bootstrap fashion'/" To emphasize the influence on the constraint-
structure this argument should have the following supplement If, 
initially, there are specific reasons to violate one or more constraints by 
accepting a theory (provisionally, for pursuit), then the elaboration of 
this theory may turn up an increasing number of reasons for changing or 
eliminating the violated constraints). 
In this section I hope to show that the chromosome theory was a 
typical example of a self-legitimating theory. The elaboration of the 
chromosome theory not only led to the full acceptance of the theory but 
also to the elimination of most of the constraints and eventually to the 
demise of the entire Mendelian program. As Jennings has put it in 1917: 
The objections raised by the mutationists to gradual change through 
selection are breaking down as a result of the thoroughness of the 
mutationists' own studies".44 The first steps in the self-legitimation of 
the chromosome theory were made in the context of the preforma-
tionism-epigenesis debate. Cytologists and embryologists disagreed about 
the way in which embryological development was directed. At the time 
of the development of the chromosome theory most of them opted for 
epigénesis. The epigeneticists considered the fertilized egg-cell to be an 
amorphous mass which differentiated into the various complex parts of 
the organism under the influence of some force or vital principle. As 
was to be expected, this dynamic and vitalistic view was endorsed by, 
among others, Bateson and Morgan. Its popularity, again, is partly ex-
plained by the fact that it showed an analogy with contemporaneous 
models in physics. 
The few preformation ists on the other hand postulated the presence 
of preformed structures in the fertilized egg-cell which were passed by 
inheritance and which determined the direction of embryological 
development. At the time the preformationists argued for their static and 
materialistic view in terms of some preexisting differentiation, without 
having to invoke the conception of a homunculus. ' Both theories had to 
deal with specific problems. The preformationists, for instance, had to 
explain how exactly these postulated structures were preformed. The 
epigeneticists should indicate which force or principle was operative. 
Wilson, a distinguished cytologist and one of the first biologists who 
fully accepted the chromosome theory, tried to give credit to both 
theories. His proposal was that the chromosomes in the cell-nucleus 
should be seen as the preformed structures determining development. The 
epigenetic component of development, according to Wilson, took place in 
the cytoplasm. Here the 'formative stuffs', the building material of 
embryological development, were produced and developed under the 
direction of the chromosomes. These changes in the 'formative stuffs' 
were called epigenetic by Wilson. With this theory Wilson did not resolve 
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the preformationism-epigenesis controversy. In fact Wilson redefined the 
term 'epigénesis' so that it fitted within his conception of 
preformationism. But Wilson made a vital contribution to the 
chromosome theory of heredity by distinguishing the notion of epigenetic 
cytoplasmic development from the notion of the transmission of 
preformed hereditary qualities by the nucleus. With this distinction 
Wilson laid the foundation for the complete separation of the problem of 
heredity and the problem of development. Wilson himself did not entirely 
succeed in separating these notions, because he was too much a 
morphological preformationist. For a complete and clear distinction it 
was necessary to differentiate between morphological and chemical 
preformationism. As long as the preformed structures were considered to 
be more or less of the same shape as parts of the full-grown organism, 
the distinction between heredity and development still remained 
problematical. "Only by 1912 - 1913 did the Morgan group form a clear 
conception of the genetic factor as a material particle which determines 
morphological characters without being isomorphic to them". ' The 
Drosophila group realized that chemical structure can be translated in 
morphological structure. This insight made the complete separation of 
the problem of heredity from the problem of development possible. 
How did these developments contribute to the self-legitimation of the 
chromosome theory? The chromosome theory, it has been shown, was 
incompatible with the constraint on the identity of the problem of 
heredity and the problem of development. The Mendelians believed that 
the chromosome theory could not give an acceptable account of 
development and therefore had to fail as a theory of heredity as well. 
Using the chromosome theory as his starting point, Wilson made the 
distinction between cytological development and nuclear, chromosomal 
inheritance. This distinction created the possibility to study heredity 
without having to bother about the development of morphological 
properties. For the first time the genetic material was seen rather as a 
program than as the actual building material itself. Moreover the 
conception of the genetic material as a chemical blueprint, removed the 
last threat of falling back into the type of preformationism so much 
feared by the Mendelians. 
In this way the Drosophila group countered two important and related 
objections against the chromosome theory. First, it was shown that 
heredity and development can be studied separately and, secondly, it was 
shown that by keeping these notions separated the threat of 
preformationism can be avoided. Thus by strengthening its own position 
the chromosome theory provided several reasons for weakening the 
constraint on the identity of the problem of heredity and the problem of 
development. At the same time doubts were raised with respect to the 
constraint on the ontological status of the hereditary factors. Both 
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constraints, it will be recalled, were strongly connected to each other. 
The Mendelian aversion to a materialistic interpretation of hereditary 
factors was partly due to a fear of preformationism. If this fear 
appeared to be groundless, the Mendelians lost an important scientific 
reason for being tenacious about their ontological constraint. 
In section two I have argued that there was a basic confusion which 
underlied both constraints discussed above. This confusion was due to 
the failure of the Mendelians to distinguish between hereditary factors 
and inherited properties. The Mendelians were used to write 
interchangeably about factors, types, unit-characters and inheritable 
properties. One far-reaching accomplishment of the chromosome theory 
in its early development was the resolution of this terminological 
unclarity. 
Before I proceed to show how this resolution was archieved it should 
be noted that the recognition of this terminological ambiguity was 
preceded by and largely a consequence of the conceptual tension 
between the chromosome theory and the Mendelian program. The 
recognition of terminological ambiguities is often preceded or 
accompanied by a conceptual tension within the relevant program. Thus 
terminological ambiguities will be expected to arise, when a theory is 
accepted which violates one or more constraints of a research program. 
In chapter II I have shown how the (partial) recognition and (partial) 
resolution of an ambiguity in the concept 'variation1 was accompanied by 
a tension between Johannsen's discoveries and the Mendelian program. 
Johannsen resolved this ambiguity in part by the introduction of the 
concepts 'genotype' and 'phenotype'. 
In a similar vein it was the conceptual tension between the 
chromosome theory and the Mendelian program which drew attention to 
the ambiguity in the use of 'factors', 'properties' and 'unit-characters'. 
Wilson's separation of developmental and transmission genetics provided 
the key to the solution of this ambiguity. Although Johannsen's 
distinction between genotype and phenotype can be seen as an 
adumbration of this solution, this distinction was often conceived of as 
just a separation of two levels of properties. In this view the genotype 
consisted of the inheritable, discontinuously varying properties (in statu 
nascendi) and the phenotype was the 'reaction' of the genotype with the 
environment which resulted in the developed organism; at this level 
appeared the non-inheritable continuously varying properties. Wilson's 
distinction for the first time clearly separated the hereditary material 
from the morphological properties. In his conception the hereditary 
material is localized in the cellular nucleus. The development of the 
morphological properties is directed by the chromosomes through their 
influence on the extranuclear cytoplasm. Wilson's ideas formed the core 
of the modern genotype-phenotype distinction*" and strongly influenced 
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Drosophila genetics. y The conception of the genetic factor as a 
chemical structure translatable in morphological properties at last 
prevented any possible confusion of factors and properties or any 
consistent use of the notion 'unit-character'. 
First by showing that the problem of development and the problem of 
heredity need not be identified and then by exposing the conceptual 
confusion which caused the Mendelians to make this to a constraint on 
their program, the chromosome theory strengthened its own position. 
Moreover, by removing the threat of an obsolete type of preformationism 
the chromosome theory swept away the only 'scientific' reason for the 
Mendelians to stick to their constraint on the ontological status of 
hereditary factors. Both constraints were considerably weakened by these 
early developments in the chromosome theory. These developments there-
fore can be seen as the first steps in the self-legitimation of the 
chromosome theory. The radical members of the Drosophila group did not 
have to bother any longer about the problem of development and were 
relatively free to see the chromosomes or parts of the chromosomes as 
the material equivalents of the hereditary factors. 
But, having been given the leash to do further research in the 
chromosome theory of hereditary, the members of the Drosophila group -
at the time: Morgan, Muller, Bridges and Sturtevant - only contributed 
to the ultimate breakdown of the Mendelian program. New discoveries by 
the Drosophila group raised doubts about even the most central 
constraints of the Mendelian program, viz. the constraints on the size 
(qualitative distinctness) and the discontinuity of the variations. A full 
account of the influence of these discoveries would extend beyond the 
scope of this study. A discussion of some of the most important 
developments must suffice here. To begin with the constraint on the size 
of the variations^, it became clear at last that this constraint was no 
longer tenable. The variations in properties, e.g. in the colour of the 
eyes, which Morgan c.s. came across in their breeding experiments with 
Drosophila, were too definite to be conceived of as fluctuating variations 
and too slight to be species-forming mutations. On these grounds, 
Morgan became willing to concede that evolution could be a gradual 
process, which takes place by small but definite mutations. * Already in 
1909 Morgan stated that "...a new situation has arisen. There are 
variations within the limits of Linnaean species that are definite and 
inherited, and there is more than a suspicion that by their presence the 
possibility is assured of further definite variations in the same direction 
which may further and further transcend the limits of the first steps". ^ 
However, several years of observing Drosophila had to elapse before 
Morgan definitely stopped to think of evolutionary relevant variations as 
being large- or small-scale jumps between species. ' Further research by 
the Drosophila group not only revealed that many small variations were 
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associated with the chromosomes but also led to the location of the 
genes, responsible for these variations, on the chromosomes. These 
developments removed all remaining doubts about the heritability of 
small intra-species variations and definitely undermined the classical 
saltationary theory of evolution. 
The last bastion of the Mendelian program, the constraint on the 
discontinuity of the variations, was left comparatively untouched during 
these developments. Though Morgan conceded that evolution might be 
gradual instead of saltationary, he stayed with his conviction that 
evolution only proceeds by discontinuous variations. But problems arose. 
What to say, for instance, about those variations, like the famous 
truncated wings of Drosophila, which did not behave as sharply 
delimited, stable mutations but varied in size and form? Morgan did not 
succeed in giving an explanation of these phenomena. Similarly, no 
satisfactory explanation could be given of Castle's demonstration of the 
heritability of continuous variations in the coat colour of hooded rats. 
Castle's own explanation, invoking a modifying influence of selection on 
the Mendelian factors, was unacceptable for most biologists. It had too 
strong a Lamarckian flavour and was inconsistent with the doctrine of 
the continuity of the germ plasm.^ But this left the Mendelians with 
the problem of the seeming incompatibility between the demonstrated 
heritability of continuous variations and the discontinuity and stability 
of the Mendelian factors. 
In the preceding chapters I have already indicated that in the early 
1900s several authors, among them Pearson and especially Yule, have 
suggested, that multiple factor inheritance might be a possible 
explanation of apparently continuous variations. History shows that each 
of these suggestions met with little response. This neglect may be 
explained as follows: The multiple factor theory was not really needed at 
the time. The theory did not fit in with either the Mendelian or the 
biometrie programs. Research in both programs fared fairly well at the 
time. Why bother then about a theory which admittedly in a way seemed 
to reconcile both programs, but which lacked any theoretical and 
experimental backing? It was an ad Aoc-theory explaining away some of 
the controversies, but without any promise for future research.55 
This situation changed when Nillson-Ehle in 1908 supplied ex-
perimental proof of the inheritability of continuous variations by means 
of multiple factor inheritance.5^ Nillson-Ehle's experiments soon became 
widely known, but the full implications of his discoveries were rarely 
recognized.57 While Nillson-Ehle immediately saw recombination as a 
fruitful source of inheritable continuous variations so as to provide the 
material that natural selection could act upon, most Mendelian geneti-
cists continued to believe that selection was severely limited, because it 
would rapidly isolate pure lines.5* They were not able to dissociate 
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themselves from the view that continuos variations only seem to be 
inheritable and sensitive to selection, because the populations used in 
hybridization-experiments always consisted of a mixture of pure lines. 9 
Even East, who discovered multiple factor inheritance independently 
from Nillson-Ehle,°" sometimes seemed to revert to this position."1 
Nillson-Ehle's experimental support of the multiple factor theory 
probably did have a considerable influence on further genetic research, 
especially on the continent. But the influence on the biologists, discussed 
in this case-study, has been negligible. This is illustrated by the fact 
that until 1920 only a few references to Nillson-Ehle can be found in 
the Mendelian and biometrical literature. Moreover, in those cases that 
Nillson-Ehle's work is referred to°^ there is no mention of the support 
that the multiple factor theory provides to the theory of natural 
selection. Whether Nillson-Ehle, apart from his influence on genetic 
research, had a part to play in the reestablishment of the theory of 
natural selection needs to be investigated. But he had no significant role 
in the controversy between Mendelians and biometricians or with respect 
to the resolution of the controversy by means of Fisher's population 
genetics. 
I think that there is a good explanation why the Mendelians were 
reluctant or even unable to grasp the full implications of Nillson-Ehle's 
discoveries: At the time they simply failed to have the conceptual means 
for a complete understanding of the multiple factor theory. In my view 
the multiple factor theory could not have much impact as long as no 
clear distinction was made between factor and property or genotype and 
phenotype. The lack of such a distinction made it too difficult to see 
how one property could be determined by several factors. ^ As I have 
argued above, it was finally the tension between the chromosome theory 
and the Mendelian program which brought forth these necessary con-
ceptual innovations. 
At last the time was ripe for one of the Mendelians, H.J. Muller, who 
really learned to grasp the distinction between factor and property, to 
formulate an acceptable solution to the problem of reconciling 
discontinuity on the level of the Mendelian factors with continuity on 
the level of the phenotypical properties. Muller used the chromosome 
theory, in particular the theory of crossing over, to identify genetic 
components which he called modifier genes.^ These genes could have a 
modifying influence on the properties determined by other genes. In 
some cases, however, it was not possible to distinguish between 
'determining' genes and 'modifying 'genes. This led Muller to his version 
of the multiple factor hypothesis which stated that one property could 
be determined by more than one gene or even a large number of genes. 
Loss or mutation of one of these genes or recombination between the 
genes would result in a continuous variation in the phenotype. In this 
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way discontinuity on the level of the hereditary factors was reconciled 
with continuity on the level of the inherited properties. But as an 
explanation of the heritability of continuous variations Muller's theory 
was incompatible with the constraint on the discontinuity of variations. 
Acceptance of his theory implied the violation of the last important con-
straint of the Mendelian program. As a matter of fact in 1918 most 
geneticists had accepted the multiple factor theory."' The consequence 
was that by this time the Mendelian program broke down as well. The 
foundation was laid for the 'synthesis' of the Mendelian theory of 
heredity and the Darwinian theory of evolution. 
Again, the radical research by the members of the Drosophila group 
contributed to the self-legitimation of the chromosome theory by 
providing an increasing number of reasons for violating and eventually 
eliminating the constraints of the Mendelian program. By 1920 all 
important constraints of the Mendelian program were dropped and 
although some biologists, among them R. Pearl and R.C. Punnett, still 
tried to defend the program, their viewpoint was not taken seriously 
anymore. 
I will conclude this chapter with a recapitulation of the changes in 
the constraint-structure of the Mendelian program as they were brought 
about by the Mendelians' own empirical and theoretical discoveries. First 
the constraint on the size of the variations had to be gradually 
weakened until, under the influence of chromosome research, it was 
dropped altogether. Secondly, the epistemologica! constraint was violated 
by starting chromosome research; further pursuit of the chromosome-
theory led to the abandonment of the constraint. Continued chromosome 
research, finally, showed the untenableness of the discontinuity-con-
straint. 
In the wake of these alterations one other constraint changed as 
well. The empirical domain was to be extended so as to comprise small, 
quantitative intra-species variations and later continuous variations too. 
With respect to the metaphysical constraint, the typological world-view, 
one is inclined to expect that the demise of the classical saltationary 
theory would have affected this constraint as well. Though it is difficult 
to trace any concrete indications to that effect, I believe that such a 
change in world-view can be shown to have occurred indeed. But I will 
postpone a discussion of this development to chapter VI. 
The alterations mentioned should suffice to show that the Mendelians 
failed to solve the 'Problem of Variation' as it was originally set out by 
their program. But such a conclusion should not be taken to imply that 
the Mendelians failed on all scores. I am not disputing the historians' 
received view that the Mendelians have been successful and that, to a 
certain extent, they even won the contest with the biometricians. But in 
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my analysis they have only been successful at the methodological level, 
viz. by developing a full-blooded theory of heredity. In the Mendelian 
evolutionary program Mendel's theory of heredity provided a method for 
the study of the evolutionary process. Mendel's laws were adopted within 
Bateson's program as a means for studying and eventually vindicating the 
saltationary character of evolution. This success of the Mendelian theory 
of heredity explains the fact that the methodological constraint was the 
only constraint that remained unchanged. The Mendelians continued their 
research by means of Mendel's method of cross-breeding individual 
organisms. In chapter VI I will show that this methodological bias 
prevented the Mendelians from seeing any useful connection between 
Darwin's theory of natural selection and their own discovery of the 
evolutionary relevance of small, continuous variations. But first we will 
have a look at the vicissitudes of the biometrical program. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCEPTUAL CHANGES IN THE BIOMETRICAL PROGRAM 
While the failure of the Mendelians to develop a detailed 
saltationary theory of evolution was due to their own investigations, 
the biometricians primarily failed because of the severe limits set by 
the constraints on their program.1 The biometrical program, as a pro-
gram which was intended to solve the 'Problem of Variation' and to 
vindicate the Darwinian theory of evolution, stagnated because it was 
based on a purely descriptive theory which did not allow of any causal 
explanations concerning evolution and heredity. 
The biometricians were convinced that statistics would change not 
only biology but our whole scientific world-picture. Our world would 
be rid of causes; ideally a scientist would only look for correlations 
between observables. There was no hidden reality. For the biome-
tricians this meant that the problem of variation and the problem of 
heredity should be viewed as the problem of the correlation between 
relatives. The biologist should search for short-hand descriptions of 
quantitative regularities in the relationship of parents and off-
spring. The degree of similarity in the observed characteristics of 
successive generations of organisms is the only measure of heredity. 
The biometricians formalized this approach by means of modified and 
refined versions of Gallon's statistical 'law of regression'. 
The initial success of the biometrical program consisted of the 
demonstration of the applicability of their method in the study of 
different small, quantitatively varying properties, such as human 
height or the size of crabs. This success was further enlarged by 
introducing refinements in the statistical analysis and taking account 
of modifying factors like in the first place, of course, selection but 
also, for example, assortative mating. Finally, the biometricians were 
able, in several cases, to show empirically the effect of selection on 
the distribution of quantitative variations. 
But soon after the initial successes there were signs that the bio-
metrical program was too limited to achieve any theoretical progress. 
The net proceeds of biological research after 1900 consisted in an 
increasing pile of, generally weak, inductive support for the law of 
ancestral heredity. Given their phenomenalistic philosophy and given 
the fact that the most important methodological problems had been 
solved, the biometrians could not do any more than repeat their study 
of the correlation of properties in successive generations on new 
organisms and new properties. 
This stagnation in the biometrical program had at least two im-
portant consequences: first, several biometricians grew uncomfortable 
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with collecting "more factors of the kind they already had" and for 
some of them this was a reason to 'defect' - Pearson's qualification -
to the other camp, the Mendelian program. Secondly, since the biome-
tricians continued to be successful in refining and elaborating 
statistical theory it is not surprising that they became more and more 
formalistic and gradually lost contact with biology.2 After 1910 the 
journal of the biometricians abounds in articles on statistics and if 
biology crops up, it is rather to serve as an illustration to a 
statistical problem than that statistics is used to solve a biological 
problem. 
These developments contributed to the weakening of the constraints 
of the biometrical program: evolutionary concerns grew pale in the 
shade of the statistical problems that had to be solved. The central 
biological constraints seemed to loose their role as heuristic guides 
in research. This disengagement of biometrical statistics from 
evolutionary theory is also illustrated by the fact that the biome-
tricians started to apply their statistics to psychological and socio-
logical problems as well. The disconnection of biology from the biome-
trical program was further enhanced by the 'defection' - a phenomenon 
unknown to the Mendelians - of several biometricians. 
All leading American biometricians - e.g. Pearl, Davenport and 
Harris - started their career as orthodox biometricians, but soon 
after Weldon's death in 1906 Pearl and Davenport became Mendelians and 
Harris at least began to feel sympathy for the Mendelian program.·* 
Pearl is quite explicit in stating his reasons for rejecting the bio-
metrical program and siding with the Mendelians. In his Modes of re-
search in genetics* he argues that biometrical statistics should be con-
sidered as an important contribution to the study of genetics, but only 
to the extent that it has given us an extremely useful quantitative 
method for the study of hereditary phenomena. Its greatest defect is 
that it is restricted to the description of the 'resemblance between phe-
nomena'^ and that it cannot give any explanation of this resemblance. 
But, and this is most interesting, as to being restricted to the 
phenomenal level biometrics is not very different from pure Mendelism: 
"Mendelism finds its limitations, just as did the biometrie method, in the 
fact that from the logical standpoint it is essentially a statistical method 
which studies only the laws of distribution of things given or assumed. 
It examines only the distribution of hereditary specificities, and not at 
all, directly, their origin or determination".^ Pearl continues with a 
quote from Spillman: "In genetic investigations we need theories that 
will suggest lines of investigation that will be fruitful of results - that 
will lead, not to more facts of the kind we already have, but to new 
kinds of fact that will throw light on the subjects from a new angle". ' 
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Pearl proceeds to show that such new kinds of fact were provided by 
cytology and chromosome research and he demonstrates, although rather 
implicitly, that the force of Mendelism consisted in suggesting this new 
line of investigation, chromosome research, by its assumption of 
"causative agents of the inherited character". So, here we have clear 
evidence that one of the reasons for the American biometricians to 
prefer Mendelism to orthodox biometrics was its fruitfulness. Because of 
its realistic assumption of hereditary factors Mendelism suggested new 
lines of research, which were excluded from the biometrical program. 
For the sake of completeness it should be added that there were other 
reasons for this preference as well. Assessing the different selection-ex-
periments the American biometricians became convinced of the relative 
ineffectiveness of selection. Moreover, they sided with the majority of 
the biologists, who accepted Johannsen's experiments as conclusive proof 
that selection only works on already existing 'types'. In the United 
States biometrical statistics came to be used primarily in setting up and 
interpreting pure line experiments. In this case biometrical statistics 
became not only disconnected from Darwinian evolutionary theory, as it 
occurred within the biometrie program, but even from the biometrical, 
statistical world-view: it was to be used within the Mendelian program. 
These developments show the gradual weakening of the constraint-
structure of the biometrical program: it became apparent that there was 
no tight connection between the different constraints, this in sharp 
contrast to what Pearson had thought. But more importantly, these 
developments also contributed to the denouncement of the epistemologi-
ca! constraint on the biometrical program. It is not only 'with hindsight' 
that we want to say that the biometrical program stagnated, but, as 
Pearl's remarks illustrate, already many contemporary biologists felt that 
the biometricians only succeeded in producing more facts of the same 
kind. This insight made Harris, after another statistical study in 1910, 
almost lament that the correlations found in this study were purely 
descriptive and did not give any hint of a possible further explanation. 
It was generally felt that heredity should be explained causally and that 
the biometrical epistemologica! constraint was too restrictive in ex-
cluding such explanations. 
In addition to this general rejection of biometrical phenomenalism, 
the epistemologica! constraint received a second blow by further 
developments within the biometrical program itself. 
After the rediscovery of Mendel's laws the empirical domains of the 
Mendelian and biometrical programs were clearly separated the 
Mendelians investigated only qualitatively varying properties which were 
indicative of distinct species; the biometricians investigated 
quantitatively varying properties within the species. But we have seen 
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that by incorporating Johannsen's discoveries within their program, the 
Mendelians extended their domain to quantitative variations. This in-
fringement on their domain was already felt as a threat by the biome-
tricians. They grimly tried to defend their territory by arguing that 
neither Johannsen nor Pearl or Jennings had succeeded in showing the 
ineffectiveness of selection on quantitative variations, primarily because 
they meddled with their figures. 
To make things worse, several authors, to begin with Yule in 1902, 
suggested that even continuous variations could be explained within the 
Mendelian scheme, if some kind of multifactorial theory was adopted. 
These proposals motivated Pearson to devote quite a lot of his time to 
the examination of this theory. In his article On a generalized theory 
of alternative inheritance, with special reference to Mendel's law"" he 
was convinced to have demonstrated that the Mendelian multifactorial 
theory broke down on the fact, that it predicted the wrong values for 
the regression coefficients. The predicted value for the regression of son 
on father was 1/3, whereas Pearson's own investigations had shown the 
value to be higher, in the range 0,45-0,50.10 
Pearson's argument was criticized by, among others. Yule for being 
based on the assumption of complete dominance in the Mendelian theory 
of heredity. After a lapse of several years Pearson reacted by starting 
to examine the force of this criticism. And, indeed, he found that, if 
one allowed a Mendelian scheme with no dominance, the predicted values 
for the correlation between relatives would be exactly the same as those 
made with the law of ancestral heredity. Pearson's comment made it 
appear as if he pitied the Mendelian committment to complete 
dominance: "If (Aa) were a class, or possibly on a wider determinantal 
theory a group of several classes marked by an individual somatic 
character - not invariably identical with the somatic character of (AA) -
there would be little left of the contradiction between biometrie and 
Mendelian results as judged by populations sensibly mating at random. // 
is the unqualified assertion of the principle of dominance which appears 
ai present as the stumbling block. ' 
But, as Norton *2 argues, Pearson's comment was quite unreasonable at 
the time. Pearson was well acquainted with the Mendelian literature, in 
which it was repeatedly stated that the Mendelians were not at all 
committed to the assumption of complete dominance. How should this be 
explained? I think one can only agree with Norton that "it seems 
reasonable to conclude from this that, for Pearson, dominance was a 
handy rationale for his continuing public disinterest in Mendelism; a 
disinterest maintained even in the face of his own results, which, as we 
have seen, somewhat undermined his earlier objections". ^ 
Of course, Pearson was not just downright unreasonable in rejecting 
Mendelism. Pearson did have reasons for being averse to the Mendelian 
125 
theory of heredity: first, this theory was still too firmly connected to 
the saltationary theory of evolution14 and, secondly, it was a theory 
based on 'hidden realities', which was incompatible with the biometrical 
world-view. But Pearson did not state these reasons in public, instead he 
used an 'unreasonable' scientific reason. 
I think that there is a simple and good explanation why Pearson 
acted in this way. Suppose that Pearson had conceded that the 
Mendelian theory was fully compatible with the law of ancestral heredity 
and that, on the face of it, the Mendelian model should be preferred 
because it was more simple. If Pearson had now proceeded to argue that 
the Mendelian model was still not acceptable because it was based on 
'hidden realities', then this would be received as a very weak argument. 
His opponents would have simply retorted with a 'pity for your world-
view'. Arguments based on one's world-view may work in a young, 
emerging science, but if that science already exists for two decades one 
expects that justification goes primarily one way. The world-view may be 
vindicated theoretically and empirically by that science, but it can't be 
used as an argument in defending one's science. 
So my diagnosis is that Pearson felt very uncomfortable. He lacked a 
good scientific argument for rejecting Mendelism but he could not use 
extra-scientific arguments either. We may conclude that these 
developments undermined Pearson's epistemology and that Pearson was 
irrational in maintaining his epistemologica! constraint with respect to 
genetics. This is not to imply that at this point we should invoke 
psychology or sociology to explain his irrationality. One plausible 
internal explanation would be, that Pearson had other reasons for 
maintaining his epistemology, viz. the success of applying biometrics to 
sociology and psychology. One could say that biology constituted a -
may be temporary - anomaly to Pearson's wider statistical research pro-
gram. This would be in accord with the gradual disappearance of biology 
from biometrics in favour of, e.g., research in intelligence. 
For our purpose it is sufficient that we can conclude that the epis-
temologica! constraint of the biometrical program had seriously been 
undermined by Pearson's own research. Pearson's overtly bad reason for 
rejecting Mendelism could not conceal his concession of the compatibility 
of Mendel's laws and the law ancestral heredity. And since Mendel's 
model was both more simple - for a phenomenalist an important criterion 
of scientific progress - and more fruitful, this meant that Mendel's laws 
should be preferred to the law of ancestral heredity. 
This discovery was, presumably, felt as a heavy blow to the biome-
trical program, although the biolometricians never admitted it. The 
failure of the law of ancestral inheritance - the backbone of the biome-
trical program - vis á vis Mendel's laws has certainly been an important 
cause of the biometricians* gradual loss of interest in biological matters, 
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as is illustrated by the biometrie literature after 1910. The biometricians 
continued to have success in refining and expanding their statistics and 
in applying their methods to other scientific fields, such as sociology 
and anthropology. 
127 
CHAPTER V 
THE CONVERGENCE OF THE PROGRAMS 
In the preceding chapters we have seen that some of the constraints 
of the Mendelian and biometrical programs had been weakened or changed 
under the influence of new scientific developments. In this chapter I 
will show that these changes had two important consequences: first, 
with respect to their original aims, viz. to solve the problem of 
variation and thereby to vindicate their specific evolutionary 
theories, both programs converged to each other and, secondly, the 
changes in the programs, which should be seen as solutions to the 
external conceptual problems of reconciling constraint-violating theories 
with the violated constraints, were accompanied by internar conceptual 
innovations, such as the introduction of the genotype-phenotype 
distinction and the partial resolution of the continuity-discontinuity 
distinction. Both these developments prepared the ground for the 
synthesis of the programs. By this time most obstacles for combining the 
Mendelian theory of heredity with Darwin's theory of evolution had been 
removed. So, finally, I will be able to show that the actual synthesis 
came about by 'pooling' the remaining constraints of the Mendelian and 
biometrical programs. 
The aims of the programs were primarily stated by their central con-
straints: the Mendelians wanted to show that evolution proceeds by 
large, discontinuous variations, the biometricians wanted to show that 
evolution proceeds by small, continuous variations. Both programs con-
verged to each other with respect to these central constraints and as a 
consequence also with respect to their empirical constraints. 
In the Mendelian case this is easily shown. First, the Mendelians 
were to accept the evolutionary relevance of small intra-species varia-
tions after the incorporation of Johannsen's discoveries and, later, their 
research in chromosome theory even induced them to accept the 
evolutionary relevance of continuous variations. These developments 
brought along an extension of the empirical domain to small, continuous 
intra-species variations. As a consequence the Mendelians were pushed 
into the direction of a Darwinian conception of evolution. 
The biometrical case is less clear. As we have seen, the biometricians 
tried to ward off the Mendelian encroachment upon their empirical 
domain by showing that the Mendelian prediction concerning continuous 
variations - in a multifactorial model - would not match the empirically 
well-supported biometrical predictions. We have also seen that Pearson's 
calculations in fact showed that the Mendelian predictions were in 
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complete accord with the biometrical ones. The biometricians had to 
concede the success of the Mendelian approach to heredity. This 
concession partly amounted to the acceptance of discontinuity in 
heredity and in this sense the biometrical program converged towards 
the Mendelian program. This is nicely illustrated by a revealing article 
from Pearson, in which he develops a theory of 'determinantal 
inheritance' based on posthumous notes of Weldon. 
In that article Pearson accepts chromomeres - in Pearson's definition: 
parts of chromosomes which become independent during reduction 
division - as the possible bearers of the hereditary material (an 
assumption which seems to be strongly indicative of the weakening of 
the epistemologica! constraint, to say the least). Following Weldon's 
track Pearson proceeds with conceding "the importance of segregation 
first pointed out by Mendel in the offspring of hybrids". But then he has 
the intention to show that Mendelian segregation can be explained 
within a wider biometrical frame-work, if the chromomeres are taken to 
be the basic units of segregation instead of the chromosomes, as postu­
lated in the Sutton-Boveri hypothesis. 
Pearson argues that there is a continuous transition from the 
Mendelian segregation and independent assortment to blending 
inheritance. If we have two chromosomes (or chromomeres) as 
segregating units, then unambiguous Mendelian distribution will follow. 
But if the number of segregating units is increased to a large number of 
independently segregating chromomeres, then the distribution will rapidly 
approach the biometrical 'normal curve': "We notice .... that if we in­
crease the number of determinants on which a character depends we 
very soon, even if we start with two pure races, reach by hybridisation 
and crossing of the hybrids a population closely following the correlation 
found biometrically for large groups mating at random. If the hypothesis 
here dealt with were correct, it would follow that the Mendelians were 
merely working at one end of the scale, the biometricians somewhat 
further downV 
Thus Pearson accepts a particulate, but blending view of inheritance, 
but he also accepts, as a limiting case, the Mendelian non-blending view, 
leaving room for discontinuity if the number of segregating units is 
small. However, Pearson also admits that "it may, of course, be said that 
the hypothesis which makes the inherited character depend on ρ unit 
determinants (i.e. a large number of chromomeres, V.B.) in the paternal 
and maternal chromosomes, separated into two moieties at random in the 
reducing division, is not the only conceivable one". In effect Pearson 
admits the existence of particulate, non-blending Mendelian factors and -
as the last quotation suggests - leaves it to further research to decide 
whether the Mendelian view is only a limiting case indeed. As we know 
now, there is no independent segregation of chromomeres, but 
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segregation is not restricted to chromosomes either, because of the 
phenomenon of crossing over. 
We may conclude that both programs converged to each other with 
respect to the central and empirical constraints. This convergence was 
further enhanced by the weakening of the epistemologica! constraints. I 
have shown above that these constraints, in the Mendelian program as 
well as in the biometrical program, were seriously denounced by scien-
tific developments within the programs. As a consequence they ceased to 
play an important role in the heuristics of the programs, to the effect 
that there was no longer any sharp separation between the programs on 
this score. Nonetheless there remained important differences between the 
programs. These differences were due to the strength of the methodo-
logical constraints and, to a lesser extent, the metaphysical constraints. 
I will return to these in chapter VI. 
The convergence of the programs was not only due to external con-
ceptual innovations. The emergence of external conceptual problems and 
their subsequent solution by means of alterations in the constraint-struc-
tures of both programs were often accompanied by internal conceptual 
innovations. These innovations too have been indispensable for shaping 
the possibility of a synthesis. 
The most important internal conceptual innovations ocurred within 
the context of the Mendelian program. I have discussed these changes in 
chapter II and III, so I will only give a resumé here. 
The incorporation of Johannsen's discoveries within the Mendelian 
program was accompanied by a refinement in the concept of Variations*. 
The Mendelians distinguished two types of variation: mutations and 
fluctuating variations. Mutations were the only variations which were 
relevant for evolution and fluctuating variations were considered to be, 
mostly environmentally produced, 'evolutionary noise'. Johannsen's pure 
line experiments confirmed this distinction, but they introduced a refine-
ment by making a further distinction between two levels of variation. 
Johannsen demonstrated that the fluctuating, continuous variations (e.g. 
in the size of beans) which we observe in nature often conceal the 
underlying type-variations which are caused by mutations. Under the 
influence of environment non-inheritable fluctuating variations were 
superimposed upon the inheritable type-variations. Accordingly, it may 
have seemed to the biometricians that they selected for inheritable con-
tinuous variations, but in fact they only selected the underlying type-
variations. The pure line experiments constituted a serious criticism at 
the address of the biometrical program, to which the biometricians could 
only answer by pointing out the methodological deficiencies in several of 
these experiments.^ The distinction between two levels of variation has 
been crucial for the further development of the Mendelian program, as it 
formed an adumbration of the later genotype-phenotype distinction. 
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Johannsen introduced this distinction in 1909, but it was still a long 
way from the genotype-phenotype distinction, as we understand it today. 
It was illuminating as far as that the phenotype signified the observable 
character and the genotype the inheritable character, but apart from 
that the phenotype was nothing else than the (developed) genotype plus 
the fluctuating variations. The Mendelians lacked any conception of the 
genotype as being the matrix of the phenotype. The concepts factor-
property-character were still interchangeably used, often under the 
collective noun 'unit-character'. 
This brings us to the second important conceptual innovation, which 
accompanied the second important conceptual tension within the 
Mendelian program, viz. the tension between the chromosome theory and 
the epistemologica! constraint. 
The conceptual innovation concomitant to the elaboration of the 
chromosome theory and the subsequent undermining of the epistemolog-
ica! constraint, started with the separation of the problem of heredity 
from the problem of development. Especially under the influence of 
Wilson's cytological research in chromosomes the Mendelians learned to 
distinguish between the notion of cytoplasmic development and the 
notion of the transmission of preformed hereditary qualities by the 
nucleus. Transmission and development were spatially and conceptually 
separated. 
From now on the Mendelians clearly differentiated between the 
hereditary material localized in the cellular nucleus and the development 
of morphological properties through the influence of the chromosomes on 
the extra-nuclear cytoplasm. Herewith the Mendelians learned to make a 
sharp distinction between factors and properties. This distinction formed 
the core of the modern genotype-phenotype distinction" and strongly 
influenced further research in the chromosome theory.7 
The modem genotype-phenotype distinction was an essential 
precondiction for the third conceptual innovation to be mentioned. This 
innovation concerned the sharp distinction between continuity and dis-
continuity in evolution as it was conceptualized in the early biometrical 
and Mendelian programs. This contrast was gradually toned down in the 
course of the development of both programs. Again, Johannsen's dis-
coveries were of paramount importance for initiating these changes. As I 
have shown above, Johannsen demonstrated that continuity may be ex-
plained within the Mendelian program, if continuous variations are con-
sidered to be environmentally produced modifications of the inheritable 
discontinuous variations. Johannsen was the first to show that the ob-
served continuous variations are fully compatible with the conception of 
a discontinuous hereditary mechanism. As a consequence the Mendelians 
came to accept continuous variations as relevant for their program, to 
the extent that they might disclose hitherto concealed discontinuous, 
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inheritable variations. To surface these variations the Mendelians adopted 
the pure line experiments as an important part of their program. The 
biometricians, on the other hand, had to face the conceptual possibility 
of discontinuous variations underlying the observable continuous varia-
tions. 
The effect was that both Mendelians and biometricians got used to 
the idea of a co-existence of discontinuous and continuous variations in 
evolutionary theory. Again, the biometricians1 growing interest in and 
investigations of a possible Mendelian explanation of continuous varia-
bility may serve as an illustration. But, of course, the biometricians 
persisted in rejecting such an explanation and the Mendelian conviction 
that evolution proceeds discontinuously was only strengthened by the 
pure line experiments. So the contrast between the programs with 
respect to the concepts 'continuous' and 'discontinuous' was only slightly 
toned down. 
A genuine reconciliation between these concepts became possible after 
several years of research in the chromosome theory and had to wait for 
the above mentioned conceptual innovation which resulted in the modern 
genotype-phenotype distinction. 
In their experiments with continuous variations, with which they 
intended to demonstrate the existence of types underlying these varia-
tions, the Mendelians encountered an increasing number of continuous 
variations which seemed to be inheritable and for which it was excluded 
that they were produced environmentally. These discoveries constituted 
serious empirical problems for the Mendelians, which, as I have shown 
above, in the end were to be solved by Muller's new version of the 
multifactorial theory: the continuous variations came to be accepted as 
inheritable, multifactorially determined variations. Muller's theory was 
easily and almost generally accepted as a plausible Mendelian explanation 
of continuous variability. Why was this the case and why were all 
earlier, more or less, tentative versions of the multifactorial theory - by 
Yule, Bateson, Pearson etc. - ignored? The answer was that only at this 
time the Mendelians had the disposal of the necessary conceptual tools 
to fathom such a theory. Muller's theory was formulated at the right 
time. He showed that discontinuity at the level of the genotype did not 
necessarily imply discontinuity at the phenotypic level. The multifactorial 
theory resolved the seeming incompatibility between continuity and dis-
continuity in evolution and heredity and reconciled genotypic 
discontinuity with phenotypic continuity. 
Thus far I have discussed the conceptual innovations which 
accompanied the changes in the Mendelian constraint-structure. We have 
seen that the changes in the biometrical constraint-structure were far 
less conspicuous and for this reason we can not expect to come across 
conceptual innovations, which are comparable to those in the Mendelian 
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program. The biometricians encountered only one important conceptual 
problem, relevant to our purposes, viz. the discovery of the compatibility 
of Mendel's laws with the law of ancestral heredity. I have argued that 
Pearson's fake solution to this problem is best interpreted as an implicit 
concession, on Pearson's part, of the value of a Mendelian explanation 
of continuous variations. 
This concession partly explains a conceptual innovation, which we 
have already met in the discussion of Pearson's 1908-paper. In that 
paper Pearson argued for a biometrical theory of determinantal inheri-
tance incorporating Mendel's theory as a limiting case. Part of his con-
clusion was that the Mendelian discontinuous variations were just "at 
one end of the scale", the biometrical continuous variations "somewhat 
further down". Here again, as in the Mendelian program, we have an 
indication of the resolution of the continuity-discontinuity in-
compatibility. 
I will end this chapter with two conclusions. First, I have shown that 
both programs converged to each other through the changes in their 
constraint-structures culminating in the acceptance by the Mendelians of 
continuous variations as inheritable and evolutionariiy relevant, and in 
the concession, on the part of the biometricians, of the value of a 
Mendelian explanation of continuous variability. Secondly, I have shown 
that this convergence also reveals itself in the conceptual innovations 
within each of the programs, which finally ended in the resolution of 
the continuity-discontinuity incompatibility in both programs. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE DARWINIAN SYNTHESIS 
Given the convergence of the Mendelian and biometrical programs, 
besides the failure of either program to solve the problem of varia-
tion as set out by their original constraints, one would expect that 
someone would raise the question whether a combination of ideas and 
methods might not give the necessary impetus to research in 
evolutionary theory. In fact, several biologists had already toyed 
with this idea almost from the time of the rediscovery of Mendel's 
laws. Yule, for instance, suggested in 1902 to combine Mendel's theory 
of heredity with Darwin's evolutionary theory. But these suggestions 
always met with unsurmountable obstacles and this time too the idea of 
a synthesis was prevented to take root by at least one important 
barrier, viz. the success of the programs at the methodological level. 
The Mendelians gained success after success in working out gene-
tics, first by refining their breeding techniques, later by adding 
chromosome research. The biometricians were no less successful in 
refining and expanding statistical methods and techniques. These 
methodological successes had a two-sided effect First, Mendelians and 
biometricians were inclined to specialize in genetics and statistics 
to the detriment of evolutionary theory, but, secondly, as far as they 
concerned themselves with evolutionary theory their research remained 
strongly restricted by the methodological constraints. Because of this 
methodological bias both Mendelians and biometricians failed to see 
any useful connection between Darwin's theory of natural selection and 
Mendel's theory of heredity. For example, despite the fact that the 
Mendelians came to accept the evolutionary relevance of small, con-
tinuous variations, they could not make much sense of them, because 
their research method was restricted to the cross-breeding of indi-
viduals. The Mendelians continued to view evolution as change in in-
dividuals instead of as change in populations. This was partly due 
also to the confusion of the notions 'heredity' and 'evolution'. I 
will show shortly that one of the innovations brought along by the 
synthesis was the disentanglement of these notions. To appreciate the 
role of small variations in evolution the Mendelians would have had to 
switch to the study of large populations of organisms and for this 
switch it would have been necessary to uncouple the theory of 
evolution from the theory of heredity. Some Mendelians - e.g., the 
American 'biometrician' R. Pearl - already used a method of 
quantitative analysis of larger populations, but this method was 
restricted to inbreeding populations. These investigations were in-
tended to support Johannsen's pure line theory, so within the 
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Mendelian program there was a strong connection between the method of 
quantitative analysis and the theory of discontinuous types. Probably 
for this reason the Mendelians never thought of applying this method 
to the study of continuous variations. 
The biometricians, on the other hand, did not see any useful con-
nection between Mendel's theory and Darwin's evolutionary theory, 
because their statistical approach to evolutionary change was 
restricted to the study of the distribution of phenotypes. While they 
had learned, to a certain extent, to appreciate the validity of the 
Mendelian explanation of heredity, they too only saw it as an 
explanation concerning individual heredity. When it came to the study of 
evolutionary change the only thing that counted was phenotypical varia-
tion. 
The success at the methodological level was an obstacle to the 
emergence of the evolutionary synthesis from within one of the pro-
grams. But again, given the convergence of the programs, besides the 
success of their methodologies, it would be reasonable for someone, not 
committed to one of the programs, to expect that a combination of 
methods might possibly give the much-needed injection to research in 
evolutionary theory. In the rest of this section I will try to show that 
R.A. Fischer was the first scientist who actually succeeded in combining 
these methods and that, therefore, his work has been crucial for 
bringing about the integration of Darwin's theory of natural selection 
and Mendel's theory of heredity. I will argue that this combination of 
the methodological constraints of the biometrical and Mendelian programs 
carried along in its wake the pooling of other, viz. empirical and meta-
physical, constraints as well. My conclusion will be that the pooling of 
these constraints into the program of population genetics is rightly 
called a synthesis of the biometrical and Mendelian programs. Fisher's 
first and major contribution to the synthesis consisted of his application 
of biometrical statistics to large populations of Mendelian factors or 
genes. In this way he removed in one fell swoop the methodological 
biases of the biometricians - towards the study of large populations of 
phenotypes - and of the Mendelians - towards the study of individual 
genotypes - as well. At the same time he was able to reap the fruits of 
these successful methods by fully employing modern statistical insights 
and new discoveries from chromosome research. 
As an undergraduate, in a talk before the Cambridge University 
Eugenics Society in 1911, Fisher already ponders a possible synthesis of 
biometrical results with Mendelian theory. Here Fisher expresses his 
opinion that "The value of biometrical work is largely due to the fact 
that the actual evolution of new species in the past is a question of 
population, and must have taken place in the way indicated by statistical 
methods".1 This is a remarkable statement, which, to my knowledge, had 
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never been expressed like this before. The biometricians hardly spoke 
about speciation; they studied evolutionary change within the species. 
Moreover, the statement suggests that biometrics has been important not 
because of its explanation of continuous variability nor because of its 
support of Darwin's theory of natural selection, but primarily because it 
indicated the only way to study evolution, viz. by the statistical analysis 
of populations. This insight pre-shadowed Fisher's later comparison of 
the theory of evolution with the theory of gases, an analogy which 
today is considered to have been partly responsible for the development 
of evolutionary theory to a full-grown scientific theory with genuine 
scientific laws and predictions. In the same paper Fisher occasionally 
touches upon the possibility of a multifactorial theory of inheritance and 
for the rest he discusses the respective merits of Mendelism and biome-
trics, but there is no indication yet of an adequate way of synthesizing 
these disciplines. 
As is well known, Fisher first brought Mendelism and biometrics 
explicitly together in his 1918-paper "The Correlation between Relatives 
on the Supposition of Mendelian Inheritance". In this paper Fisher does 
not content himself with ascertaining the compatibility of the Mendelian 
theory of inheritance with the biometrical laws, as several authors had 
done before his time. Fisher actually works out a theory in which bio-
metrical statistical conceptions, like 'paternal regression' or 'fraternal 
correlation' are explained in terms of Mendelian genetics and in which 
typically Mendelian conceptions like 'epistacy' and 'coupling' are 
approached by means of biometrical, statistical methods. By displaying 
"how these different instruments for the scientific representation of 
nature complemented each other"' Fisher laid the foundation for the 
synthesis of the biometrical and Mendelian programs. 
As I have stated above, the synthesis of the programs started with a 
combination of methods. Accordingly, the prime accomplishment of 
Fisher's 1918-paper consisted of bringing together Mendelian genetics 
and biometrical statistics to establish a new line of research: biometrical 
genetics. However, there is scarcely any mention yet of the possible 
consequences of this combination for evolutionary theory. These conse-
quences were to be investigated by Fisher in 1922 in his paper "On the 
dominance ratio". But Fisher had run the first and most important 
barrier the methodological biases of the Mendelian and biometrical pro-
grams. That this was not an easy task is nicely illustrated by Pearson's 
and Punnett's reactions which were probably responsible for the rejec-
tion of the paper by the Royal Society. Both had prudent methodological 
objections and both suggested that it should be left to the other camp 
to judge the value of the paper. 
Pearson stated that he was "unaware that any Mendelian would admit 
of an indefinitely large number (of Mendelian factors); in fact it would 
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carry that character out of the range of experiment by Mendelian 
methods". Pearson concludes "whether the paper be published or not 
should depend on Mendelian opinion ...". 4 
Punnett had to admit that he couldn't follow the paper owing to his 
ignorance of mathematics. He was unable to judge but sceptic about its 
relevance for the Mendelians. However, "as a contribution to biometry it 
may have a real value - but I am not qualified to judge it from that 
point of view".' 
Apparently Fisher's research did not fit in with the methodology of 
either of the programs and, taken in this context, there seems to be 
some truth in the story, attributed to Fisher, that the paper was 
inevitably refused because it had been sent for refereeing to "a mathe-
matician who knew no biology" and to "a biologist who knew no mathe-
matics".^ Fortunately the paper was accepted by the Royal Society of 
Edinburgh and it was well received by the few geneticists who could 
understand his mathematics. This encouraged Fisher to examine 
quantitatively the evolutionary consequences of Mendelian heredity. The 
germinal ideas for this research were to be expounded in the 1922-paper, 
which I mentioned above. By combining the methods of biometrical and 
Mendelian programs Fisher brought along a complete fusion of the 
empirical domains. This was shown, for instance, by the explanation of 
biometrical phenomena, like fraternal correlation, and Mendelian pheno-
mena, like epistacy, in terms of one theory, biometrical genetics. At the 
same time Fisher had shown "that the assumption of multiple, or 
cumulative, factors afforded a working hypothesis for the inheritance of 
such apparently continuous variations as human stature".8 In 1922 this 
hypothesis was widely accepted and supported by chromosome research, 
which had surfaced an increasing number of "characters which are 
evidently affected by many separate factors".' But one important problem 
remained to be tackled. A problem which, as I have shown, neither the 
Mendelians nor the biometricians were able to solve: Given the 
evolutionary relevance of continuous variations in a Mendelian inter-
pretation, i.e. their being determined by multiple factors, how does this 
relevance show itself in evolutionary theory? 
For Fisher it almost seemed to go without saying that this problem 
could be solved if selection and mutation were taken on the same 
footing as epistacy and coupling in his earlier paper, viz. as disturbing 
influences on the distribution of Mendelian factors in successive 
generations or, in other words, as disturbing influences on the Hardy-
Weinberg equilibrium. " Fisher finally established the relevance of con-
tinuous variations by showing the indirect influence of selection on the 
Mendelian factors determining these variations. In a sense this approach 
can be seen as a more or less obvious consequence of combining 
Mendelian genetics with biometrical statistics. But on the other hand, by 
137 
coupling the idea of selection to changes in the distribution of 
Mendelian factors Fisher introduced several conceptual innovations which 
were indispensable for the synthesis of the biometrie and Mendelian 
programs, because they made it possible to combine the remaining con-
straints of these programs. These innovations have at least been three-
fold: 
1) The idea of selection was to be detached from the phenotypical level 
and brought to bear upon genes and genotypes as well. 
2) The problem of evolution came to be conceived of as a problem 
concerning variations in the long run while the problem of heredity 
came to be conceived of as concerning variations in the short run. 
3) Consequently the concepts of heredity and evolution were finally to 
be uncoupled. 
I will discuss each of them: 
1) We have seen that the biometricians tried to demonstrate the effect 
of selection by showing a uni-directional shift in the distribution of an 
observable continuously varying property in successive generations. 
Evolution proceeded by the selection of phenotypes. The orthodox bio-
metricians did not accept the multifactorial theory of inheritance as 
relevant for evolutionary theory, partly because the idea of natural 
selection was too tightly linked to the phenotypical level. We have also 
seen that those who accepted the multifactorial theory of inheritance 
were mostly Mendelians, who were not capable of thinking of heredity 
or evolution in terms of large populations of genotypes or phenotypes. 
Fisher was the first to show in detail** how natural selection affects 
not only the statistical distribution of phenotypical properties but also, 
indirectly, the statistical distribution of genes and genotypes. So in a 
sense Fisher taught the biometricians to see the relevance of Mendelian 
genetics for evolution. The Mendelians, on the other hand, learned to 
see how natural selection might become relevant for genetics. 
2) The Mendelians did not clearly distinguish between heredity and 
evolution. Bluntly stated, they thought of evolution as a kind of deviated 
heredity. The Mendelians studied the inheritance of properties from 
individual to individual and if one of these properties mutated, they 
were studying evolution. But in order to see the evolutionary process in 
this way, it was necessary that the mutations were clearly distinguished. 
The discovery of a small variation, such as a slight change in skin-
colour, which is passed from individual to individual, could scarcely give 
them the idea that they were observing evolution. 
The biometricians already knew that small variations can only become 
evolutionarily significant, if they are accumulated in a long range of 
successive generations of large populations. But in their conception there 
was no room for Mendelian factors. Fisher's introduction of the study of 
large populations of Mendelian factors at last shaped the possibility for 
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the Mendelians - after they had accepted the inheritability of continuous 
variations - to conceive of the evolutionary process as a gradual 
accumulation of selectively advantageous Mendelian factors. The effect 
was that not only the Mendelians but most biologists came to see the 
problem of evolution as a problem concerning statistical variations in the 
long run, while the study of heredity remained the study of individual 
variations in the short run. 
3) Consequently, the concepts of heredity and evolution came to be 
unambiguously distinguished. Both the Mendelians and the biometricians 
were right in assuming from the start the interdependence of inheritance 
and evolution, but they were wrong in confusing these notions. I have 
shown how this confusion affected the Mendelian conception of 
evolution. The biometricians, too, partly identified inheritance and 
evolution. Their law of ancestral inheritance was both a law of 
inheritance and a law of evolutionary change. On the biometrical part 
this confusion affected the conception of heredity, which always 
remained a statistical conception. Inheritance was not primarily 
conceived of as the conveyance of properties from individual to 
individual. Individuals showed too much variance to be interesting from 
the biometrical viewpoint. But, like Darwin, the biometricians kept pro-
blems with explaining how occasional new variations could be 
accumulated instead of being swamped, which was much more probable in 
large populations. Fisher solved this problem by retaining the statistical 
conception of evolution but adding the Mendelian theory of heredity as 
an explanation for the maintenance of new variations. 
We are now able to see how the synthesis of biometrical statistics 
and Mendelian genetics contributed to the separation of the notions of 
heredity and evolution. Fisher made it clear that evolution concerns long 
term variations in factors and properties; heredity concerns short term 
variations in factors and properties. But heredity and evolution remain 
interdependent not only because inherited factors and properties are the 
'stuff of evolution1 but also because evolution can only take place if 
there is stability of factors and properties on the individual level. 
Given the conceptual innovations which accompanied the fusion of 
Mendelian and biometrical methodologies and the beginning of Fisher's 
research of the effect of selection on populations of Mendelian factors 
or genes, there was no longer any obstacle to the pooling of the 
remaining constraints of the Mendelian and biometrical programs. 
In chapter I I have divided the contrasting constraint-structures of 
the Mendelian and biometrical programs each into five mutually con-
nected constraints. Until now we have followed the changes in four of 
these constraints. I have shown that the epistemologica! constraints were 
gradually weakened under the influence of scientific developments. They 
ceased to play an important heuristic role in the further development of 
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the programs. By the time of the publication of Fisher's 1918-paper most 
biologists, with a few exceptions, simply accepted the reality and the 
materiality of Mendelian factors, largely because chromosome research 
had shown them to be real and material. 
With respect to the central constraints we have seen that the 
Mendelian constraint on the size of the variations was gradually 
abandoned and that the Mendelian discontinuity-constraint was gradually 
weakened so as to comprise in the end only the discontinuity of 
Mendelian factors and genes. The biometrica! constraint on the size of 
the variations remained unchanged, but the continuity-constraint changed 
as far as that the biometricians had to concede the compatibility of 
discontinuous factors with continuous variations. 
The successful methodological constraints were fused by the 
combination of biometrical statistics and Mendelian genetics into biome-
trica! genetics, Fisher's method to study large populations of Mendelian 
factors or genes. This combination of methods brought along a complete 
fusion of the empirical domains and consequently a union of the 
empirical constraints of both programs. 
Sofar I have almost completely neglected one pair of important con-
straints, the metaphysical constraints. The reason for this neglect is the 
absence of any clear indications that these constraints have been 
changed during these developments. On the other hand they cannot have 
remained unaffected. For instance, the discovery by the Mendelians of 
evolutionarily relevant variations which were not constitutive of new 
species must have had an influence on their typological world-view. 
Anyway, now that I have discussed the fusion of the methodological and 
empirical constraints as the first steps in the synthesis of the programs, 
I shall also have to show what happened to the metaphysical constraints. 
After that there will be no problem to show how and why the remains 
of the central constraints were brought together to constitute the 
complete synthesis of the programs into the program of population 
genetics. 
At first sight there seems to be only one plausible story with respect 
to the metaphysical constraints. In Fisher's biometrical genetics and in 
his research of the effect of selection on the distribution of Mendelian 
factors, all mention of types seems to be abandoned. All variations, 
phenotypical or genotypical, are studied by means of statistical methods 
and evolutionary change concerns statistical variations in the long run. 
So the Mendelian typological world-view gave way in favour of the 
biometrical statistical world-view. Though, of course, there is much truth 
in it, this is too simplified a story. I think that, even if it would go too 
far to claim that the Mendelian and biometrical world-views equally 
contributed to the synthesis, at least it can be argued that the biome-
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trical statistica! world-view was to be modified by the Mendelian world-
view. In order to show this I will have to go back in history again. 
Bateson started his program, which was to become the Mendelian pro-
gram to solve the 'Problem of Variation' left behind by Darwin. Darwin 
had not been able to convince his contemporaries that small varations 
were inheritable and, on the assumption of their inheritability, that they 
would not be swamped in two or three generations. Bateson set out to 
solve the problem of variation by assuming that small variations are 
irrelevant for evolution and that evolution proceeds by 'jumps' between 
'types'. Only types were stable enough to avoid swamping. So the typo-
logical world-view was partially supported by scientific reasons. This 
world-view in itself remained unchanged during the development of the 
Mendelian program, but, repeatedly, opinions had to be changed about 
which entities were to be considered as types. Thus we have been seen 
that Bateson's species-types had to be replaced by Johannsen's types, 
signifying discontinuous variations underlying the observable continuous 
variations; these were later to be called geno-'types'; chromosome re-
search finally splitted up the genotype into separate genes, which still in 
a sense could be considered as types until it was discovered that one 
property could be determined by several genes or that one gene could 
contribute to the determination of several properties. 
This development, as I described it, can of course, only be seen as a 
serious excavation of the concept 'types'. But I want to point out one 
common aspect of all these successive 'types': all these entities were 
considered to be stable and to remain the same through successive 
generations. From the Mendelian view-point this was an essential 
characteristic for any variation to be evolutionarily relevant. It was the 
stability of types that from the start provided a solution the problem of 
variation. So the scientific reasons for maintaining a typological world-
view, in the end being more or less independent of that world-view, still 
remained valid. It was this part of the Mendelian world-view which was 
to modify biometrical population-thinking. 
In chapter I I have shown that in the biometrical world-picture no 
entity - only observable entities were admitted - was considered to be 
of the same nature as any other entity. From individual to individual 
there was always variation. There was only 'statistical sameness'. So 
with respect to individual inheritance, e.g. from father on son, no 
property would remain the same; there would only be correlation. This 
view seemed to make the biometricians particularly vulnerable to the 
objection, that every new variation - if it was possible to speak of new 
variations - would disappear in the next generation. The biometricians 
never produced a satisfactory answer to this objection.1^ But, on the 
other hand, they did not really have to answer. They were able to show 
the actual effect of selection on the distribution of observable properties 
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in successive generations and that was enough. Any objection that 
selection was only possible because of the presence of stable factors, 
could be shoved aside as an illegal attempt to give causal explanations. 
But for every instrumentalist there will come a day that he will have to 
accept a causal explanation, albeit often in the guise of a more economic 
description of observable phenomena. So too with the biometricians: they 
had to accept the Mendelian theory as a valid explanation of inheri-
tance. 
We have seen above that Fisher draw the consequences and combined 
Mendelian genetics with biometrical statistics. He saw the value of the 
biometrical world-picture as "due to the fact that the evolution of new 
species in the past is a question of population, and must have taken 
place in the way indicated by statistical methods". But he also saw the 
value of the Mendelian theory of heredity, as he particularly makes clear 
in the first chapter of his book The genetica! theory of natural selection 
(1930), primarily because it took away the objections against the theory 
of natural selection. The multifactorial theory safeguarded the main-
tenance of even small variations in large populations. But the admittance 
of stable entities, which can be similar to each other and which remain 
the same through successive generations, also implied a modification of 
the biometrical world-view. So we are justified to conclude that Fisher's 
synthesis of methodological constraints also brought along a partial 
fusion of the metaphysical constraints, at least in so far as that Fisher 
adopted the biometrical world-view as modified by the Mendelian world-
view. 
The last constraints to be mentioned with respect to the synthesis of 
the programs are the central constraints on continuity and discontinuity 
in evolution. Against the background of the fusion of the methodological 
and metaphysical constraints it was no longer difficult to see the 
heuristic promise of combining the central constraints too. Methodo-
logically and metaphysically there were no longer any reasons for the 
representatives of both programs to stick to their central constraints, 
Given the conceptual innovations, that I discussed above, the Mendelians 
were able to recognize that their claim that variations have to be dis-
continuous to be evolutionarily relevant was to be preserved in the sense 
that discontinuity remained a necessary characteristic of genotypic 
variations to safeguard the stability of the inherited variations. Discon-
tinuity concerns variations in the short run at the genotypical level, but 
it is also a necessary precondition for evolution to take place. The 
relevance of the discontinuity-theory of inheritance for the preservation 
of variability in the evolutionary process is nicely illustrated by the 
following quotation from Fishen " The particulate (i.e. discontinuity-) 
theory of inheritance resembles the kinetic theory of gases with its 
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perfectly elastic collisions, whereas the blending theory resembles a 
theory of gases with inelastic collisions, and in which some outside 
agency would be required to be continually at work to keep the particles 
astir"/3 
The biometrical continuity-constraint was to be preserved in the 
sense that the evolutionary process concerns continuous - long term -
variations in the distribution of - continuous or discontinuous - phenoty-
pical variations. The multifactorial explanation of - short term - con-
tinuous phenotypical variations is only part of this wider conception of 
evolution as a continuous process based on statistical fluctuations in 
variability. 
By combining these constraints alongside the constraints, already 
mentioned, Fisher established the program of population genetics. And in 
fact Fisher already partly fulfilled the heuristic promise of this fusion 
by providing a solution to the 'Problem of Variation' which was 
acceptable to most biologists. 
Fisher's solution of the problem of variation opened the gate for the 
vindication of the Darwinian theory of evolution in terms of Mendelian 
genetics. This was the aim of the program of population genetics. After 
the early papers which primarily concerned the problem of variation 
Fisher started to devote himself fully to the Darwinian theory of 
evolution in his book The genetical theory of natural selection. 
So now we are justified to conclude that the Darwinian synthesis, 
which found its incipience in the establishment of population genetics, is 
rightly called a 'synthesis', because it consisted of the pooling of the 
most important constraints of the rival biometrical and Mendelian pro-
grams. It should be emphasized, though, that Fisher's program was only 
the start of a process, in which the synthesis was to be extended to 
form the 'modern evolutionary synthesis', in which, among other things, 
population genetics came to be applied in different biological disciplines. 
Moreover, Fisher's population genetics was soon to be modified by, e.g., 
alternative, partly non-Darwinian accounts of speciation (cf. the in-
fluence of Sewall Wright) or alternative, again partly non-Darwinian, 
accounts of the preservation of variability in populations. However, at 
least with respect to intra species evolution, Provine's conclusion that a 
consensus concerning the mechanism of evolution appeared during the 
1920-1950 period, is fully justified. 
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SUMMARY 
Few philosophers of science have fully endorsed - although many 
have approved of - Quine's view that there is no place for a prior 
philosophy. Sympathy was restrained because it was strongly felt that 
Quine went too far with his verdict that philosophers should refrain 
from all attempts to justify knowledge. Surely, it was argued, empiri-
cal explanations alone cannot be sufficient; for one thing, we already 
need some criterion (or foundation or 'first philosophy') to rationa-
lly choose between the rival theories that will be generated to em-
pirically explain our knowledge. Some justification will be necessary 
from the start if relativism is to be avoided. 
In this conflict both Quine and his critics seem to have tacitly 
presupposed that any justification of knowledge is necessarily linked 
to an 'indubitable' foundation of knowledge. It is my view that such a 
presupposition is unwarranted and this view has served as the starting 
point of my study: If it can be shown that the justification needs no 
foundation of knowledge then, perhaps. Quine will be prepared to ac-
cept 'justificationalism' as a healthy philosophical enterprise and 
his critics will be prepared to reject 'foundationalism' as a curious 
relic from traditional philosophy. 
To this purpose I have argued that our scientific knowledge can be 
justified - in principle - by means of a detailed empirical study of 
the history of science or rather the history of ideas. If such a study 
shows that there has been progress both in science and in scientific 
rationality, then we can explain the confidence we have in our present 
ideas about rationality and this explanation will simultaneously serve as 
a justification of this confidence. 
One major problem for this truly naturalist conception of science - in 
a sense the 'ought' is indeed derived from the 'is' - is, of course, the 
demonstration of progress in rationality. It seems that, again, we would 
need some criteria to assess this progress with and if these criteria are 
also taken to be non-foundational or subject to change we will end up 
inan infinite regress. 
However, such regress can be avoided if we accept a 'bootstrap 
theory of rationality'. The central idea of this theory is that science and 
scientific rationality are assessed with respect to each other Not only 
do we use our rational standards to guide our scientific research, but we 
also learn from science which rational standards we should adopt. Doing 
science we learn how to improve the rational standards and methodologi-
cal rules which in turn will be employed to improve our scientific re-
search. "In other words, through pursuing aims and articulating compet-
ing theories we can actually learn to pursue aims and compare competing 
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theories more rationally. Or to put it more colourfully - we can pull 
ourselves up by our own bootstraps." ' 
In the first part of this study I have shown how this bootstrap-
phenomenon can be demonstrated if science is conceived of as a dis-
covery-process in which scientists try to find solutions - e.g. theories -
to problems, guided by the constraints on the problem-situation. At any 
time during this process scientists may encounter conceptual problems 
that are best resolved by means of a readjustment of the constraints -
which include the rational standards - to the state of their science at 
that time. I have cited many examples from the history of science which 
supported this conception of scientific development by actually 
demonstrating the feed-back of science on the rational standards govern-
ing that science. 
The case-study in part II is another illuminating example, this time 
worked out in detail. It appears that the Mendelism-biometry controversy 
supports the naturalist conception of science in many respects. Not only 
does it show that science is essentially a discovery-process in which 
scientists also discover how to discover problem-solutions by reshaping 
their standards in the course of their research, but the study also in-
dicates how progress in science and rationality can be achieved if initi-
ally disagreeing scientists reach a consensus both about specific scienti-
fic theories and about the rational standards that should govern their 
research. Although the views of the Mendelians and biometricians on the 
possible solution of the problem of variation had already converged to 
each other under the influence of their scientific research, it was only 
by pooling the remaining methodological, metaphysical and biological 
constraints of both programs that an adequate solution could be achieved 
that accounted for the hereditary and evolutionary relevance of both 
discontinuous variations at the genotypical level and continuous varia-
tions at the phenotypical level. So it was only after the fusion of some 
of the rational standards governing scientific research that scientists 
also came to agree about the solution of the problem of variation. More-
over, it was only through the influence of science on the con-
straint-structures of both programs that such a fusion became possible in 
the first place. 
Research in evolutionary theory got a strong impulse from the es-
tablishment of the program of population genetics. I have argued that 
this impulse is largely due to changes on the level of rational standards. 
To support my view that these changes also constituted progress in 
rationality - with respect to evolutionary theory - further research will 
be necessary. But a strong indication that there has been such progress 
indeed is already available in the view, shared by biologists, historians 
and philosophers alike, that evolutionary theory could only reach 
'maturity' after the biologists had adopted the statistical (biometrica!) 
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approach for the study of populations of (Mendelian) stable genes (or 
'types').2 
This statistical outlook, characterized by Mayr as 'population 
thinking', constitutes an important rational constraint on research in 
modern evolutionary theory. I believe to have shown that the biologists' 
confidence in this constraint is largely explained and justified - apart 
from the internal justification it receives from the success with which 
the constraint guides research - by the way in which the constraint 
emerged from the interaction between science and scientific rationality 
in the previous biological history. 
This case-study should therefore be seen as a contribution to the 
detailed historical investigations that will be necessary to explain and 
justify the confidence we have in the standards that govern present-day 
science or rather in the different - content-specific - standards that 
nowadays govern different scientific disciplines. 
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SAMENVATTING 
Consensusvorming in de wetenschap: Een naturalistische benadering van 
de Darwiniaanse synthese 
Ofschoon Quine's opvatting, dat er geen plaats meer is voor een 
'prior philosophy', door vele wetenschapsfilosofen welwillend werd 
ontvangen, werd zij slechts zelden volledig onderschreven. De sympa-
thie-betuigingen waren terughoudend, omdat men sterk het gevoel had, 
dat Quine lever ging met zijn oordeel dat filosofen zich zouden moeten 
weerhouden van alle pogingen om kennis te rechtvaardigen. Empirische 
verklaringen zonder meer, zo ging het argument, kunnen toch niet 
voldoende zijn; we zullen op zijn minst een criterium (of grondslag of 
'first philosophy') nodig hebben om een rationele keuze te kunnen 
maken tussen de concurrerende theorieën, die ontwikkeld zullen worden 
ter empirische verklaring van onze kennis. Om relativisme te vermijden 
zal enige rechtvaardiging van het begin af noodzakelijk zijn. 
Zowel Quine als zijn critici lijken in dit conflict stilzwijgend te 
hebben aangenomen dat elke rechtvaardiging van de kennis noodzakelij-
kerwijs verbonden is met een Ontwijfelbare' fundering van de kennis. 
In mijn visie is een dergelijke vooronderstelling ongewettigd en deze 
visie vormde het uitgangspunt van mijn onderzoek: Als aangetoond kan 
worden dat rechtvaardiging geen fundering van de kennis behoeft, dan 
zal Quine misschien bereid zijn 'justificationalism' te accepteren 
als een gezonde filosofische onderneming en zullen zijn critici mis-
schien bereid zijn 'foundationalism' te verwerpen als een curieus 
overblijfsel uit de traditionele filosofie. 
Met dit doel voor ogen heb ik geargumenteerd, dat onze wetenschap-
pelijke kennis - in principe - gerechtvaardigd kan worden door middel 
van een gedetailleerd empirisch onderzoek van de wetenschapsgeschiede-
nis of, meer nog, de ideeëngeschiedenis. Als een dergelijk onderzoek 
laat zien dat er vooruitgang is geweest in zowel de wetenschap als de 
wetenschappelijke rationaliteit, dan kunnen we een verklaring geven voor 
het vertrouwen dat we hebben in onze huidige ideeën over rationaliteit 
en deze verklaring zal tegelijkertijd dienen als een rechtvaardiging van 
dit vertrouwen. 
Een groot probleem voor deze waarlijk naturalistische wetenschapsop-
vatting - in zekere zin wordt 'ought' inderdaad van 'is' afgeleid - is 
natuurlijk het aantonen van progressie in de rationaliteit. Het lijkt erop, 
dat we opnieuw criteria nodig hebben om deze vooruitgang te taxeren en 
indien ook deze criteria als niet-fundamenteel worden beschouwd en zij 
onderhevig kunnen zijn aan verandering, dan lijken we in een oneindige 
regressie te geraken. 
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Zo'n regressie kan echter vermeden worden als we een 'bootstrap 
theory of rationality1 accepteren. Het centrale idee van deze theorie is 
dat wetenschap en wetenschappelijke rationaliteit met betrekking tot 
elkaar beoordeeld worden: Enerzijds gebruiken we onze rationele maat-
staven om het wetenschappelijk onderzoek te sturen, anderzijds leren we 
van de wetenschap welke rationele maatstaven we moeten hanteren. 
Tijdens het wetenschappelijk onderzoek ontdekken we hoe de rationele 
maatstaven en methodologische regels kunnen worden verbeterd; deze 
verbeterde maatstaven en regels worden op hun beurt gebruikt om het 
onderzoek bij te sturen. 'In other words, through pursuing aims and 
articulating competing theories we can actually learn to pursue aims 
and compare competing theories more rationally. Or to put it more 
colourfully - we can pull ourselves up by our own bootstraps."* 
In het eerste gedeelte van deze studie heb ik laten zien hoe dit 
'bootstrap'-fenomeen kan worden aangetoond, als wetenschap beschouwd 
wordt als een ontdekkingsproces, waarin wetenschappers trachten oplos-
singen - bv. theorieën - voor problemen te vinden onder geleide van de 
constraints op de probleem-situatie. Op elk tijdstip gedurende dit proces 
kunnen wetenschappers conceptuele problemen tegenkomen, die het best 
kunnen worden opgelost door middel van een aanpassing van de con-
straints - waartoe ook de rationele maatstaven behoren - aan de stand 
van de wetenschap op dat moment. Ik heb vele voorbeelden uit de we-
tenschapsgeschiedenis aangehaald die deze opvatting van wetenschappe-
lijke ontwikkeling ondersteunen door inderdaad een feed-back van de 
wetenschap op de rationele maatstaven te laten zien. 
De case-study in deel Π is nog een illustratief voorbeeld, deze keer 
in details uitgewerkt. Het blijkt dat de controverse tussen Mendelianen 
en biometrici de naturalistische wetenschapsopvatting in vele opzichten 
ondersteunt. Ze toont niet alleen aan, dat wetenschap in de grond een 
ontdekkings-proces is, waarin wetenschappers ook ontdekken hoe ze 
probleem-oplossingen ontdekken door hun maatstaven in de loop van het 
onderzoek bij te schaven; de case-study laat bovendien zien hoe vooruit­
gang in wetenschap en rationaliteit verkregen kan worden, wanneer we­
tenschappers, die het aanvankelijk oneens zijn, een consensus bereiken 
zowel over specifieke wetenschappelijke theorieën als over de rationele 
maatstaven die hun onderzoek moeten sturen. 
Ofschoon de opvattingen van de Mendelianen en de biometrici over de 
mogelijke oplossing van het probleem van de variatie reeds onder invloed 
van hun wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar elkaar toe waren gegroeid, kon 
slechts door het samenbrengen van de overgebleven methodologische, 
metafysische en biologische constraints van beide programma's een 
adequate oplossing worden verkregen, die rekenschap gaf van de erfelijke 
en evolutionaire relevantie van zowel de discontinue variaties op het 
genotypische niveau als van de continue variaties op het fenotypische 
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niveau. Alleen nadat enkele van de rationele maatstaven betreffende het 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek waren samengevoegd, konden de wetenschap-
pers tot een overeenstemming komen over de oplossing van het pro-
bleem van de variatie. Bovendien werd deze samenvoeging pas mogelijk 
door een voorafgaande invloed van de wetenschap op de constraints van 
beide programma's. 
Het onderzoek in de evolutie-theorie kreeg een sterke impuls door 
het tot stand brengen van het programma van de populatie genetica. Ik 
heb betoogd, dat deze impuls grotendeels te danken is aan veranderingen 
op het niveau van de rationele maatstaven. Verder onderzoek zal nood-
zakelijk zijn om steun te geven aan mijn opvatting dat deze veranderin-
gen ook vooruitgang in de rationaliteit - met betrekking tot de evolutie-
theorie - tot stand brachten. Maar we beschikken reeds over een sterke 
aanwijzing, dat een dergelijke vooruitgang heeft plaatsgevonden, in de 
visie - die gedeeld wordt door biologen, historici en filosofen - dat de 
evolutie-theorie slechts Volwassen' kon worden, nadat de biologen een 
statistische (biometrische) benadering voor het bestuderen van populaties 
van (Mendeliaanse) stabiele genen (of 'types') hadden aangenomen. 
Deze statistische benadering, door Mayr gekarakteriseerd als 'popula-
tion thinking', vormt een belangrijke rationele constraint op het onder-
zoek in de evolutie-theorie. Met deze studie heb ik willen laten zien, dat 
het vertrouwen van de biologen in deze constraint grotendeels verklaard 
en gerechtvaardigd kan worden - afgezien van de interne rechtvaardiging 
die het verkrijgt door het succes waarmee de constraint het onderzoek 
stuurt - vanuit de manier waarop de constraint tevoorschijn kwam uit de 
interactie tussen wetenschap en wetenschappelijke rationaliteit in de 
voorafgaande biologische geschiedenis. 
Deze case-study moet daarom gezien worden als een bijdrage aan het 
gedetailleerde historische onderzoek, dat nodig zal zijn om een verkla-
ring en een rechtvaardiging te geven voor het vertrouwen dat we hebben 
in de maatstaven die de huidige wetenschap sturen of, om precies te 
zijn, voor het vertrouwen dat we hebben in de verschillende - van de 
inhoud afhankelijke - maatstaven, die in de diverse wetenschappelijke 
disciplines worden gehanteerd. 
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description is that abduction appears to have been a reliable method 
thusfar and therefore strong specific doubts about its reliability have 
to be raised before it will be rejected as a research-method. 
7. Cf. Laudan 1984, p. 65. 
8. Cf. Laudan's "refutation" of convergent realism. Laudan 1981. 
9. Cf. Cutting's remark in the discussion of Shapere's paper in Nickles 
1980a, p. 102. 
10. Derksen 1985. 
11. Cf. Laudan 1984. 
12. I will discuss this possibility in section 2. 
13. Laudan 1984. 
14. Ibid., p. 47. 
15. Ibid., p. 48. 
16. Ibid., chapter I. 
17. There is no need to assume that the original contestants come to an 
agreement. Even if each scientist retains his beliefs against all 
evidence to the contrary (the so-called Planck-principle, cf. Laudan 
1984, p. 18 note 24), we still have to explain why younger scientists 
adopt other beliefs either within the same program or in switching 
to another program or we have to explain as in our case why 
younger scientists can come to an agreement. 
18. This, I will argue in part II, happened to the competing Mendelian 
and biometrie programs. 
19. Laudan 1984. 
20. Cf. Lugg 1980. 
21. Cf. Doppelt 1978. 
22. Cf. section IV. 1. 
23. The label comes from Bloor 1976. 
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24. Roil-Hansen 1980, p. S02. 
25. Bloor 1976, p. 4-5. 
26. Cf. Trigg 1978. 
27. Cf. Barnes1 impertinent critique of Roll-Hansen's 1980-paper, Barnes 
1980. 
28. Cf. Laudan 1981b and McMullin 1984. 
29. Whenever a scientist or philosopher posits some rule or aim as basic 
to science or as constitutive of scientific reasoning, the sociologist 
can always ask why this particular rule or aim is accepted. If such 
rules or aims are not rationally negotiable, then apparently this 
acceptance is not caused by reasons, but by other causes, e.g. social 
determinants. On the other hand, if it can be shown that all scien­
tists accept a common aim of science, as e.g. the acquisition of 
reliable knowledge about the world (cf. section Г .1), then the 
sociologist will be unable to explain such a wide-spread agreement in 
terms of social causes. 
30. McMullin 1984. 
31. Cf. Bloor 1976 and Barnes 1976. 
32. Newton-Smith 1981, p. 249. 
33. McMullin 1984, p. 152. 
34. Forman 1971. 
35. Farley and Geison 1974. 
36. Harwood 1976-77. 
37. Mackenzie and Barnes 1975 and 1979; Mackenzie 1981. 
38. Cf. Derksen 1985. 
39. Hendry 1980. 
40. Roll-Hansen 1983. 
41. Roll-Hansen 1980. 
42. Bloor 1976. 
43. Cf. Boon 1983. 
44. Pearson 1902, p. 321. 
45. Mackenzie and Barnes 1975 and 1979. 
46. Mackenzie 1981. 
47. Coleman 1970. 
PART II 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Mayr and Provine 1980. 
2. Provine 1980, p. 399. 
3. Cf. Shapere 1980b for a discussion of the meaning of the 
'evolutionary synthesis'. 
4. Laudan 1984, p. 23. 
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CHAPTER I 
1. Cf. chapter III part I and note 14 of that chapter. 
2. Nickles 1980d, p. 285. 
3. Cf. Laudan 1977a. 
4. Cf. Nickles 1980d and Laudan 1977a, p. 59. 
5. The discovery by the Pythagoreans of the irrationality of the num-
ber of the diagonal of the square is a good example of a theoretical 
development which appeared to be incompatible with the constraints 
on the scientific program to which it belonged. The irrationality of 
V2 was clearly in conflict with the Pythagorean conviction that any 
measure could eventually be reduced to integers. This conviction was 
part of the most important constraint on the Pythagorean program, 
viz.their metaphysical view of the world as expressible in terms of 
integral numbers and their proportions. 
6. Cf. Einstein's recognition and subsequent resolution of the ambiguity 
in the term 'simultaneity' which can be seen as a response to the 
problems that were posed to the Newtonian program by Maxwell's 
electromagnetic field theory. 
7. Chapter IV part I. 
8. Quoted in Provine 1971, p. 12. 
9. Ibid., p. 12. 
10. Strictly speaking, it was only Bateson's program at the time. This 
program became the Mendelian program after 1900. Since I will 
primarily discuss the program as it existed after 1900, I hope the 
reader will excuse me if I continue to speak of the Mendelian pro-
gram. 
11. Cf. Cock 1973 and Carlson 1966, p. 5-8. Bateson already began 
breeding experiments in 1897, but it was not clear to him yet how 
they would contribute to his program. Mendel's experiments finally 
provided the method to demonstrate the discontinuous and 
saltationary character of evolution. Cf.Provine 1971. 
12. Of course, this classification of constraints is not exhaustive. 
Neither is it mutually exclusive. The Mendelian epistemologica! con-
straint, e.g., might have been classified as metaphysical as well. I 
have called this contraint epistemologica!, because I wanted to con-
trast Mendelian non-materialistic realism to biometrical phenomena-
lism, the latter being rightly classified as epistemologica!. 
13. Although, formulated in this way, the connection seems obvious, it 
was one of the main causes of much confusion within the Mendelian 
program and in the controversy between Mendelians and biometrics. 
In Chapter II it will be shown how Bateson contributed to this con-
fusion. 
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14. Readers of the manuscript have pointed out that the label 
'Mendelians' can be misleading. My main motive to continue the 
application of this label was to join an already existing tradition 
(started by Pearson and Fisher and still persistent in the discussions 
about the 'Mendelism-biometry controversy')· In this tradition the 
'Mendelians' are those biologists who accepted Mendel's theory of 
heredity and believed that this theory was strongly supportive of the 
saltationary theory of evolution (or at least refuted the theory of 
gradual evolution). This implies that many (mendelian) geneticists are 
not 'Mendelians', among them de Vries, Baur, Lock, Nillson-Ehle and 
probably Correns and Tschermak. Those who can be called 
Mendelians are Bateson and his co-workers Saunders, Hurst and 
Punnett. Johannsen. Pearl, Jennings and Morgan were strongly 
affiliated with the Mendelian program, because they accepted all or 
most of the constraints of the program. With respect to Bateson, 
Johannsen and Morgan, the most important Mendelians, I will more 
extensively explain how each of them subscribed to the constraints 
of the program. 
15. It should be mentioned here that studying Bateson's writing one will 
repeatedly come across the term 'races'. Although it seems as if 
Bateson wanted to distinguish between species and sub-species, he 
never clarifies the evolutionary status of these 'races'. But whether 
or not 'races' are to be interpreted as sub-species, this does not 
have any consequences for my arguments. The reader simply sub-
stitutes sub-species for species. The point remains that, according to 
the Mendelians evolution proceeds by 'jumps' between species or 
sub-species. All intermediate variations were considered to be 
non-inheritable and irrelevant for evolution. 
16. Cf. for more indications Hull 1973 and Mayr 1973 and 1980. 
17. Roll-Hansen 1978. 
18. Mayr 1973 and 1980. 
19. Analogously the representatives of the (neo-)classical theory in 
population genetics could be seen as typologists. According to the 
(neo-)classical theory there are few genetica! differences between 
the members of one species, all of them being mainly homozygous 
and more or less sharing the same genotype. This view, however, 
does not make the (neo-)classicists essentialists. The (neo-)classicists 
would explain the typological distribution in terms of, e.g., the 
selection pressures acting on the population. A real essentialist does 
not and can not explain types, he only uses them as explanatory. 
See also E. Sober 1980, for a comprehensive and subtle analysis of 
the role of essentialism in evolutionary theories. 
20. E.g. the absence of any intermediate forms between species in the 
paleontológica! record. 
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21. Provine 1971, p. 35-45. 
22. Pearson 1892. 
23. Pearson was probably influenced by Mach with whom he corres­
ponded. Cf. Thiele 1969. 
24. For a comprehensive analysis of the philosophical position of the 
biometricians, cf. Norton 1975a and 1975b. 
25. The development of sophisticated statistical theories by the biome­
tricians probably has had a decisive influence on establishing the 
mode of thinking which May г has dubbed 'population thinking*. 
'Population thinkers' take variability in its own right. They make 
no attempts to reduce variability by explaining variations as devia­
tions from invariable types. 
26. The multi-factorial theory was already formulated in 1902 by Udny 
Yule, but ignored by most biologists at that time. Yule suggested 
that Mendel's laws and the law of ancestral heredity were not really 
imcompatible with each other. Mendelism could account for con­
tinuous variations if it was assumed that these variations were 
determined by a number of Mendelian factors. Discontinuous varia­
tion in one of these factors then gave the appearance of continuous 
variation at the observable level. 
27. Pearson showed that, if it was assumed that, e.g., stature depended 
on a large number of Mendelian factors and if it was assumed, 
moreover, that complete dominance was not necessary in the 
Mendelian interpetation, then the average correlation in stature 
between, e.g., father and son was 0,5 in the Mendelian interpre­
tation, similar to the value found in the biometrie interpretation. If, 
however, the assumption of complete dominance is necessary in the 
Mendelian interpretation, then the value of the correlation between 
father and son predicted by Mendel's laws appeared to be 0,3. 
Because of this last derivation Pearson persisted in rejecting the 
Mendelian theory of heredity. 
28. Cf. Bateson 1902. Instances are found throughout the whole book. 
29. Norton 1975b. 
30. See for a further discussion chapter IV. 
31. Darden also sees a close connection between these views though not 
for the same reasons mentioned here. Cf. Darden 1977. 
32. Morgan 1910, quoted in Coleman 1970, p. 236. 
33. Coleman 1970, p.241. 
"He (Bateson) insisted that a theory of heredity should account for 
development as well as transmission of characters" Darden 1977,p.98. 
"...Bateson's inalterable demands upon any theory of inheritance: it 
must explain development as well as heredity and variation..." 
Coleman 1970, p.261. 
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34. Cf. Roll-Hansen 1978b. Since Johannsen distinguished between geno-
type and phenotype, one would expect that he would have some 
clear ideas about the independency of transmission genetics and 
developmental genetics. However, clear ideas about such a distinction 
are lacking throughout his work. On the contrary, in 1923, in a 
discussion of obsolete conceptions in genetics, he wrote:" - the 
worst of all these relics is probably the expression Transmission 
where no transmission exists but where continuity is found." What 
Johannsen really wanted to dismiss here remains unclear, but his 
stress on continuity fits well into the main theme of this article, 
viz. the defense of a holist, Aristotelian conception of development 
in which properties are seen as imperfect actualisations of ideal 
forms. For Johannsen, as for the other Mendelians, factors are not 
translated in properties, they already are the (ideal) properties 
which only have to be (imperfectly) actualized. 
35. Cf. Carlson 1966. 
36. It is difficult to get a clear picture of this conception. In some way 
the inherited factors-properties were unfolded or made visible during 
development. One is repeatedly reminded of the Aristotelian 
actualization of potentialities'. But, although this was actually the 
view of Johannsen, such an interpretation would be a distortion of 
Bateson's and Morgan's conceptions of heredity and development. 
37. Allen makes the same point T o Morgan and others the invocation 
of material particles as the bearers of hereditary information from 
one generation to another seemed to go back to the old idea of 
preformed 'character' in the germ plasm." G.E. Allen, 1975,p. 54. See 
also A.L. Baxter, 1976. 
38. The resultant conceptual problems and the solution to these problems 
will be dealt with in chapter III. 
39. This is not to imply that the Mendelians never made statistical 
analyses of populations. But, compared to biometry, the populations 
were small and the statistics elementary. More importantly, whenever 
it came to the study of evolution the Mendelians were primarily 
interested in individual 'mutations'. 
40. Norton 1975a. 
41. Perhaps I am taking the term 'physiological* too literally. 
'Physiological' might be interpreted here as only designating a level 
lying lower (viz. the level of the Mendelian factors) than the 
phenomenological level. Interestingly, Norton mentions this 
distinction as the main reason why the Medelism-biometry conflict is 
often seen as a phony conflict. Both programs operating on different 
levels, no real conflict could develop. 
Norton then proceeds to argue, against this view, that the conflict 
ceases to be phony - or subject to psychological explanations -, if 
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one pays attention to the metaphysical and methodological 
differences between the programs. In the present study I have 
gratefully made use of Norton's analysis of the metaphysical and 
methodological presuppositions in the biometrie program. 
42. Mayr 1980. 
43. Cf. Provine 1971, p. 56-89; Mackenzie 1981, p. 120-152 and Froggat and 
Nevin 1971, p. 17-23. 
CHAPTER II 
1. Cf. Pearson's reaction to the multiple factor theory, chapter I. 
2. Bateson 1894 and 1897. 
3. Bateson 1894, p. 18. 
4. Ibid., p. 18. 
5. Ibid., p. 42. 
6. Remember that 'size' was already implicitly defined in such a way, 
that a variation was Marge' if it was constitutive of a new species. 
7. Bateson 1894, p. 69; Bateson 1897, p. 347; Bateson 1898, p. 358 and 
Bateson 1902, p. 18. 
Perhaps Bateson had some sort of 'little species' in mind. Cf. Lock's 
statement "It may be safely concluded that a very large part, if not 
the whole, of evolution has taken place by the discontinuous method. 
New little species - Jordan's species - arise, then, from time to 
time, each at a single step, from pre-existing species". Lock 1906, p. 
322. 
8. Darden 1977, p. 91. 
9. Provine 1971, p. 69. 
10. Cf.note 6. 
11. Weldon 1902. 
12. Cf. also Weldon 1902-03. Here Weldon makes the same point about 
the 'shades of green' in the Mendelian peas. 
13. Provine 1971, p. 72. 
14. Cf. Roll-Hansen 1978b, p. 214. 
15. Johannsen 1909, p. 178-179. 
16. Johannsen 1903, p. 8. 
17. Roll-Hansen 1978b, p. 221. 
18. Ibid., p. 204. Johannsen also subscribed to the other constraints of 
the Mendelian program: He was an (Aristotelian) typologist with 
respect to the species-concept (Roll-Hansen 1978b); he had a realist, 
but non-materialist conception of genetic factors (which he still 
defended in his 1923-paper) and with respect to methodology his 
emphasis lay on the study of individual, biological differences (as he 
repeatedly pointed out to the biometricians). 
19. Johannsen 1909, p. 178. 
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20. Johannsen 1903, English translation, quoted in Provine 1971, p. 94. 
The phrase "quite up to the type of the line" may sound puzzling. It 
should be understood as meaning that the regression goes completely 
back to the type of the line. The type of the line is given by the 
normal distribution of characters in a pure line, which remains con­
stant in successive generations. 
21. There is some difference of opinion about the question how long 
Johannsen continued to believe that individual or continuous varia­
tions were non-inheritable and irrelevant for evolution. In his article 
"Does hybridization increase fluctuating variability?" (Johannsen 
1907) Johannsen sets out to answer the question, expressed in the 
title, in reaction to suggestions that hybridization could increase 
continuous variation and that this increased variation was hereditary. 
Provine takes this article to claim, that variability cannot be in­
creased beyond the F 2-generation (Provine 1971, p.99). N.Roll-Han-
sen (1986) criticizes Provine for misreading the article. He rightly 
argues that Johannsen merely claimed that there was no increase in 
fluctuating variability. Roll-Hansen proceeds to argue that Johannsen 
was well aware that recombination of stable factors could produce 
increased variability in a few generations. This may be the case, but 
it seems to me that such an awareness does not tally with 
Johannsen's repeated statement, that any conception of a natural 
selection of continuous variations is 'absolutely erroneous' (cf.Jo-
hannsen 1907, p.101 and p. 110). A major tenor of Johannsen's paper 
was - and this is again emphasized in his conclusion - that con­
tinuous variations are irrelevant for evolution. It should be added 
here that Johannsen was often concerned with 'soft inheritance' 
when he wrote about continuous variations. But it would be too fair 
an interpretation to say that Johannsen only means to reject 'soft 
inheritance' when he states that the theory of natural selection is 
done with. 
22. Johannsen coined these terms in 1909. 
23. Previously Bateson had repeatedly criticized the biometricians for 
the biological irrelevancy of their large-scale studies and their 
sophisticated statistics. Cf. Provine 1971. 
24. Cf. К. Pearson 1910. 
25. Although Johannsen himself did not seem to have any problems in 
considering his pure lines to be distinct species and the type to be 
the essence of the species. Cf. Roll-Hansen 1978b. 
26. This would be analogous to the thesis of the modern saltationists. A 
similar conception was in fact already known at the beginning of 
the century. Cf. V.L. Kellogg 1907. 
27. Cf. also chapter II of part I. 
28. Nickles 1980d. 
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29. Ibid. p. 292. 
30. Ibid. p. 293. 
31. Both the Mendelians and the biometricians were primarily interested 
in variation and the inheritance of variation, mainly because Darwin 
so conspicuously failed in providing an acceptable theory of heredity. 
But the theories of heredity, developed in both programs, simul­
taneously functioned as theories of evolution. Paradoxically, it was 
only after the 'synthesis4 of Mendel's theory of heredity and Dar­
win's theory of evolution that a clear distinction was made between 
the theory of heredity and the theory of evolution. 
32. E.g. W. Bateson 1909, p. 225 and p. 230. 
33. W. Bateson, 1904, p. 238 (note 2). 
34. Ibid., p. 238. 
35. These matters will be dealt with in chapter III. 
36. Nickles 1980d, p. 300. 
37. Shapere 1980a, p.68. 
38. Cf. Castle's experiments. Provine 1971, p. 109-114. 
39. Johannsen's distinction between genotype and phenotype was a pre­
condition for identifying the separating structures in the nuclei of 
the gametes (discovered by the cytologists and later to be dubbed 
chromosomes) as the possible material equivalents of the genotype. 
This identification was actually made by means of the chromosome 
theory of heredity. The chromosome theory explained the striking 
compatibility between the cytological behaviour of the chromosomes 
and the behaviour of the postulated factors in the Mendelian theory 
of heredity. In chapter ΙΠ I will argue that the Mendelians were 
practically forced to adopt the chromosome theory within their 
program because: a) an unexplained compatibility between two 
strongly related scientific fields constitutes a serious conceptual 
problem for the scientists involved, and b) the chromosome theory 
was the only reasonable explanation, at the time, of the com­
patibility between the strongly related fields of genetics and cytol­
ogy. So the Mendelians had to adopt the chromosome theory, for 
pursuit, notwithstanding the violation of several of the constraints 
of their program. 
40. Johannsen 1903, p. 8. 
41. E.g., both Galton and Bateson distinguished mutations and fluctuating 
variations, but Bateson made a sharp distinction while Galton saw 
mutations as 'intensified manifestations' of fluctuating variations. 
Apart from that, the concept of 'variation' has been problematic in 
many other respects. Cf. R. Schwartz Cowan 1972. 
42. Johannsen 1909. 
43. Cf. Carlson 1966. 
44. Cf. N. Roll-Hansen, 1978a and E.A. Carlson 1974. 
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45. Another distinction had to be made, viz. the distinction between 
development and transmission in genetics. Cf. Roll-Hansen 1978a. Cf. 
also chapter III. 
46. Roll-Hansen 1978b, p. 220 and Carlson 1966, p. 20. 
47. 'Unit-character' in Bateson's terminology. Cf. Carlson 1966, p. 23-38. 
48. Roll-Hansen 1978b., p. 217. 
49. Provine 1971, p. 105-108. Cf., e.g., Pearson 1910. 
CHAPTER III 
1. Cf. chapter II part I. 
2. Cf. Dunn 1965. 
3. Laudan 1977a, p. 54. 
4. Ibid., p. 53 
5. Cf. Mayr 1982. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Cf. Darden 1980. 
8. Cf. Darden 1976 and 1980. 
9. As I will show shortly, the cytologists did not have to search for 
long. Before 1900 some cytologists already speculated that the 
chromosomes formed the physical basis of heredity. They had only to 
discover yet that the behaviour of the chromosomes was perfectly 
compatible with the Mendelian theory of heredity. 
10. Cf. Mayr 1982. 
11. In section 3 I will return to the distinction between developmental 
and transmission genetics. 
12. Quote from Wilson 1900 in Dunn 1965, p. 53. 'Idioplasm' was Naegeli's 
term for the hereditary substance. 
13. Cf. Mayr 1982, p. 761. 
14. Weismann's doctrine of the 'continuity of the germ-plasm'. This 
doctrine was not generally accepted and the most controversial of 
the three theses mentioned. Other cytologists believed, e.g., that the 
chromosomes dissolve after cell-division only to be reassembled prior 
to the next cell-division. 
15. See for instance L. Darden 1976. Darden strongly suggests that these 
cytological discoveries, among other developments, made it possible 
for Hugo de Vries to rediscover Mendel's laws. 
16. Cf. e.g.. Lock 1906: "The intimate connection between Mendelism and 
cytology rests to a large extent upon the close parallel which exists 
between the behaviour of allelomorphic characters on the one hand 
and that of chromosomes on the other" (p. 306). 
17. Cf. L. Darden and N. Maull 1977. The chromosome theory constitutes 
an interfield theory between cytology and genetics. In my analysis a 
theory like the chromosome theory was more or less bound to be 
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developed in order to resolve the conceptual tension arising from 
the mere compatibility between cytology and genetics. I suspect that, 
in general, interfield theories will arise, when there is need for an 
explanation of the compatibility between strongly related scientific 
fields. 
18. This was Bateson's explanation of the chromosomal behaviour. 
19. Cf. Coleman 1970. 
20. Cf. Darden 1980. 
21. Cf. Carlson 1966. 
22. Cf. Allen 1975. Also Baxter 1976 on the preformation-epigenesis 
debate among the biologists of those days. 
23. Cf. Mayr 1982, p. 749. 
24. Cf. Brush 1978. 
25. Bateson 1907, p. 174. 
26. Cf. Coleman 1970. 
27. Cf. Roll-Hansen 1978a and Carlson 1974. 
28. Cf. Coleman 1970, p. 233. 
29. Ibid., p. 237. Italics added. 
30. Cf. Koestier 1959. 
31. As I have shown above, these philosophical, i.e. epistemologica!, 
reasons were partly based on scientific considerations, viz. the fear 
of an obsolete type of preformationism. All of the constraints of the 
Mendelian program should rather be seen, I believe, as based on a 
mixture of scientific and extra-scientific beliefs. 
32. Cf. Allen 1980. 
33. Cf. Allen 1978, p. 125-144. 
34. Ibid., p. 117. 
35. Ibid., p. 106. 
36. Ibid., p. 106 and 148ff. 
37. Ibid., p. 125. 
38. Laudan 1977a. 
39. In a similar vein Frankel argues that it was rational for some 
geologists to pursue the theory of continental drift, while the 
majority of the geologists had good reasons to reject it. See H. 
Frankel 1979. 
40. Nickles 1980d, p. 295. 
41. Cf. Roll-Hansen 1978a and Carlson 1974. 
42. For other opinions about Morgan's position in the Drosophila-group 
cf. Coleman 1970, Allen 1978 and Allen 1968. 
43. Nickles 1980d, p. 300-303. 
44. Quoted in Provine 1971, p. 123. 
45. Cf. Baxter 1976. If .however, hereditary factors and properties are 
identified, then it seems rather difficult to avoid the invocation of 
166 
some kind of homunculi. This, I argued, explains the aversion of the 
Mendelians to a materialistic interpretation of heredity. 
46. Cf. Wilson 1905 and Baxter 1976. 
47. Roll-Hansen 1978a, p. 173. 
48. Cf. H.J. Muller 1951. 
49. Cf. Roll-Hansen 1978a, p. 173-174. 
50. Recall that this constraint was already modified. Variations at least 
had to be qualitatively distinct to be evolutionarily relevant. And 
even this modified constraint was considerably weakened after the 
incorporation of Johannsen's discoveries within the Mendelian 
program. 
51. Cf. Allen 1968. 
52. Morgan 1909, p. 375. 
53. Cf. Allen 1968. 
54. Cf. Provine 1971, p. 108-114. 
55. Cf.L.Boon, 1983. 
56. H.Nillson-Ehle, 1908. 
57. Provine 1971, p.118. 
58. Cf.e.g., R.Pearl and F.Surface 1909; H.S.Jennings 1910; W.Johannsen 
1915 and R.Pearl 1917. 
59. Cf. East's discussion of one of his selection experiments: "It is very 
evident that the original stock was a mixed race containing sub-
races of various composition intermingled by hybridization. Selection 
rapidly isolated these sub-races....After this selection accomplished 
nothing". E.M.East 1910a, p. 199. Also quoted in Provine 1971, p.119. 
60. E.M.East 1910b. 
61. Cf. Provine 1971, p.119 and East 1910a. 
62. E.g. Pearl 1915,p.21. 
63. How difficult this was, is demonstrated by Castle's persistent 
defense of his 'contamination'-theory of unit-characters - to explain 
the inheritance of continuous variations - against the criticisms of 
the Drosophila-group. Cf. Carlson 1966. 
64. Cf. Carlson 1974, p. 42. 
65. Cf. Provine 1971, p. 129. 
CHAPTER IV 
1. The same rigidity of the heuristics gave the biometrica! program so 
much headway at the start. In contrast to the Mendelians the bio-
metricians knew precisely which problems they had to solve, how 
they had to solve them and which solutions they were to expect. But 
soon after this initial success it became clear that their program 
failed in indicating any new promising lines of research. In Urbach's 
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terminology the heuristics of the biometrie program was precise but 
too little resourceful and autonomous. Cf. chapter III part I. 
2. Cf. Boon 1983. 
3. Cf. Provine 1971. 
4. Pearl 1915. 
5. Ibid., p. 12. 
6. Ibid., p. 23. 
7. Ibid., p. 24. Italics added. 
8. Cf. Boon 1983, p. 100. 
9. Pearson 1904. 
10. I have already discussed Pearson's criticism of the Mendelian theory 
of heredity in chapter I. I hope the reader will find it clarifying 
rather than redundant that I repeat this discussion here in an ex-
tended version. 
11. Pearson 1909, p. 227. Italics added. 
12. Norton 1975b. 
13. Ibid., p. 548. Roll-Hansen (1987) has given another strong argument 
or the unreasonableness of Pearson's rejection of Mendelism. In 1902 
Weldon already described the experiment that he would accept as 'a 
clear proof that the 'view of the facts of regression is wrong' and 
this was exactly the experiment to be carried out by Johannsen. So 
the results of Johannsen's experiment should at least have been 
accepted as a serious anomaly for the the biometrie theory of 
regression, though I do not agree with Roll-Hansen that they should 
have been sufficient for the choice of Mendelism. 
14. Conversely, the Mendelians themselves ignored all suggestions of a 
multifactorial theory of continuous variations, because such a theory 
was incompatible with most of the constraints of their program. 
CHAPTER V 
1. Cf. chapter II part I for the distinction between internal and exter-
nal conceptual problems. 
2. Pearson 1908. 
3. Ibid., p. 93. 
4. Ibid., p. 93. 
5. Though some of the biometrical criticism was unjust (cf. e.g..Roll-
Hansen 1987), many pure line-experiments showed methodological 
deficiencies. Cf. the comments on Pearl's and Jennings' experiments 
in Pearson (1910) and Harris (1911). 
6. Muller 1951, p. 78. 
7. Roll-Hansen 1978a, p. 173-174. 
8. Cf. Castle's experiments. Provine 1971. 
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CHAPTER VI 
1. Norton and Pearson 1976, p. 159. 
2. Cf., e.g., Williams 1973. 
3. Fisher Box 1978, p. 186. 
4. Norton and Pearson 1976, p. 154. 
5. Ibid., p. 155. 
6. Ibid., p. 151. 
7. Provine 1971, p. 147. 
8. Fisher 1922, p. 322. 
9. Ibid. 
10. The Hardy-Weinberg law was formulated in 1908 independently by 
C.H. Hardy and W. Weinberg. The law is in fact a generalization of 
Mendel's segregation law. A simple way of explaining the law is the 
following. Assume that in a big population there are two alleles, A 
and a, for a given locus - the place of the gene on the chromosome 
- and that their frequencies are ρ for A and q for a. Assume also 
that males and females mate at random, then the distribution of 
genotypes in each next generation will be p^ AA + 2pqAa + q2 aa if 
there are no disturbing influences. This is the Hardy-Weinberg equi­
librium law. Forces that can disturb this equilibrium are, e.g., muta­
tion, selection and migration. 
11. Actually H.T.J. Norton was the first (cf. Provine 1971), but Norton's 
analysis provided only a start to the investigation of the effect of 
selection on the distribution of Mendelian factors. I am not sure 
whether Fisher knew of Norton's analysis, but a fact is that two 
other population geneticists, Haldane and Chetverikov, were highly 
influenced by Norton's tables. 
12. One of the biometricians' answers was that such blending would only 
occur if mating is completely random. "Regression (would) not quash 
all exceptional variation of the blending sort, if the exceptional 
offspring were bred among themselves." (Provine 1971,p. 34) or in 
Fisher's negative wording: "The important consequence of the blend­
ing is that, if not safeguarded by intense marital correlation, the 
heritable variance is approximately halved in every generation." 
(Fisher 1930, p. 5). As we have seen the biometricans' reasoning was 
clearly contradicted by Johannsen's experiments. 
13. Fisher 1930, p. 11. 
SUMMARY 
1. Cf. Briskman 1977. 
2. Cf. Williams 1973. 
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Stellingen 
1. Het argument, dat er geen synthese zou hebben plaatsgevonden van 
Darwin's evolutietheorie en Mendel's erfelijkheidstheorie, omdat 
Darwin's theorie geen specifieke erfelijkheidstheorie nodig zou 
hebben is gebaseerd op een onvolledige reconstructie van Darwin's 
evolutietheorie. 
vgl. Gerrit van Balen, 'The Darwinian synthesis: A criti-
que of the Rosenberg/Williams argument', te verschijnen 
in Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 
2. De indirecte strategie van het 'reculer pour mieux sauter' en het 
vermogen om zichzelf beperkingen op te leggen teneinde toekomstige 
wilszwakte te omzeilen zijn gelijkwaardige vormen van rationaliteit, 
die niet te onderscheiden zijn in 'perfect' en 'imperfect rationality'. 
vgl. J. Elster (1979), Ulysses and the sirens, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
3. Door het argumentum ad hominem tot methodologie te verheffen 
slaagt de kennissocioloog er nog niet altijd in zich van de boulevard-
journalist te onderscheiden. 
4. Vanuit evolutionair oogpunt is verliefdheid een snelle maar navenant 
onbetrouwbare graadmeter voor het te verwachten voortplantingssuc-
ces. 
5. De verzekeringsgeneeskundige onderscheidt zich van de klinisch ge-
neeskundige doordat hij in zijn oordeelsvorming de hoogste prioriteit 
behoort te verlenen aan een gedegen argumentatie tegenover belang-
hebbende en verzekeringsinstantie ter rechtvaardiging van zijn oor-
deel. 
6. 'Kennistheorieën .... vertonen een merkwaardige gelijkenis met de 
onscrupuleuze advertenties voor patentgeneesmiddelen die alle kwalen 
met één klap moeten verhelpen. Dat neemt niet weg dat zo'n middel 
wel eens goed kan zijn tegen een verkoudheid.' 
V. Nabokov, De gave, Amsterdam: Polak en Van Gennep, 
1977, p. 297. 

